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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY, 1 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
1 
1 
1 Supreme Court No. 34797 
-vs- 1 
1 
SCOlTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR, INC., ) 
an Idaho corporation; BART and ALANE 1 
MCKNIGHT, husband and wife; and DOES I ) 
through V, 1 
J 
Defendants-Respondents. 1 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, Idaho. 
HONORABLE RENAE J. HOFF, Presiding 
Jon M. Steele and Karl J. Runft, RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC, 
1020 W. Main St., Suite 400, Boise, ID 83702 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Susan E. Buxton and Tamrny A. Zokan, MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, 
CHARTERED, 950 W. Bannock St., Suite 520, Boise, ID 83702 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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Goodman 0 1  Company vs. Scottys Duro Buiit Generator, Bart Mcknight, Alane Mcknight 
User: HEIDEMAN 
Other Claims 
Date Judge 
911 912005 New Case Filed-other Claims Renae J. Hoff 
Summons Issued (3) Renae J. Hoff 
Filing: A1 - Civii Complaint, More Than $1000 No Prior Appearance Paid Renae J. Hoff 
'by: Steele, Jon M (attorney for Goodman Oil Company) Receipt number: 
0137672 Dated: 9/19/2005 Amount: $82.00 (Check) 
9/27/2005 Acceptance of service (fax) Renae J. Hoff 
10/3/2005 Acceptance of Service Renae J. Hoff 
10/12/2005 Answer Renae J. Hoff 
Filing: 12A - Civil Answer Or Appear. > $300, Not > $1000 No Prior Renae J. Hoff 
Appearance Paid by: Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke Receipt number: 
0141827 Dated: 10/12/2005 Amount: $52.00 (Check) 
10/24/2005 Notice Of Service of responses to pltf. first set of interrogatories request for Renae J. Hoff 
production of documents and request for admissions to scotty's duro-bilt 
and Bart McKnight 
1211 512005 Notice Of Service (fax) Renae J. Hoff 
111 712006 Notice Of Service Renae J. Hoff 
3/20/2006 Pltfs first supplemental responses Renae J. Hoff 
Notice Of Service Renae J. Hoff 
611 612006 Notice of change of address Renae J. Hoff 
Lodged memorandum in support of defendants' motion for summary Renae J. Hoff 
judgment and motion to dismiss 
Affidavit of Christopher Yorgason in support of defendants motion for Renae J. Hoff 
summary judgment and motion to dismiss 
6/29/2006 Defendants' Motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss Renae J. Hoff 
Notice Of Hearing Renae J. Hoff 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 08/03/2006 09:OO AM) Renae J. Hoff 
7/6/2006 Amended Notice Of Hearing 9-5-06 Renae J. Hoff 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 09/05/2006 03:OO PM) sum judg Renae J. Hoff 
8/22/2006 Request For Trial Setting Renae J. Hoff 
Motion for summary judgment on issues of liability Renae J. Hoff 
Brief in reponse to def mo for summary judgment & mo to Dismiss Renae J. Hoff 
Affidavit of Jon M Steele in support of mo sum judgment Renae J. Hoff 
Notice Of Hearing 10-2-06 9:00 Renae J. Hoff 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 10/02/2006 09:OO AM) Plt sum Renae J. Hoff 
judgment 
8/25/2006 Amended Notice Of Hearing 10-24-06 Renae J. Hoff 
Hearing result for Motion ~ear ing  held 0n'l0/02/2006 09:OO AM: Hearing Renae J. Hoff 
Vacated Plt sum judgment 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 10/24/2006 0 :00  AM) sum judg Renae J. Hoff 
8/28/2006 Response To Request For Trial Setting Renae J. Hoff 
-8/29/2006 Affidavit of tammy a zokan in support of defendants motion for summary Renae J. Hoff 
judgment and motion to dismiss 
800001 
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Page 2 of 5 Case: CV-2005-0009800-C Current Judge: Ronae J. Hoff 
Goodman Oil Company vs. Scottys Duro Built Generator, etal. 
Goodman Oil Company vs. Scottys Duro Built Generator, Bart Mcknight, Alano Mcknight 
User: HEIDEMAN 
Date 
Other Claims 
Judge 
Defendants reply in support of defendants motion for summary judgment Renae J. Hoff 
and motion to dismiss 
of car1 j withroe in support of defendants motion for summary judgment Renae J. Hoff 
and motion to dismiss 
Affidavit of Jon M Steele in support of Goddmans Motion to strike the Renae J. Hoff 
affidavit of Carl J Withroe in support of defendants motion for summary 
judgment and motion to dismiss 
Motion to strike the affidavit of Carl J Withroe in support of defendants Renae J. Hoff 
motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 09/05/2006 03:OO PM: Interim Renae J. Hoff 
Hearing Held Motion to Dismiss Dof McKnights Granted 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 10/24/2006 10:30 AM) sum judg Renae J. Hoff 
(CHANGED FROM 11 :00 AM TO 10:30 AM) 
Affidavit of Tammy Zokan in support of McKnights' motion for attorney foes Renae J. Hoff 
and costs 
Bart and Alane McKnight's memorandum of costs and attorney fees Renao J. Hoff 
Bart and Alane McKnight's brief in support of memorandum of costs and Renae J. Hoff 
attorney fees 
Order for Expedited Transcript Renae J. Hoff 
Order of Dismissal of Bart And Aiane MckNight Renae J. Hoff 
Case Status Changed: closed pending clerk action Renae J. Hoff 
Goodmans Motion for reconsideration of order Dismissing BArt & Alane Ronao J. Hoff 
Mcnight Individually 
Affidavit of Jon M Steele in support of Goodmans Mo for reconsideration Renae J. Hoff 
Goodmans Objection to def BArt & Alane McKnights memo of cost & atty Renae J. Hoff 
fee 
Brief in support of Goodmans mo for reconsideration of Order Dismissing Renae J. Hoff 
BArt & Alane Mcknight 
Brief in support of Goodmans objection to def BArt & Alane Mcknights Renae J. Hoff 
memo of costs &fees 
Notice Of Hearing 10-24-06 10:30 Renae J. Hoff 
Defednant's response in objection to plaintiffs motion for summary Renae J. Hoff 
judgment 
Second Affidavit of Tammy Zokan Renae J. Hoff 
Goodman's reply brief Renae J. Hoff 
Second Affidavit of Tammy Zokan in support of the McKnight's Renae J. Hoff 
memorandum of costs and fees 
Bart and Alane McKnight's reply in support of memorandum of costs and Renae J. Hoff 
attorney fees 
Defenant's response in objection to'plaintiffs,motion for reconsideration Renae J. Hoff 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 1012412006 10:30 AM: Interim Renae J. Hoff 
Hearing Held sum judg 
Order (Plt mo reconsider denied Renae J. Hoff 
Defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment Renae J. Hoff 
000002 
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Other Claims 
Judge 
Renae J. Hoff 
Date 
12/26/2006 Affidavit of Tammy A. Zokan inSupport of Defendant's Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
Renae J. Hoff 
Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 01/25/2007 09:OO AM) Summary 
Judgment 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Brief in Response to Def Second motion for summary Judgment (fax Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff Defendant's Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Tammy A. Zokan Regarding Notice of Errata Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Defendant's Notice of Errata 
Motion Granted - D's Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Tammy A Zokan in support of Mcknight amended memo of atty 
fees & costs 
BArt & Alane Mcknights amended memo of Costs and atty Fees 
BArt & Aiane McKnights Brief in support of amended memo of costs & atty 
fee 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Duro Biits Memorandum of costs & atty fees Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Duro Biits Brief in support of memo of costs and atty fees 
Notice Of Hearing 3-22-07 10:OO 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 03/22/2007 10:OO AM) memo of 
costs 
Order (summary judgment granted) Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff Brief in support of goodman's objection to defendant' memorandum of 
costs and attorney fees 
Goodman's motion for reconsideration of order granting defendant's 
second motion for summary judgment 
Brief in support of Goodman's motion for reconsideration of order granting 
defendant's second motion for summary judgment 
Affidavit of Jon Steele in support of goodman's motion for reconsideration 
of order granting defendant's second motion for summary judgment 
Defs respsonse in objection to plaintiffs feb 23 2007 motion for 
reconsideration 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Defs motion to strike 
Affidavit of Christina Fenner in support of defendants motion to strike 
Affidavit of Tammy A Zokan in support of defs motion to strike and defs 
reply in supp of memo of costslatty fees 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
DuroBiits and the Mcknights reply in supp of memo of costslatty fees 
Notice Of Hearing on Defs Motion to Strike 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff Objection to motion to strike and reply memo to defs response memo in 
supp of memo of atty fees/costs and replys to defs response in obj to 
plaintiffs 02-23-07 motion for reconsideration 
AffidaviffJon M Steele in support of objection .4,, 
onnnnn 
Renae J. Hoff 
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Date 
311 612007 
3/20/2007 
Other Claims 
Judge 
Defendants' reply in support of motion to strike Renae J. Hoff 
Motion to Deem Goodman's amended renewed objection to def. Bart and Renae J. Hoff 
Alane McKnights' memorandum of cost 
Affidavit of Jon Steele in support of motion to Deem Goodman's amended Renae J. Hoff 
renewed objection to defendants Bart and Aiane McKnights' memorandum 
of costs 
Motion to shorten time Renae J. Hoff 
Notice Of Hearing 3-22-07 Renae J. Hoff 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 03/22/2007 10:OO AM: Hearing Renae J. Hoff 
Heldlmo for reconsideration deniedlcosts & fees graned 
Order (Pit mo for reconsideration denied Renae J. Hoff 
Duro Bilts Amended Memorandum of Costs and Fees Renae J. Hoff 
Affidavit of Tammy Zokan in support of the Mcknights second amended Renae J. Hoff 
memo of costs 
Mcknights Second Amended Memorandum of Costs and Fees Renae J. Hoff 
Affidavit of Tammy AZokan in support of Duro-Biits amended memo of Renae J. Hoff 
costs & atty fees 
Goodman's Renewed Objection to Defendants Bart and Aiane McKnights' Renae J. Hoff 
Second Amended Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees Dated Aprii 5, 
2007, and Objection to Duro-Biit's Amended Memorandum of Costs and 
Attorney Fees Dated Aprii 5, 2007 
Goodman's Second Motion for Reconsideration of order granting Renae J. Hoff 
defednat's second motion for summary judgment 
Affidavit of Jon M Steeie in support of goodman's second motion for Renae J. Hoff 
reconsideration of order granting defendant's second motion for summary 
judgment 
brief in support of goodman's second motion for reconsideration of order Renae J. Hoff 
granting defendant's second motion for summary judgment 
Notice Of Hearing 7-26-07 Renae J. Hoff 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 07/26/2007 09:OO AM) Renae J. Hoff 
reconsideration 
6/1/2007 Defendants' Motion to strike plaintiffs second motion for reconsideration Renae J. Hoff 
Defendants' Memorandum in support of their motion to strike and response Renae J. Hoff 
in objection to plaintiffs May 14, 2007, second motion for reconsideration 
Notice Of Hearing on sefendants' motion to strike 7-26-06 Renae J. Hoff 
Defendants' Motion for entry of judgment Renae J. Hoff 
Affidavit of Tammy Zokan in support of defendants' motion for entry of Renae J. Hoff 
judgment 
Notice Of Hearing on defendants' motion for entry of judgment 7-26-07 Renae J. Hoff 
7/3/2007 Pltfs Notice of withdrawal of second motion for reconsideration Renae J. Hoff 
7/6/2007 Defs Memorandum of costs and Attys fees for costs and fees difinding Renae J. Hoff 
against Pits second Motion for Reconsideration 
Affidavit of Tammv A Zokan in s u ~ ~ o r t  of Defs memorandum of Attv fees Renae J. Hoff 
and costs 
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Other Claims 
Date Judge 
7/6/2007 Defs brief in support of memorandum of costs and atty fees Renae J. Hoff 
Notice Of Hearing on Defs Memo of costs and atty fees Renae J. Hoff 
7/26/2007 Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 07/26/2007 09:OO AM: Motion Renae J. Hoff 
Granted reconsiderationlmotn to strike 
8/7/2007 Order for atty fees & Costs$23,674.14 Renae J. Hoff 
10/16/2007 Brief in support of Pit Motn for entry of Judg Renae J. Hoff 
Motion for entry of Judg Renae J. Hoff 
Affidavit of Jon M. Steele in support of Motn for entry of judgment Renae J. Hoff 
10/19/2007 Hearing Scheduied (Motion Hearing 11/05/2007 11:OO AM) mo for entry Renae J. Hoff 
of judgment 
Notice Of Hearing 11-5-07 11 :00 Renae J. Hoff 
10/24/2007 Defendants' Motion to strike plaintiffs motion for entry of judgment Renae J. Hoff 
Defendants' Memorandum in support of their motion to strike and response Renae J. Hoff 
in objection to plaintiffs motion for entry of judgment 
Affidavit of Tammy Zokan Renae J. Hoff 
Notice Of Hearing on defendatns' motion to strike Renae J. Hoff 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 11/05/2007 11:OO AM) Renae J. Hoff 
PlaintiWs response to defendants' memorandum in support of their motion Renae J. Hoff 
to strike and reply to defendants' response in objection to plaintiffs motion 
for entry of judgment 
Defendants' reply to plaintiffs responselreply filed october 29, 2007 Renae J. Hoff 
Second Affidavit of Tammy Zokan in support of defendants' motion to strike Renae J. Hoff 
and objection to plaintiffs' motion for entry of judgment 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 11/05/2007 11 :00 AM) mo for entry Renae J. Hoff 
of judgment 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 11/05/2007 11:OO AM: Hearing Renae J. Hoff 
Vacated motion to strike - WITHDRAWN 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 11/05/2007 11:OO AM: Motion Renae J. Hoff 
Denied mo for entry of judgment 
Ordedjudgment is denied) Renae J. Hoff 
Appealed To The Supreme Court Renae J. Hoff 
Notice of appeal Renae J. Hoff 
Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court ($86.00 Directly to Supreme Renae J. Hoff 
Court Plus this amount to the District Court) Paid by: Steele, Jon M 
(attorney for Goodman Oil Company) Receipt number: 0279159 Dated: 
11/26/2007 Amount: $15.00 (Check) For: Goodman Oil Company (plaintiff) 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 279166 Dated 11/26/2007 for 100.00)(For Renae J. Hoff 
Clerk's Record) 
S C - Order Denying Motion to Consolidate Renae J. Hoff 
S C - Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Appeal Renae J. Hoff 
S C - Order Granting Motion for ~econsiderition Renae J. Hoff 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 313198 Dated 5/16/2008 for 450.00)(for Renae J. Hoff 
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JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
KARL J. F. RUNFT (ISB # 6640) 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1020 W. Main St., Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: 208 333-8506 
Facsimile: 208-343-3246 
Email: jmsteele@runftlaw.com 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
&-&qJhw, DDPUT' 
FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY, 1 
Plaintiff, 
1 
1 case NO&DS -4%m 
VS. 
1 
) COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR 
INC., an Idaho corporation; BART and 
Steele and Karl J. Run&, and for causes of action against Defendants, complains and alleges as 
follows: 
I. PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff is informed and believes that at the time of the incident which is the subject matter 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - Page 1 
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.:, i., 
of this litigation that Defendant Scotty's Duro-Bilt, Inc., ("Duro-Bilt"), was and is an 
Idaho corporation with its principal place of business in the County of Canyon, State of 
Idaho. 
2. Plaintiffis informed and believes that at the time of the incident which is the subject matter 
of this litigation that Defendants Bart and Alane McKnigHt, ("McKnight"), husband and 
wife, were and are residents of the County of Canyon, State of Idaho. 
responsible in some manner for the acts and omissions of their agent or employee or have 
some statutory or vicarious liabiity to Plaintiff. Plaintiffwill move this Court to allow 
amendments when the identities and roles of Doe Defendants become known. 
6. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the above named Defendants pursuant to and 
by virtue of Idaho Code 9 5-514 and other applicable laws and rules. 
7. Venue is proper in Canyon County pursuant to and by virtue of Idaho Code 9 5-404 and 
other applicable laws and rules. 
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111. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
8. On August 2, 1995, Defendant Duro-Bilt, the Blamires Family Trust, T.J. Forest, Inc., and 
the Plaintiff; Goodman Oil Company ("Goodman"), entered into a Property Owner Street 
Vacation Agreement ('Vacation Agreement") whereby the parties consented to the City 
of Nampa's vacation as public right-of-way of First Avenue South located between Blocks 
16 and 19 of Pleasants Addition to the City of Nampa, Canyon County, Idaho. 
a perpetual easement upon the vacated property for the purpose of access to and iiom their 
property. 
11. The parties also agreed to fully cooperate to ensure that the purpose and intent of the 
13. On August 3, 1995, Goodman submitted an application to the City for vacation of First 
Avenue South between 2nd Street South and 3rd Street South. 
14. On July 28,2004, Goodman entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement with James R. 
Wylie ("Wylie") whereby Goodman agreed to sen and Wylie agreed to purchase 
Goodman's property adjoining First Avenue South. 
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15. A true and correct copy of the Purchase and Sale Agreement is attached to this Complaint 
as Exhibit B. 
16. Closing of the Purchase and Sale Agreement was contingent upon the City completing the 
vacation of Fist Avenue South. 
17. The Purchase and Sale Agreement provided for a purchase price of Six Hundred Thousand 
($600,000.00) Dollars. 
Wylie. 
20. The existing constructed portion of First Avenue South to be vacated is 40 feet in width 
back of curb to back of curb. 
24. Title to the vacated property will be subject to an easement reserved by the City for 
utilities. 
25. On August 16,2004, the Vacation Ordinance ("Ordinance No. 3374'3 was approved by 
the Council and the Mayor. 
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26. At the Council meeting held August 16,2004, the Mayor declared Ordiiance No. 3374 
passed and directed the City Clerk to record it as required by law. 
27. The Mayor, after signing O r d i i c e  No. 3374 delivered the Ordinance to the City Clerk, 
surrendering possession and control of the Ordinance to the City Clerk on August 16, 
2004. 
28. On or about August 17,2004, the City Clerk delivered Ordinance No. 3374 to the Idaho 
Press Tribune with instructions that the Ordinance be published on August 23,2004. 
29. Sometime after August 17, 2004, but prior to August 23, 2004, Defendant McKnight 
contacted the City and attempted to verbally withdraw Duro-Bit's consent to the vacation 
of First Avenue South 
30. McKnight is a fiiend of the Mayor. 
31. McKnight phoned the Mayor, and the Mayor agreed to veto Ordiiance No. 3374. 
Council, signed by the Mayor and City Clerk on August 16,2004, and then vetoed by the 
Mayor on September 2,2004, is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit C. 
35. On September 3,2004, one day aAer the Mayor's veto, Defendants sent a letter to the City 
attempting to withdraw Defendants' consent to the vacation of First Avenue South 
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36. Defendants did not inform Goodman that Duro-Bilt had attempted to withdraw its consent 
to the vacation. 
37. A true and accurate copy of Duro-Bilt's letter is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit D. 
38. At no time prior to the Mayor's veto of O r d i i c e  No. 3374, did Defendants give 
Goodman notice of Duro-Bilt's attempt to withdraw its consent to the vacation of First 
Avenue South. 
41. Goodman has instituted proceedings against the City of Nampa to have First Avenue South 
vacated by Writ of Mandamus. 
42. The Preemptory Writ of Mandamus was granted on August 7,2005, in case 04-10007, 
44. Goodman re-alleges all prior allegations set forth in this Complaint. 
45. The Vacation Agreement is a contract between Goodman and Duro-Bilt. 
46. Duro-Bilt breached the Vacation Agreement. 
47. The attempted withdrawal of conserlt to the vacation of Fist Avenue South is a breach of 
Defendants' obligations set forth in the vacation Agreement. 
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48. Defendants' have breached the Vacation Agreement in the following manner: 
a. Their obligation to consent to the vacation of First Avenue South; 
b. Their obligation to grant and convey a perpetual easement upon the vacated street 
for the purpose of access to and from the parties' properties; 
c. Their obligation to M y  cooperate to ensure that the purpose and intent of the 
Vacation Agreement is accomplished; 
to the amount of property each party owns; and 
E Their promise that the Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit 
of the parties and their respective successors, assigns heirs, and personal 
of Goodman's property. 
51. Goodman has been damaged by Defendants' breach of the Vacation Agreement in an 
amount to be proven at trial. 
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V. COUNT TWO - TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH 
PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT 
52. Goodman re-alleges all prior allegations set forth in this Complaint. 
53. A contract existed between Goodman and Wylie for the purchase and sale of Goodman's 
property adjoining First Avenue South. 
54. Defendants had knowledge of the contract between Goodman and Wylie. 
amount to be proven at trial. 
VI. COUNT THREE - NEGLIGENT INTERFERENCE WITH 
59. The Defendants knew or should have known of the existence of this economic relationship. 
60. By notifying the City of Nampa of the withdrawal of their consent to the vacation of First 
Avenue South, the Defendants disrupted Goodman's relationship with Wylie causing the 
sale to fail. 
61. The Defendants' failed to act with reasonable care. 
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62. Goodman has suffered injury resulting from the Defendants' disruption with Goodman's 
economic relationship in an amount to be proven at trial. 
W. COUNT FOUR - INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH 
PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE 
63. Goodman re-alleges all prior allegations set forth in this Complaint. 
65. The Defendants knew of the existence of this economic relationship. 
66. By notifying the City of Narnpa of the withdrawal of their consent to the vacation of First 
Avenue South, the Defendants disrupted Goodman's relationship with Wiley causing the 
. ' sale to fail. 
' . 
67. The Defendants' intended to and did disrupt this relationship. 
VIII. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
69. Goodman hereby demands a jury trial on all issues triable to a jury. Goodman does not 
stipulate to a six (6) person jury or a jury consisting of any number of persons less than 
twelve (12). 
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WHEREFORE, PlaintBGoodman requests the following relief: 
1.  Entry of a Judgment against Duro-Bilt in an amount to be proven at trial; 
2. Entry of a decree requiring Duro-Bilt to specifically perform all of its contractual 
obligations set forth in the Vacation Agreement; 
3. For an award of costs and attorneys fees againit Duro-Bilt pursuant to the 
DATED this 1 6 day of September, 2005. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada 1 
CHARLES CONLEY, after beiig duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: 
IN WITNESS WHERJ?OF, said Petitioner/PlaintBhas set his hand and seal the day and 
year &st above written. 
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY 
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2.cGk5 ])a PROPERTY OWNER 
STREET VACATION AGREEMENT 
This Agreement is entered into by and between SCOTTY'S DURO-BUILT 
GENERATOR, INC.; BLANlRES FAMILY TRUST; T.J. FOREST, INC.; and GOODMAN 
OIL COMPANY, an Idaho corporation, collectively referred to herein as "the parties." 
W I T N E S S E T H :  
Recorder; 
WHEREAS, BLAMIRES FAMILY TRUST owns real property described as a 
portion of Lots 1, 2, and 3, Block 16, Pleasants Addition to the City of Nampa, County of 
WHEREAS, GOODMAN OIL COMPANY owns the real property located at Lots 
4,5, and 6 of Block 16, Pleasants Addition, and Lots 7, 8, 9, 11, and 12 of Block 19, Pleasants .. .. 
w iV 
n a 
rl 
0 
0 
0 I 
R 
V1 
PROPERTY OWNER STREET VACATION r 
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2 EXHIBIT A 
Addition, all in the City of Narnpa, County of Canyon, State of Idaho, as designated on the 
official plat filed within the office of the Canyon County Recorder; and 
WHEFSAS, the parties' property abo~e-described surrounds and adjoins First 
Avenue South as it divides Blocks 16 and 19 of the Pleasants Addition in the City of Nampa, 
County of Canyon, State of Idaho. 
NOW THEREFORE, the parties, for good and valuable consideration the receipt 
of which is hereby acknowledged, agree as follows: 
That the parties consent to the City of Nampa's vaca 
Blocks 16 and 19 of Pleasants Addition above-desc 
on Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
2. That the parties grant and convey among themselves, their agents, 
licensees, and assignees a perpetual easement upon vacated First Avenue South for the purpose 
of access to and from their property from both Second and Third Street located in Nampa, 
Canyon County, Idaho. The actual location of the easement shall be at the discretion of 
owner of the vacated property upon the City's vacation of First Avenue South as de 
herein. 
3. That the parties shall fully cooperate to ensure that the pu 
of this Agreement shall be accomplished. The parties shall execute a formalized agreement 
recognizing the rights and obligations of the parties upon the City of Nampa's vacation of First 
.. .. 
Avenue South as described herein. The parties shall equally share in the maintenance of said 
easement in proportion to the amount of property they own which adjoins First Avenue South 
as described herein. 
PROPERTY 0 WNER STREET VACATION AGREEMENT - 2. 
4. That the parties shall hold each other harmless and indemnify the other 
parties from their negligent acts and that of their agents in maintaining and using said access 
easement. 
5. This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the 
parties and their respective successors, assigns, heirs, and personal representatives. 
SCOTTY'S DURO-BUILT GENERATOR, INC. 
T.J. FOREST, INC. 
I L ~  , 31 
Date 
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY '.. 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
) ss. 
County of AljlR 
On this z % a y  of before me, the undersigned, a Notary 
Public in and for said sfate, McKNIGHT, known to me to be the 
person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that he 
executed the same. 
IN WJTNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official 
seal the day and year in this certificate first above written. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
) ss. 
County o f J 4 B &  
On this &'day of /?U~(CSI , 1995, before me, the undersigned, a Notary 
such trust executed the 
.. . 
Commission Expires: &&6VJ,j' 
PROPERTY OWNER S W E T  VACATION AGRE- - 4. 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
) ss. 
County of ) 
o n  this3/JLYof & , 1995, before me, the undersigned, a Notary 
Public in and for said state, p e r s a y  &peared KURT BATEY, known to me to be the 
President of T.J. FOREST, INC., which is the corporation that executes this instrument and the 
person who executed the instrument on behalf of said corporation, and acknowledged to me that 
such corporation executed the same. 
IN WITBESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official 
seal, the day and year in this certificate first above written. 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
) ss. 
County of ,9 D A  ) 
PROPERTY OWNER STRJ3ET VACATION AGREEMENT - 5. 
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C0W)ntlERCIALIINVESFMiFMT REAL ESTATE 
PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT 
THIEIS A LCQAUI PIWINO C C ~ C T .  ~EHIAE BIG&I(O, IUD THE ENTIRE DOCUME~I~. INC~UDING THE Buu.lllnuiP, 
OENERILL PRINTW YflOVISIONS dNC ATTACliNSEXTS. C YOU W V E  AN? OVESTON9 BEFORE fiIONWO. O~rn+.aL, 
CONJULT TOUR A n O R N E I  ANDICR BCCQUNTANT. 
rD # 04-07 7 
1. RE4L ESTATE OFFICES: 
DATE U y  28 ,2004  -- 
Listing h ~ e n c y  & R . . P ~ ~ I e s  -- Sulling Agency iyichensr lnvesr@.enrs. LIP 
Listing Agent BaP?Ma- Phone: Y3-4090 Sslliny Agent L-loyf&hener .- Phone: &$tics3202 
2. WPRESENPhTlON COWFIRMATIOPE: 
Cheuk one (1) box in Section 1 below and one (1) box in S ~ c t ~ o n  2 below 'to confirm that in this transaction. t h e  
brokeregels1 involved had Pha tollowing relationshipls~ with thu 8UYER(SI snd SELLERIS). 
Section 1 : 
A. Th& bfoker working with rhe SUYER!St is acting ss an AGENT for the BUYEH(S1. 
a 8. Tho broker working with ?he BUYER(S1 is acling as a LIMITED DUAL AGENT for the BkJYER(S). a C. The broker working wirh the BUYERCS) is acting es a NONAGENT for the BUYER(S1. 
a A. The broker working wirh the SELLERIS) is actitrg a8 aa AGENT for the S'ELLE 
I7 6. Tho broker workingwith the SEUER(St is acting a6 a LIMITED DUAL AGENT 
broker working wit$ the SELLER(S1 is acting as a NONAGENT for the SEI' 
8ig.nlng this dacumenr confirms that he or *he has rcelved; road and und 
nd he8 elected the ralationihip confirmsdet~ove. In udditlon,' each piyrtycon 
ca policy was rnad~euailabls t c i  ins~ection and reviwuv. EACH PARTY 
"CUST0MER"ND IS NOT REPRESENTED BY 4 BROKER UNLESS THERE I$ A SIGNED WFliTEN 
T FOR AGENCY REPRESENTATION. 
~~ ~ . 
3. BUYER; James A. Wylie or A&ns -- --- 
IHereinatter oelled 'Buyer" agrees to puruhase and ale bniefsigned Seller agrees fo sell the following described 
. 
real estere herelnsftcr referred to w 'Propwry." 
4. PROPERTY ADDRESS 4ND LEQAL DESCRIPTION: The prnparfv commonly known 8s TEJD Second Street 
.&mp,qJ&Q.J+l- 1.22 acre@ City of m~~ Counrv of .Caw. fdaho !@gaily described as: Tamed-bx 
i!a(s Dollars l6.6.0~03 
y Earnest Money deposit. , . . . 
ance of tha purehsse price to be p 
. . . . . . - . . 
a) 8uyer hereby deposlrs 88 E ~ r i W s t  Money and 
1$LOQQl,evldenced by: 0 Cesh Check a Cas 
b) Eorie8t Money ro be'depa%ite$ in rrust sccoun 
@!&#3rnonts Trw! for the benefit of the parties. her 
INCLUDED ITZlM15: A l l  atteohed floor caverings. 
equlPmen1, attached plurnblnu,. bathroom snd lis 
- - ~ ~ - - - . , - .  
dvors, window &veringi exterior trees. plants or shubbery, water hearing apparatus end f i n  
cs equipment. awnings, vantilating, wcl lag and heating systems, builr-in and "drop-In" raoges 
er rangeat, fuel ranks and Ifrig8tiopl flnurss and usuiornent, and anv end all. i f  env. water and .wafer rinhts. 
, . " . .  
and erly and an, i f  env. dirchecr end ditch rights that are appunenanf rhereio that are now on or used in connaction 
wirh the prernisss shell be Included in the sale unless crtnsrvvise provided herein. 
Other Items specifically included in this sob: &&.er:d #20 
--- 
lrems apeclficdly oxcluded In the seie: 5.6 !/B ana $26 
Buyer end 8olsr aoknohhd Ipt 01 W P ~  ef this pew, whio 
I Soi.#@r's initial1 
1 Adr Catntr Atsuslatruri d.dprd lor  ond s 
LI~.I. C~*imlsr!crn who a., i8 ie n.mbw at the NIlim.1 i~*oti8t!*n s! REALTOC6R. 
PROPERn ADPRESS: T B D - S f c c u . !  South & Namoa BL?d,-Nam-ua. Idaho 1D #0-4:0.71 
-- 
8. ADDITIONAL TERMS. CONDfllONS, AND/OR CONTINGENCIES: The closing of this transaorion IS contlngen1 upon 
written $adsfaction or walver of tha foilowing c~ndirionz: 
- - 2 & D f i 0 9 ~ ~  -- 
-1.!r.oyj,aed bv Seller and bv Ms!." 
-- 
,2, Title R w - b y S . e & g r .  ----. ---- 
~ L @ U J L ~ ~ .  . ,. , ,... - - va~e.!iqn of M . , e e  .$' ,
Buyer wlll have unril w ! e , & r  scceotanos to satisfy or woive all conditions andlor contingencies. 
9. TITLE COMBANQICLOSING AGENCY: eJ Tho partics agree thar Cand.~L\merica Transnqti,~n Title Company shall 
- -. ~~- ~ 
provide env required Titlo Polloy and preliminary roport afnommitment, b) The Closing ~ ~ o n i y  for ih is 'irensscrion 
shall be ~ c , o  Tronsnarion Titlq. 
Each party agrees to f the Closing Agency's fee. 
10. T~TLE INSURANCE: for d standard Owner's ni Purchaser's Title Policy pren~ium In this transcrcrior. 
Purchaser's Extandcd e Title PO~ICV requested 0 Yes No. Addi~ional Premium rc be paid by a. Tit p k= 
tompanv to plovido all parries to this Agreement with e preliminary Tiire Repon or1 or before 1-5 davs from 
i%.WUZQ. Buyer shell have until .55dd~y2 to obiecl in wfiting to the condltbn of the jirle as set forth in the report. 
ritten objocrion to rhe T~tle, Soller shall have a reasonable tlme, not r o  exceed. 
defect$ of title or provide aifirrnqtiye Till? ln$vence coverage. ~ c l y e r m a y  elect, ss:lt$,. 
lnate this'Agra~emenrcr~curu the defects at $uyer's.ex~ense, or proceed'tpclo~lng. .: 
Uefects:. If Buyer d o e ~ n u t , s v .  objecr!, Fuyiir shallbe~deemod to haveaccepted t h a  ' ' 
event Buyer elocrs t? teiminare rhe ~ ~ r e d m e n t  due r o u n ~ a i l ? f ~ c t o r y  titic . . . ,. co,nditiors, . . 
he returnof ,ali..refunditble.dep@sir6 made . , by him but that such return ot deposits shall.,, 
bthbr remedies a ~ ~ ~ i l a b l ~ t o  Bbyer. Tho Title ~ 0 m p a n ~ ' i h s l l  deliver the final T i~ le  
ssible efter cfosing. 
escrowlcollqcrion is involved, rhen the escrow1colleotian holder shall be 
of escrow!colluclion fees. 
1Z.CLOSlNO DATE; On or befoce tho closing date. Buyer and Seller shall deposit with the Ciasing Agoncy all funds 
and inaluments necesrdry to complete fhe sale. The closing dale shall be nu later than Lday-s from r e m g t @ M  
.wDSkQm& "Closing Dsto" means the date on which all documenrs ere either recorded or aocapted by an 
e e c r o w k o l i ~ r ~ o n  agency end the sale prvcaads are av~ilsble to Seller. 
rovided. that the amount ro b e  pqld tp, Seller's Broker: shall no 
:lar and b y e r  spe&ifi~ally &knowledgo and agree rhar i f  Selle 
damages. 'such shell be Seller's sole and ewoiuslvs romedy, and 
e. It Seller siems to proceed under (21, the holder of  the Earnest 
by Sellor's Broker on behalf of Seller and Buyer related to the 
s of bfok~rage fees, tiile insurance, egorow fees, credit repoq 
fees, inspection f w s  and attorney's fees, with any baiance of  tne Earnest Money to be held pending resolurion of 
tho matter, K S d l v r  dsf9!&~, having approved said raip and fails to consummate the same es herein agrcod. 
E u Y ~ ? ' ~  Earnest Money depoglt r;hail be returnod to himlhcr and Seller shall Day for the aoscs of ri!le insursnee, 
escrow fees, credlr report fees. inwection fees, btakerage fees end arromey's fuss, If any. This shall not be 
considered a3 a walver by  Buyer of anwothor lawful rioht if remedv to which euver mav be entitled. 
Buyer and ~ell'or 
Buymr'm inltids I P Soilvr'a lnitiels 
1."-'C$llV CI)DD"SC-TO # W W  U-IVTld .rm---*l-nrgm nlv.:'. N1,#. lI..\. I d . , , ,  ,EI * 91'271 
13 .  
~ u n ~ u c r  a rcrir: II h ~ ~ n a r  party lnlrlsras oi%iC8nos any arolrrerion or legal action or proceedings, whlch are, in 
5nv way conn~arnd with ?hi3 Ar~rmamAnP, the prwaiiing parlv shall be enetled to recovqr from tho ncn.provaillng 
uorty rearanebls coats ei%rl n i l v~ t i r v ' r  r ~ n * ,  ; * , t  I c ~ * l i a ~ ~  * ~ t a . l r  vuvt r  w t r l  rues 01, u p p a l .  
16. dARNE$T MONW DISPUTEIINTSWPLEAC)ERi Notwirhstend~ng bny ttfmjnoricn of rhis contract, Buyw~ a ~ i J  Sallar 
anrw that in I ~ P  @van? nf anv cnntrvvvrrv rooardinq rho E.m.n+ M o n o v  "nrt thinon o< v n ~ , , ~  hnlrl hy R m l r - r  -- 
closing sguncy, unless nrurual wt.ittv~i oirirul;~iu~~s dra rs?ctrivad by the holder of rhe Eornesr Money and things 01 
value. Broker or closing agenav shell not be ro~uirnrl rn inkn any nctlon hut may await *ny procooding, o. 
Broker's or ciosino bornsv'n ontion nnd noln rlhnmrinn m-v intsrnlr*A -11 p x i t i o ~  and J . p . 4 ~  r r . l y  trjvtiuyu u r  thinso 
or v r luu  1:nu v oourr of oompotonr lurladier~an 070 snn i l~e~over  COU? costs and reasonable attoo iwy's lavs. 
77,TlTW CONV%YANCE: Tltlo of Seller Is to be ccnvevad bv warranrv deed or d p ~ d ,  rind ii. to h p  
marke%olio and ivruurwblu vxvwpl lor rights roeorvod In tcdoral potunrs. building or use rkstrrGttons, builrliny b ? i J  
zonina roclulptlon~ 3-d wdinnnnnn n P  nny gnvn-nmnnral i , m i r ,  rlqhrr o< v,n,r .nd r.s-tr+-., ,cu rv~rlr~iui.ud vr r u e s r d  
and onv orher liens, encumhrannas nr Nawnts anproved ~y B u ~ r r .  
'lU RISY OF I n R R -  Shoroid the Prrrpeny P* ma~orioliy domagsd by Or. ~r mhcr sour. p r i ~  ro u l e a i n ~ ,  u n l o ~ *  O v r c l ~  11-a 
taken Posses*on prior to ctosind by Agreement. this Agreement shail be voideble at the option of 8uyer. 
between the panics end no werrantles, including any warranty of habirabliity, Aerecrnonts or representations have 
been made or shail be binding upon either party ,vnIess herein 6et forth. 
24. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE IN THIS AGREEMENT. 
28, ACCEPTANCE: Buyer's offer i, mode subject lo the acceptance of Sellcr on or before (Cat01 w . c i a , y ,  July 28, 
2M4 end ITimv) 5:90. If Seller does nor accept th~s  Agreement within the timo specified, the enrire Earnest 
Money shell bo refunded to B u v ~ r  on demand. 
~B.OTME~TERMS~ 1.  hi#-f-a 7031 Fxnh&~~n,fnr horh B u ~ e ~ p n d  Betlrrr, bo!b-$? ?p:co~oroto., .
kSScjlor: due a7 dos!pct. 
DDENDUM IS): . ISpecify number of Buyer 
Buyer 5lgnakro /fi jb/.w\/L . . _ 8uyor Signature -- 
Buyer (Print ~ems)/ . Iliur 
- - 
49 L. V d \  
. - - --. Buyer (Print Name) - 
ueto f - Tlme I Pho%e# Obto Time - Phone# 
Addrosa 
-. Addross 
City - - State State Zi P 
- br of COPY ef tnis pago. whit 
Buvrr'r hitid8 I 
11111 #Y,T*~  Ipnmn n n  om,iou~.a ur inn nrm WOCIUDI~I f Soilor'w lnirials ( 
PROPEarY ADDRESS: D O  Second Svem Sou&; Narnpa Blvd. Namp-a,Ja 10 # 04-071 
28. SELLER'S 5IGNATURES. 
On thig deto, IiWe hereby approve and accepr the tranuaclion >;at forth :n the ebovv Agrsemenr end agros to carry 
out aft tho terms thereof On the pan of ths Seller. IIWe turthor acknowledge remipr of a ,rue copy of this 
Agraornont signed by both perties. 
C-WE 21 revised Augusf 1999 
Psge 4 ot 4 
AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF NAMPA, IDAHO, VACATING lST AVENUE, 
SOUTH BE- zrn STREET SOUTH AND 3RD STREET SOUTH IN THE CITY OF 
NAMPA, CANYON COUNTY, IDAHO, SUBJECT TO AN ACCESS AND UTILITY 
EASEMENT RESERVED THEREON, AND ANDDIRECTING THE CITY ENGWER TO 
ALTER 'l"Ht3 USE AND AREA MAP ACCORDINGLY. 
Nampa was read before the City Council; and 
WHEREAS, on October 2, 1995, the Second Reading of the above described 
vacation Ordinance was read before tbe City Council; and 
WHBREAS, on October 16, 1995, the Third Reading of the above 
vacation Ordinance Was tabled by the City Council because the necessary 
access tbrough the area by the Fire D e p m e n t  had not been obtained; and 
WHEREAS, the access and utility easement is acceptable to the Fise 
Department as to location and dimension. 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY 'QE MAYOR AND 
COUNCZL OF TEE CITY OF NAMPA, IDAHO: 
Section 1: That lST   venue South between zND Skeet South and 3RD Street 
South in the City of Nampa, Idaho be and the same is hereby vacated, such vacation subject 
to the fo110wing described access and util i ty easement wJich is hereby reserved on the 
vacated property, to-wit: 
See Exhibit A attached hereto and, by this reference, incorporated 
herein as if set forth in full. 
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Section 2: That the City Engineer is hereby instructed and directed to alter 
the Use and Area Map in accordance with the above Ordinance. 
6th DAY OF PASSED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NAMPA, IDAHO, THIS - 
a11cp&.-, 2004. 
APPROVED BY THE MAYOR OF THE CITY OF NAMPA, IDAHO, THIS '6th DAY 
OF Auqust: , 2004. 
State ofIdaho ) 
mthLI /bn3dav 
a Notary Public, ppers andl M4 
C k  
known 
or identified to me to be the M a p  and City Clerk, n~g&eIy, of flhe C i t y w w h o  
executed the imtmment oq,the person that executed the instmmmt on behalf of said corporation, 
and aoknowledge to me,@at such capomtion e x d  the same. 
LEGAT., DESCRIPTION FOR 
VACATION OF FRST AVENUE SOUTH 
and Third Street South 

city of Nampa 
i - i 
DUROBILT '' 
STARTERS ALTERNATORS * REGULATORS * BATTERIES 
j 1st Ave. South P.0. BOX 904 b Nampa, Idaho 83653-0904 FAX 208 1466-7023 TEL 208 1466-7614 
City of Nampa, Office of the Mayor 
31 1 3'* Street South 
Nampa, ID 83651 
September 3,2004 
Attention: All Nampa City Officials 
In 1995 an application was sought to vacate 1'' Avenue South in Nampa, Idaho for 
development of the surrounding area. Property owners were contacted and an agreemellt 
was signed clearing the way for development of the area. The original idea behind the 
agreement was to transplant property owners to other properties opening this block for 
future development. The idea was cleared to a certain point and then drop without being 
s 1 eloper wants to resurrect the issue of vacating 1'' Avenue South, 
but development plans have changed dramatically. N o  longer are all property o wners 
has grown to where it has 
industrial & agricultural v 
- 
traffic. 
Once again, I am not in favor of vacating 1'' Avenue South. To restrict this street would 
cripple my business, frustrate customers and become a traffic hazard. It is my 
understanding that all property owners must be in agreement on such action. I am not in 
agreement. Please dismiss action on vacating Is' Avenue South. 
Bart h K n i g h t  ,' 
President / Owner 
JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
KARL J. F. RUNFT (ISB # 6640) 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 333-9496 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
GOODMAN O E  COMPANY, 1 
Petitioner, 
1 ) CASE NO. CV 04-10007 
1 
VS. 1 
This Court has duly found and adjudged that Petitioner is entitled to this 
Peremptory Writ of Mandamus compelling Nampa Respondents in the above case to 
publish Ordinance #3374. 
Now, therefore I command that you, City of Nampa, Mayor Tom Dale and Diana 
Lambing, in her capacity as City Clerk, publish Ordinance #3374 in accordance with the 
PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDAMUS- Page 1 
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applicable law and do also command that you make known to me on or before fourteen 
days after the service of this writ, that you have executed this Peremptory Writ of 
Mandamus. 
h o c ~ ; ~  
DATED this *day of July, 2005. 
I PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDAMUS- Page 2 
OOOORS 
CERTWICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 8 day o 
correct copy of the foregoing PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDAMUS was served upon 
opposing counsel as follows: 
Christopher E. Yorgason 
Moore Smith 
225 N. 9th, Suite 420 
Boise ID 83702 
A US Mail 
- Personal Delivery 
Facsimile 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC - Personal Delivery 
1020 W. Main St. Suite 400 F a c s i m i l e  
Boise, ID 83702 
PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDAMUS- Page 3 
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CHRISTOPHER E. YORGASON # 5844 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHARTERED 
Attomeys at Law 
225 North 9th Street, Suite 420 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 33 1-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202 
Email: cev@,msbtlaw.com 
.. 
OCT 1 2 2005 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
G USOG, DEPUTY 
Attomeys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
Plaintiff, ) Case No. CV 05-9800 
) 
V. 1 
) ANSWER 
SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR, ) 
INC., and Idaho corporation; BART and 1 
ALANE MCKNIGHT, d wife; and ) 
DOES I through V. 1 
) 
Defendants. 
& Turcke, Chartered, and by way of Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
("Complaint"), admit, deny and allege as follows: 
INTRODUCTION 
The following defenses are not stated separately as to each claim for relief or allegation of 
the Complaint. Nevertheless, the following defenses are applicable, where appropriate, to any 
ANSWER - 1 
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ORIGINAL 
and all of Plaintiffs claims for relief. Duro-Bilt, in asserting the following defenses, does not 
admit that the burden of proving the allegations or denials contained in the defenses is upon it, 
but, to the contrary, asserts that by reason of said denials, and by reason of relevant statutory and 
judicial authority, the burden of proving the facts relevant to many, if not all of the defenses and 
affirmative defenses and the burden of proving the inverse of the allegations contained in many, 
if not all, of the defenses and affirmative defenses is upon Plaintiff in this action. 
11. SECOND DEFENSE 
Duro-Bilt denies each and every allegation contained in Plaintiffs Complaint not 
specifically admitted in this Answer. 
1. Duro-Bilt admits the 
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein and, 
therefore, denies the same. 
IV. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
5. In answer to paragraph 5 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt admits this Court has 
subject matter jurisdiction over this action. 
ANSWER - 2 
6.  In answer to paragraph 6 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt admits that this Court has 
personal jurisdiction over the Defendants in this action. 
7. In answer to paragraph 7 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt admits that venue is proper 
in Canyon County. 
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
8. In answer to paragraph 8 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt admits only that it entered 
10. In answer to paragraph 10 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt admits only that the 
Vacation Agreement speaks for itself. 
11. In answer to paragraph 11 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt admits only that the 
14. In answer to paragraph 14 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt is without knowledge or 
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein and, 
therefore, denies the same. 
ANSWER - 3 
15. In answer to paragraph 15 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt is without knowledge or 
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein and, 
therefore, denies the same. 
16. In answer to paragraph 16 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt admits only that the 
Purchase and Sale Agreement speaks for itself. 
17. In answer to paragraph 17 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt admits only that the 
20. In answer to paragraph 20 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt is without knowledge or 
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein and, 
therefore, denies the same. 
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein and, 
therefore, denies the same. 
26. In answer to paragraph 26 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt is without knowledge or 
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein and, 
therefore, denies the same. 
ANSWER - 4 
27. In answer to paragraph 27 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt is without knowledge or 
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein and, 
therefore, denies the same. 
28. In answer to paragraph 28 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt is without knowledge or 
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein and, 
therefore, denies the same. 
paragraph 29 of the Complaint. 
30. Duro-Bilt denies the allegations contained in paragraph 30 of the Complaint. 
3 1. In answer to paragraph 3 1 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt admits only that it phoned 
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein and, 
therefore, denies the same. 
34. In answer to paragraph 34 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt is without knowledge or 
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein and, 
therefore, denies the same. 
ANSWER - 5 
35. Duro-Bilt denies the allegations contained in paragraph 35 of the Complaint. 
36. In answer to paragraph 36 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt adinits that it had no 
discussions with Goodman regarding the vacation for several years. 
37. Durn-Bilt admits the allegations contained in paragraph 37 of the Complaint. 
38. In answer to paragraph 38 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt admits that it had no 
discussions with Goodman regarding the vacation for several years. 
40. In answer to paragraph 40 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt is without knowledge or 
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein and, 
therefore, denies the same. 
document speaks for itself. 
VI. COUNT ONE -BREACH OF CONTRACT 
44. Duro-Bilt realleges its answers to all prior allegations set forth in the Complaint. 
45. In answer to paragraph 45 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt denies that the Vacation 
Agreement is a valid contract between Goodman and Duro-Bilt. 
ANSWER - 6 
46. Duro-Bilt denies the allegations contained in paragraph 46 of the Complaint. 
47. Duro-Bilt denies the allegations contained in paragraph 47 of the Complaint. 
48. Duro-Bilt denies the allegations contained in paragraph 48, including subparts (a) 
through (g), of the Complaint. 
49. Duro-Bilt denies the allegations contained in paragraph 49 of the Complaint. 
50. Duro-Bilt denies the allegations contained in paragraph 50 of the Complaint. 
52. Duro-Bilt realleges its answers to all prior allegations set forth in the Complaint. 
53. In answer to paragraph 53 of the Complaint, Duro-Bilt is without knowledge or 
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein and, 
PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE 
57. Duro-Bilt realleges its answers to all prior allegations set forth in the Complaint. 
58. Duro-Bilt denies the allegations contained in paragraph 58 of the Complaint. 
59. Duro-Bilt denies the allegations contained in paragraph 59 of the Complaint. 
60. Duro-Bilt denies the allegations contained in paragraph 60 of the Complaint. 
ANSWER - 7 
61. Duro-Bilt denies the allegations contained in paragraph 61 of the Complaint. 
62. Duro-Bilt denies the allegations contained in paragraph 62 of the Complaint. 
K. COUNT FOUR - INTENTIONAL INTEREFERENCE WITH 
PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE 
63. Duro-Bilt realleges its answers to all prior allegations set forth in the Complaint. 
64. Duro-Bilt denies the allegations contained in paragraph 64 of the Complaint. 
68. Duro-Bilt denies the allegations contained in paragraph 68 of the Complaint. 
X. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
69. Goodman is estopped from raising claims for breach of contract, tortious 
Duro-Bilt reserves the right, after fwrther discovery, to amend this Answer to add or 
delete affirmative defenses supported by the facts, and a failure to include all such defenses in 
this Answer shall not be deemed a waiver of any right to further amend this Answer. 
ANSWER - 8 
XI. REOUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
Duro-Bilt hereby requests that it be awarded attorney fees and costs incurred herein 
pursuant to all applicable Idaho law, including Sections 12-120 and 12-121 of the Idaho Code, 
and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
WHEREFORE, having answered Plaintiffs Complaint and Demand for jury Trial, Duro- 
Bilt prays that Plaintiff takes nothing by its Complaint, that the same be dismissed with 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
By: a(*~l- 
~hrihtophey~. Yorgason 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC - Overnight Mail 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 J Facsimile 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Facsimile (208) 343-3246 
Email: jmsteele@mnftlaw.com 
~hridopher!~. Yorgason 
ANSWER - 9 
CHRISTOPHER E. YORGASON # 5844 
TAMMY A. ZOKAN # 5450 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHARTERED 
Attorneys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 33 1-1 800 
Facsimile: (208) 33 1-1202 
Email: taz@msbtlaw.com 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
P. - SALAS, DEPUN - I 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIA 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR T 
. > 
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, ) Case No. CV 05-9800 
v. ) 
) DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR, ) SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
INC., and Idaho corporation; BART and ) MOTIONTO D 
ALANE MCKNIGHT, husband and wife; and ) 
DOES I through V. ) 
1 
, Defendants Scotty's Duro-Bilt Gen 
(collectively "Duro-Bilt"), by an through their attorneys of record, Moore, Smith, Buxton & Turcke, 
Chartered, and hereby move this Court for summary judgment in accordance with Rule 56 of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and move this Court to dismiss Plaintiffs claims against Bart and 
Alane McKnight in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
pleadings on file and to be presented before decision hereon demonstrate that there is no genuine 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 
issue as to any material fact and that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law and that 
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against the McKnights as 
individuals. This Motion is supported by the memorandum of law and Affidavit of Christopher E. 
Yorgason lodged on June 16, 2006, and the pleadings on file and any argument presented before 
decision hereon. Defendants request attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code $5 12-120 and 
12-121 and any other reimbursement and relief deemed appropriate by the Court. 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that oh this 29 
Karl J. F. RunR 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC - Overnight Mail 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 Facsimile 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
I Facsimile (208) 343-3246 Email: imsteele@,ixnRlaw.com 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO DISMISS - 2 
JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
KARL J ,  RUNFT GSB # 6640) 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFlCES, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 333-9495 
Fax: (208) 343-324& 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AM) FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY, 1 
1 I 
COMES NOW Plaintiffs, Goodman Oil Company ("Goodman") by and through their 
attorney, Jon M. Steele, and pursuant to IRCP 56 moves for summary judgment on the issues of 
liability of Defendants in regards to the following: 
1. Count One - Breach of Contract (the "Vahtion Agreement") as to Defendant Duro- 
Bilt. 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ISSUES OF LIABILITY, P. 1 
000048 ORIGINAL 
2. Count Two - Tortious Interference with the GoodmadWylie Purchase and Sale 
Agreement as to all Defendants. 
3. Count Three - Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage (the 
"GoodmaniWylie" sale) as to all Defendants. 
Plaintiff requests a separate trial on the issue of damages. 
This Motion for Summary Judgment is based upon the verified pleadings, supporting 
affidavits, Memorandums and Exhibits previously filed in this case and in the case of Goodman v. 
City ofNampa, a corporate bodypolitic; The City Council of the Ciry OfNampa; Mayor Tom Dale, 
Diana Lambing, andScofzy's Duro-Bill Generator, Inc., Case No. CV 04-10007. 
The issues of liability on each of the three causes of action are fully briefed in the Plaintiffs 
Brief in Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss and In 
Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Issues of Liability filed with &is Motion. 
Plaintiffs move for summary judgment as there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment on the liability issues as a matter of law. 
By: a JON M. STEELE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ISSUES OF LIABILITY, P. 2 
000049 
CERTIHCATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this day of August 2006, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ISSUES OF 
LIABILITY was served upon opposing counsel as follows: 
Christopher Yorgason - US Mail 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ISSUES OF LIABILITY, P. 3 
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JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
KARI, J. RUNFT (ISB # 6640) 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC j;,z t,5ah k. 8 " .  BJ 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 "..-,~~.fi~~r&-%?---- ?.M. 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 333-9495 A"':; '? ., u i ;ofl& 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: jmsteele@runllaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE. DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICLAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
SCO'M'Y'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR, 
INC., an Idaho corporation; BART and 
ALANE MCKNIGHT, husband and wife; 
and DOES I through V. 
Defendants. 
) 
) CASE NO. CV 05-9800 
) 
) BRIEF I N  RESPONSE TO 
) DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
) MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN 
) SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
) FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
) ISSUES OF LIABILITY 
) 
) 
1 
COMES NOW Plaintiff Goodman Oil Company ("Goodman") and r e s p ~ d s  to.Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's 
Motions should be summarily denied. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on Issues of Liability should be gxanted. 
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON ISSUES OF LIABILITY, P. 1 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
This dispute arises out of proceedings to vacate the public right-of-way known as First 
Avenue South between 2nd Street South and 31d Skeet South in Nampa. 
This litigation is a spin-off of mandamus and judicial review litigation before Judge Morfltt. 
See, Goodman Oil Company v. City of Nampa, The City Council ofthe City of Nampa, MCzyor Tom 
Dale and Diana Lambing and Scoiiy's Duro-Bill Generator, Znc., Case No. CV 04-10007, 31d 
Judicial District, Canyon County, Idaho (hereafler referred to as the "Goodman Mandamus 
Proceeding"). 
On August 8, 2005, Judge Morfitt, in the Goodman Mandamus Proceeding, entered his 
Peremptory Writ of Mandamus (with an IRCP 54(b) certificate) ordering Nampa to publish Ordinance 
No. 3374 vacating Fist Avenue South. See, Affidavit of Jon M. Steele in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Issues of Liability, Bates Nos. 000001-00001 1. This mdavit is hereafter 
referred to as "See, Bates Nos. . . . ." 
The Goodman Mandamus Proceeding also seeks judicial review of the fifty (50') foot wide 
easement reserved in Ordinance No. 3374. Goodman has asked Judge Morfitt to strike the easement. 
It is Goodman's contention in the Goodman Mandamus Proceeding that: (1) The easement 
reserved in Ordinance No. 3374 is redundant to the cross easements granted in the Vacation 
Agreement; (2) the vacation statute itself (Idaho Code 9 50-3 1 1) reverses the appropriate easements; 
(3) the easement reserved in Ordinance No. 3374 is wholly out of proportion to anyone's 
interpretation of reasonable access; and, (4) the building review process (i.e. obtaining a building 
permit) will provide Nampa the opportunity to review development plans and at that time require, if 
BREF IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON ISSUES OF LIABILITY, P. 2 
000052 
necessary, an appropriate easement providing access to the property owners adjoining vacate First 
Avenue South. See, Bates Nos. 000012-000054. 
The issues have been fully briefed and oral argument is scheduled before Judge Morfitt on September 
1,2006 at 1 : 30 p.m. See, Bates Nos. 0000 12-0001 68. 
The vacated street is now owned by the adjoining property owners, subject to the reserved 
easement in Ordinance No. 3374. 
Defendants contention that the "vacation is mired in litigation" (See, Defendants' 
Memorandum, p. 12) conveniently ignores the fact that the Goodman Mandamus Proceeding and this 
litigation are the result of Defendants' breach of contract, Defendant's interference with contract and 
Defendant's role as the instigator of an illegal veto by Nampa's Mayor. This entire dispute would 
never have occurred if Duro-Bilt had complied with its contractual obligations. Defendants' 
contention also ignores the fact that F i t  Avenue South is now vacated. 
The real issue in this litigation is whether the tail will be allowed to wag the dog. Duro-Bilt, 
the owner of a 2800 square foot lot, has torpedoed a 43,000 square foot development that would have 
enhanced the gateway to, and a major comdor of, the City of Nampa. 
Defendants' complaints boil down to nothing more than that Goodman, the adjoining property 
owners, potential developers and the City of Nampa have all failed to concede to their demands. See, 
Defendants' Memorandum, p. 6. 
Goodman, nor anyone else, has any intention or desire to deny Duro-Bilt access. This entire 
dispute would never have occurred if Duro-Bilt had abided by the contractual terms it agreed to in the 
Property Owner Street Vacation Agreement (hereafter "Vacation Agreement"). 
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR S-Y
JUDGMENT ON ISSUES OF LIABILITY, P. 3 
FACTS 
On August 2,1995, Goodman entered into the Vacation Agreement with Defendant Scotty's 
Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc. (hereafter "Duro-Bilt"), the Blamires Family Trust (hereafter "Blamires"), 
and T. J. Forest, Inc. (hereafter "Forest"). Goodman, Duro-Bilt, the Blamires and Forest were the 
owners of & property adjacent to that portion of Fist Avenue South between 2nd Street south and 31d 
Street South. 
In the Vacation Agreement, the parties exchanged mutual promises consenting to Nampa's 
vacation of First Avenue South. The parties granted and conveyed among themselves a perpetual 
easement upon the vacated property for the purpose of access to and from their property. The parties 
agreed to fully cooperate to ensure that the purpose and intent of the Vacation Agreement was 
accomplished, and to equally share in the maintenance of the easement in proportion to the amount of 
property they owned which adjoins First Avenue South. See, Bates Nos. 000038-000043. 
Prior to vacation, Goodman's property consisted of over 36,800 square feet. Blamires' 
property consisted of over 17,250 square feet. Forest owned 3,750 square feet. Duro-Bilt owned a 
single tot of 2,850 square feet. The building on Duro-Bilt's lot covers almost the entire lot. 
First Avenue South, prior to its vacation, ran north and south and was a street of eighty (80') 
feet in width and three hundred (300') feet in length. The actual constructed roadway is forty (40') 
feet in width, back of curb to back of curb. The easement reserved in Ordinance No. 3374 is over the 
westerly fifty (50') feet of the vacated property. The reserved easement in o r d i c e  No. 3374 is ten 
(10') feet rester than the constructed roadway. This leaves only thirty (30') feet of the original 
eighty (80') feet of street width unencumbered by the reserved easement and d l  of that unencumbered 
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON ISSUES OF LIABILITY, P. 4 
property is located on the west side of the vacated street. 
In other words, that portion of the vacated street to the east is partially encumbered by the 
easement resewed in O r d i i c e  No. 3374 and that portion of the vacated street to the west is 
completely encumbered by the easement resewed in Ordmance No. 3374. This encumbrance renders 
15,000 square feet now owned by Goodman, Blamires, Forest and Duro-Bilt unbuildable and of little 
value. See, Bates No. 000246. 
Goodman owns property on both sides of the vacated street. Lots 7,8,9,11 and 12 (each fifty 
(50') feet in width) are located on the west side of the vacated street. Lots 4,5 and 6 (each fiRy (50') 
feet in width) are located on the east side of the vacated street. 
Duro-Bilt is the owner of Lot 10 located on the west side of the vacated street. Lot 10 is 
bordered by Goodman property to the north (Zot 1 1) to the south (Zot 9), and following vacation of 
First Avenue South, to the east. 
Defendant Bart McKnight is the president and owner of Duro-Bilt. Defendant Alane 
McKnight is Bart McKnight's wife. Defendants Bart and Alane McKnight will hereafter be referred 
to as "McKnight". 
On August 3, 1995, Goodman submitted an application to Nampa for vacation of Fist 
Avenue South. See, Bates No. 000044. On August 24,1995, Mr. Holm, Nampa Planning Director, 
prepared a Staff Report. The Staff Report lists the applicant as the adjoining property owners, 
Goodman, Duro-Bilt, Blamires, and Forest. See, Bates No. 000045. On September 5,1995, apublic 
hearing was held and the Nampa City Council (hereafter "Council") approved the vacation of First 
Avenue South between 2nd Street South and 3rd Street South See, Bates No. 000098. On 
September 18,1995, the first reading of the O r d i i c e  vacating First Avenue South was completed by 
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON ISSUES OF LIABILITY, P. 5 
oooqP5g; 
- -  - 
the Council. See, Bates Nos. 000101-000102. On October 2, 1995, the second reading of the 
Ordinance was completed by the Council. See, Bates No. 0001 10. On October 16,1995, the third 
reading of the O r d i i c e  was tabled because the issue of fire department access had not been 
resolved. See, Bates No. 0001 17. This Ordinance did not reserve an easement. See, Bates No. 
In this Ordinance the legal description of the property to be vacated read as follows: 
The portion of 1" Avenue South between Blocks 16 and 19 of Pleasants 
Addition to Nampa as shown on the official plat thereof on file in the office 
of the Canyon County Recorder in Book 4 of Plats at Page 10, located from 
the Southwesterly right-of-way of 2"d Street South to the Northeasterly right- 
of-way of 31d Street South. 
In 1999 and 2001, Goodman inquired of Nampa regarding the status of the vacation of First 
Avenue South. Planning Director. Holm confirmed that the vacation of First Avenue South had been 
approved by the Council on September 5,1995. 
In letters dated September 6, 1995, March 1, 1999, and May 29, 2001, Planning Director 
Holm stated that "once a plan for development of the site has been prepared, presented to, and 
approved by the Fie  [Dlepartment I will request the City Council take the matter of the street 
vacation off the table and complete their action vacating the street." See, Bates Nos. 000240-242. 
The vacation application never lapsed. 
On July 28, 2004, Goodman and James R Wylie (Wylie) signed a Purchase and Sale 
Agreement whereby Goodman agreed to sell its property. The sale price was Six Hundred Thousand 
($600,000) Dollars to be paid in cash at closing. The only contingency was completing the vacation 
of First Avenue South in a manner acceptable to Goodman and Wylie. See, Bates Nos. 000203- 
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In August of 2004, Goodman and Wylie informed Defendants of this sale and that the sale 
was contingent upon the successful vacation of Fist Avenue South. See, Bates No. 000178. 
On August 4,2004, the Nampa Fire Department provided written conditional approval of 
development plans for the vacated property and the property owned by Goodman. See, Bates Nos. 
000046 and 000179. The development plans had been submitted by Wylie. The Nampa F i e  
Department approved the vacation of Fist  Avenue South subject to a dedicated twenty (20) foot wide 
fire apparatus access road. The F i e  Department also requested Wylie to obtain the consent, once 
again, of the adjoining property owners. See, Bates No. 000046. 
Both Goodman and Wiley informed Duro-Bilt and McKnight of the pending sale. to 
entering into the Purchase and Sale Agreement with Wylie, Goodman through Mr. Conley, its 
president (hereafter "Conley") called McKnight at his place of business and offered to sell the 
Goodman property to McKnight on the exact same terms as made available to Wylie. After signing 
the Goodman/Wylie Purchase and Sale Agreement, Wylie visited McKnight 3 or4 times during July 
and August of 2004. Wylie told McKnight about the pending sale and the need to complete the street 
vacation. Both Conley and Wylie will testify that Defendants had knowledge of the Goodman/Wylie 
Purchase and Sale Agreement and that Defendants knew that the transaction was contingent upon the 
successful vacation of F i  Avenue South. Wylie asked Duro-Bilt to sign the consent requested by 
the F i e  Department. Wylie will testify that McKnight agreed to sign the consent form presented to 
him after the other property owners signed. After Wylie obtained the consent of the other property 
owners, he returned to McKnight's place of business to obtain his consent. McKnight and Duro-Bilt 
then refused their consent. See, Bates Nos. 000178-000179. 
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On August 16,2004, the vacation ordinance ("Ordinance No. 3374") was approved by the 
Council and the Mayor. See, Bates Nos. 000207-000208. However, this was not the Ordinance 
passed by the Council in 1995. At the August 16,2004 Council meeting, with no prior notice the 
Council was presented and passed an entirely new ordinance after suspending the rules. The new 
Ordinance reserved a fifty (50') foot wide easement that had not been included in the original 
Ordinance. See, Bates Nos. 000207-000208. The Ordinance reserved a fifty (50') foot easement 
despite the fact that the Nampa Fire Department had only requested a twenty (20') foot wide 
easement. 
OrdinanceNo. 3374 was identical to the Ordinance passed by the Council in 1995 except the 
phrase "...SUBJECT TO AN ACCESS AND UTILITY EASEMEXT RESERVED TEREON.. ." 
had been added to the title and the reserved easement was added to the legal description. See, Bates 
No. 000207. 
In discoveiy, Goodman was surprised to learn that Defendants had instigated the veto through 
exparte contacts with the Mayor. 
McKnight's efforts to interdict Ordinance No. 3374 began with speaking to a Nampa City 
Clerk and telling the City Clerk he no longer consented to the vacation of First Avenue South and 
wished to prevent OrdinanceNo. 3374 fkom going into effect. The City Clerk directed McKnight to 
call the City Attorney, Mr. White. McKnight called the City Attorney that same day and voiced his 
objections to Ordinance No. 3374. McKnight was told by Mr. White that, "they could withdraw this 
if I talked to the mayor." McKnight then, again that same day, called Nampa City Hall, spoke to 
Mayor Dale, and explained his objection to the vacation. Mayor Dale agreed to veto Ordinance No. 
3374. McKnight specifically recalled this exchange in his deposition testimony: "I asked him [the 
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Mayor] if there was a way to pull this off of being published, and he said, 'Yes, I can veto it."' See, 
Bates Nos. 0001 80-000181. 
An e-mail dated August 19,2004, from the City Clerk, Diana Lambing, had the following 
message to Cris Luna and Deborah Bishop, deputy clerks at the Nampa City Clerks office: 
Hi Kids! 
Just a little note to let you know that at the Mayor and Terry White's direction, 
I pulled this Ordinance for Vacation of Fist  Avenue South from being 
published. One of the property owners is not in agreement anymore. So it is 
on hold until M e r  notice. 
Thanks. 
See, Bates Nos. 000179-000180. 
On ~ e ~ t e m b e r  2nd, Mayor Dale vetoed Ordinance No. 3374. See, Bates Nos. 000180-000181. 
It was Mayor Dale's only veto since the beginning of his term. This is the only veto seen by Planning 
Director Holm in his 27 years with the City. See, Bates No. 000180. The veto was instigated by 
Defendants. 
McKnight's objection to Ordinance No. 3374 was aided by the fact he is a friend of Mayor 
Dale. McKnight and the Mayor have participated in civic activities and events. McKnight and the 
Mayor have mutual friends, specifically Council member Thome. It was Thorne who at the August 
14,2005 Council meeting, moved that Ordinance No. 3374 be passed under suspension of the rules. 
See, Bates No. 000180. 
McKnight, Thome and the Mayor had been on a ski trip together to Sun Valley in March of 
2004. Mayor Dale describes McKnight as a friend. See, Bates No. 000180. 
In his deposition, Mayor Dale confi ied McKnight's material, ex parte contact, recalling 
that "he [McKnight] conveyed to me that, as a property owner on that street, he did not agree to the 
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vacation at this time." Concerning his decision to veto Ordinance No. 3374, the Mayor stated: 
[Olne of the ways of dealing with this was with avcto. Another way was to 
bring it back before city council. Because, since the ordinance had not been 
published, it had not become law at this time. And the city council could 
have brought it back and reconsidered it and voted on it. It was my decision 
that the most expedient way to do it was through the veto. 
See, Bates No. 0001 8 1. 
Once learning of Mayor Dale's veto, Conley visited McKnight at his place of business. 
McKnight said he didn't like Wylie and that he (McKnight) wanted to purchase the Goodman lots 
which adjoined his property to the south, the one with the car lot. Goodman immediately mote to the 
Mayor and Council in an effort to save the transaction with Wylie. The sale closing date was 
extended to October 1,2004. See, Bates No. 000217. Goodman argued to the Mayor and Council on 
~e~ t embe r  2 0 ~  that the Mayor did not have authority to veto Ordinance No. 3374. Goodman wrote 
to the Mayor and Council on three (3) separate occasions, explaining that the Mayor's veto would 
seriously jeopardize Goodman's transaction with Wylie. Goodman told the Mayor and Council that 
it would file a Petition for Writ of Mandate if the City refused to amend and publish Ordinance No. 
3374. The Mayor and Council refused to override the Mayor'sveto. See, BatesNos. 000181-000182. 
Goodman's transaction with Wylie failed by reason that the vacation had not been completed 
in an acceptable manner. See, Bates No. 000182. 
Goodman then filed its Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and for Judicial Review of Ordinance 
No. 3374. See, Bates No. 000182. 
Planning Director Holm stated in his deposition, that all that was required from the adjoining 
owners to effect a vacation was a simple note establishing that all adjoining landowners had 
consented. Holm also testified that the Vacation Ageement, signed by Duro-Bilt, was more formal 
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and detailed than the usual consents received for street vacations. See. Bates No. 000177. 
Holm knows of no source of authority allowing the Nampa F i e  Department to request an 
access easement be reserved in a street vacation ordinance. See, Bates No. 000178. 
Holm also has no expectation that a detailed easement would be submitted to the City of 
Nampa until such time as the property owner or developer seeks a building permit. See, Bates No. 
000178. 
This is standard practice in the development of a commercial site. The actual description of 
an easement is not finalized until such time as the site requirements are determined. The owner and 
designer must have some flexibility in designing buildings and providing for access, but yet comply 
with local standards. The building review process provides the City of Nampa with the opportunity 
to review development plans and at that time to establish, if necessary, appropriate easements. The 
Nampa Fire Department, as a consulting agency, has the opportunity to review and comment on 
development plans when they are submitted. But they have no statutory authority over a street 
vacation or the issuance of a building permit. 
This Complaint alleging breach of the Vacation Agreement by Duro-Bilt, tortious 
interference with the GoodmadWylie Purchase and Sale Agreement by all Defendants, negligent 
interference with prospective economic advantage (the Goodman/Wylie Purchase and Sale 
Agreement) by all Defendants and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage (the 
Goodman/Wylie Purchase and Sale Agreement) by all Defendants was filedon September 19,2005. 
Goodman's damages include, but are not limited to, the difference between the value of 
Goodman's real property in August 2004 and the now reduced fair market value of the Goodman 
property. See, Bates No. 000246. The GoodmadWylie Purchase and Sale Agreement would have 
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closed absent Duro-Bilt's breach of the Vacation Agreement and Defendant's interference. 
Goodman's damages also include attorney fees and costs incurred. See, Ray1 v. Shull Enterprises, 
Znc., 108 Idaho 524,700 P.2d 567 (1984) (attorney fees allowed as special damages) 
The damages incurred by Goodman are dependent upon the result of judicial review 
proceedings before Judge Morfitt. 
Ill. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Upon a motion for summary judgment, the court must liberally construe the f%ts in the 
existing record in favor of the nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
nonmoving party. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 887 P.2d 1034 (1994). 
Summary judgment is appropriate if the "pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765,769,820 P.2d 
360,364 (1991). If there are conflicting inferences arising from the record or reasonable minds might 
reach different conclusions, summary judgment must be denied on those points of difference. Bonz 
v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539,808 P.2d 876 (1991). 
AS A MATTER OF LAW DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FAILS 
Duro-Bilt contends (a) that there is no valid contract between the parties @. 12 Defendants' 
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Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment); @) that the Vacation 
Agreement lapsed due to failure of the vacation (page 12, Defendants' Memorandum in Support of 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment); (c) that the Vacation Agreement did not contain a 
contract term and therefore should be deemed to have lapsed (page 13, Defendants' Memorandum in 
Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment); (d) that the Vacation Agreement is invalid 
for lack of consideration (page 15, Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment); (e) that even if the Vacation Agreement is valid, Duro-Biit is excused fiom 
performance (page 17, Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment); (f) that Duro-Bilt has acted faitly and in good faith (page 17, Defendants' Memorandum 
in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment); and (g) that Goodman has breached its 
duty of good faith and fair dealing (page 19, Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment). 
As a matter of law, each of these contentions fails. "The objective in interpreting contracts 
is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties." Twin Lakes Village Property Ass'n v. 
Aune, 124 Idaho 132,135,857 P.2d 61 1,614 (1993). The intent ofthe parties should, ifpossible, be 
ascertained fkom the language of the contract. Id See also, Hogan v. Blakney, 73 Idaho 274,279, 
25 1 P.2d 209,2 13 (1952). "The scope of ...[ the court's] inquiry into the parties' intent is limited 
however, by the general rule that if a deed is plain and unambiguous the parties intent must be 
ascertained only fkom the deed itself, par01 evidence being inadmissible for that purpose." Phillips 
Industries, Znc. v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693,697,827 P.2d 706,710 (1992) (citing Gardner v. Fleigel, 
92 Idaho 767,770-71,450 P.2d 990,993-94 (1969)). 
Questions of contract interpretation and enforcement are normally the sole province of the 
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courts. See, A$on Energy, Znc. v. Idaho Power Co., 122 Idaho 333,337,834 P.2d 850 854 (1992). 
Interpretation and legal effect of an unambiguous contract are questions of law over which this Court 
exercises free review. See, Hanks v. Sawtelle Rentals, Znc., 133 Idaho 199,202-03,984 P.2d 122, 
125-26 (1999); FirstSecuriiy BankofIdaho, N.A. v. Murphy, 13 1 Idaho 787,791,964 P.2d 654,658 
(1998). In construing a written instrument, this Court must consider it as a whole and give meaning 
to all provisions of the writing to the extent possible. See, Magic Valley Radiology Assoc., P.A. v. 
Prfl Business Servs., 119 Idaho 558,565,808 P.2d 1303,13 10 (1991). 
Both Goodman and Duro-Bilt agree that the interpretation of the Vacation Agreement is a 
matter of law (page 12, Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants:' Motion for Summary 
Judgment). Each of Duro-Bilt's contentions are addressed below. 
a. The Vacation Agreement is a Valid Contract. 
Defendants' various contentions concede the existence of a contract between Goodman and 
Duro-Bilt. There must first be a contract before it can lapse or be otherwise unenforceable. 
The plain language of the Vacation Agreement establishes a contract between Goodman and 
Duro-Bilt. 
The Vacation Agreement provides the following: 
... the parties, for good and valuable consideration the receipt of which is 
hereby acknowledged, agree as follows: 
1. That the parties consent to the City of Nampa's vacation of First 
Avenue South, located between Blocks 16 and 19 of Pleasants Addition 
abovedescribed, as a public right-of-way as depicted on exhibit "A" attached 
hereto. 
2. That the parties grant and convey among themselves, their agents, 
licensees, and assignees a perpetual easement upon vacated First Avenue 
South for the purpose of access to and from their property &om both Second 
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and Third Street located in Nampa, Canyon County, Idaho. The actual 
location of the easement shall be at the discretion of the legal owner of the 
vacated property upon the City's vacation of First Avenue South as described 
herein. 
3. That the parties shall fully cooperate to ensure that the purpose and 
intent of this Agreement shall be accomplished. The parties shall execute a 
formalized agreement recognizing the rights and obligations of the parties 
upon the City of Nampa's vacation of Fist Avenue South as described 
herein. The parties shall equally share in the maintenance of said easement in 
proportion to the amount of property they own which adjoins First Avenue 
South as described herein. 
4. That the parties shall hold each other harmless and indemnify the 
other parties from their negligent act and that of their agents in maintaining 
and using said access easement. 
5. This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the 
parties and their respective successors, assigns, heirs, and personal 
representatives. 
See, Bates Nos. 000038-000040. 
The burden of proving the existence of a contract and fact of its breach is upon the plaintiff, 
and once those facts are established, the defendant has burden of pleading and proving affirmative 
defenses which legally excuse performance. See, 0 'Dell v. Basabe, 1 19 Idaho 796,8 13,810 P.2d 
The existence of a contract between Goodman and Duro-Bilt cannot be seriously disputed. 
b. The Vacation Agreement did not Lapse due to Failure of the Vacation. 
Defendant's contention is that without a street vacation, there is no contract. See, p. 12, 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. This 
contention ignores the fact that F i t  Avenue South is now vacated. Judge Morfitt's Order Granting 
Writ of Mandamus was a final appealable Order and included a 54(b) certificate. See, Bates Nos. 
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000001-000002. Neither the City of Nampa nor Duro-Bilt appealed. 
Consent of all adjoining property owner's is a pre-requisite to a vacation proceeding. Idaho 
Code F) 50-1321. The only Duro-Bilt consent provided to the Nampa Planning Director, to the 
Nampa Council and to Judge Morftt was the Vacation Agreement. No one but Defendants believes 
consent is an issue. 
The issue of Duro-Bilt's consent has been judicially resolved by Judge Morfitt and Duro-Bilt 
is estopped from contending otherwise. 
Duro-Bilt was named as a Respondent in the Goodman Mandamus Proceeding. Despite 
Goodman's contention that Duro-Bilt was an indispensable party, Judge Morfitt granted Duro-Bilt's 
Motion to Dismiss. 
In the Goodman Mandamus Proceeding, Goodman, in opposing Duro-Bilt's dismissal, 
contended that Duro-Bilt had a significant property interest to protect. Duro-Bilt acquired ownership 
of an additional 2,000 square feet upon vacation of First Avenue South. Duro-Bilt also bad an 
interest in prese~ing its existing utility and access easements or participating in revising the 
description of access and utility easements as reserved in the Ordinance. See, Bates No. 000255 to 
000265. 
Duro-Bilt elected to abandon the opportunity to contest its consent and the enforceability of 
the Vacation Agreement. 
The doctrine of claim preclusion bars Duro-Bilt from now raising the issue of consent and the 
enforceability of the Vacation Agreement. The rule of claim preclusion is that "in an action between 
the same parties upon the same claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes parties and 
privies not only as to every matter offered arid received to sustain or defeat the claim but also as to 
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every matter which might and should have been litigated in the fist  suit." Wove v. Farm Bureau 
Insurance Co., 128 Idaho 398,402,913 P.2d 1168,1172 (1996), citing Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. 
v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434,436-37,849 P.2d 107,109-1 10 (1993). 
Duro-Bilt's claims concerning consent and the validity of the Vacation Agreement were 
resolved by the vacation of First Avenue South. Claim preclusion serves three fundamental 
purposes. "Fist, it ipreserves] the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive 
disrespect that would follow if the same manner were litigated to inconsistent results. Second, it 
serves the public interest in protecting the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and 
third, it advances the private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims." Aldape v. 
Akins, 105 Idaho 254,257,668 P.2d 130,133 (1983) ( i t e d  citation omitted). 
Quasi-estoppel also precludes Duro-Bilt from asserting the failure of the Vacation Agreement 
and absence of consent. 
The doctrine of quasi-estoppel is properly invoked against a person asserting a right 
inconsistent with a position previously taken by him, with knowledge of the facts and his rights, to 
the detriment of the person seeking to apply the doctrine. Treasure Valley Bankv. Butcher, 121 Idaho 
53 1, 826 P.2d 492 (1 992). The applicability of quasi-estoppel turns upon the specific facts and 
circumstances of the case under consideration. See, KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, 94 Idaho 279,486 P.2d 
992 (1 971). Quasi-estoppel does not require misrepresentation by one party or actual reliance by the 
other. Lunders v. Estate of Snyder, 131 Idaho 689, 695, 963 P.2d 372, 378 (1998). Duro-Bilt is 
estopped to deny its consent to vacation and the validity of the Vacation Agreement. 
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c. The Vacation Agreement has not Lapsed for Failure to Include a Term for Performance. 
Defendants' contention ignores the self executing language of the Vacation Agreemenl: The 
parties to the Vacation Agreement "...grant and convey among themselves.. .a perpetual easement 
upon the vacated Fist Avenue South for the purpose of access to and from their property from both 
Second and Third Street located in Nampa, Canyon County, Idaho." 
A grant of a perpetual easement is not unusual. See, Ponderosa Home Site Lot Owners, et a1 
v. Garfeld Bay Resort, Znc., 139 Idaho 699,701,85 P.3d 675,677 (2004) ("...the owner intended to 
grant a perpetual easement.. ."); Mountainview Landowners Cooperative Association, Inc., et a1 v. 
Cool, 136 P.3d 332, 334 (2006) ("...[a] perpetual easement is granted to the grantees...") on 
rehearing ("the grant in this case was only of a perpetual easement.") 
The Vacation Agreement is a conveyance of an interest in real property. See, Idaho Code 9 
55-601. 
The use of the word "grant" in the Vacation Agreement has significant legal effect. The 
word "grant" carries with it statutory covenants. Idaho Code 9 55-612 states in relevant part that: 
From the use of the word 'grant' in any conveyance ... the following 
covenants.. . are implied, unless restrained by express terms contained in such 
conveyance: 
1. That previous to the time of the execution of such conveyance, the grantor 
has not conveyed the same estate, or any right, title or interest therein, to any 
~. 
person other than the grantee. 
2. That such estate is at the time of the execution.. . free &om encumbrances 
done, made or suffered by the grantor, or any person claiming under him. 
Such covenants may be sued upon in the same manner as if they had been 
expressly inserted in the conveyance. 
Idaho Code 9 55-606 provides that "[elvery grant or conveyance of an estate in real property 
is conclusive against the grantor." 
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Duro-Bilt is conclusively bound by the Vacation Agreement. The term of the Vacation 
Agreement is perpetual. 
d. Defendant's Contention That the Vacation Agreement is Invalid for Lack of Consideration 
Fails as a Matter of Law. 
Duro-Bilt's contention that the Vacation Agreement fails for lack of consideration is based 
upon Duro-Bilt's expectation of a development incentive. See, p. 14 Defendants' Memorandum in 
Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
This contention fails as a matter of law. Duro-Bilt bears the burden of proof in showing a 
want of consideration. Idaho Code 8 29-104. 
In interpreting a contract, the primary function of the court is to seek and carry out the intent 
of the parties. See, Hogan v. Blakney, 73 Idaho 274,279,251 P.2d 209,213 (1952). "The scope of 
. ..[the court's] inquiry into the parties' intent is limited, however, by the general rule that if adeed is 
plain and unaxnbiguous the parties' intent must be ascertained only from the deed itself, parol 
evidence being inadmissible for that purpose." Phillips Industries, Inc. v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693, 
697,827 P.2d 706,710 (1992) (citing Gardner v. Fleigel, 92 Idaho 767,450 P.2d 990 (1969)). 
The consideration clause of the Vacation Agreement binds Dwo-Bilt. Hall v. Hall, 116 
Idaho 483,484,777 P.2d 255,265 (1989) ("Where as here, the consideration clause clearly recites 
that the transfer was made 'For Value Received", parol evidence is not admissible to contradict the 
deed.. . ."). 
Defendants contend that they received no consideration for entering into the Vacation 
Agreement. In fact, Defendants received the substantial consideration and benefit of a perpetual 
access easement from three adjoining'property owners. 
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The term "easement" may be said broadly to be a privilege which the owner of one tenement 
has a right to enjoy over the tenement of another; a right which one person has to use the land of 
another for a specific purpose, or a servitude imposed as a burden upon land. 17A Am. Jur. 616, Ej 1. 
The following definition is contained in Black's Law Dictiomy, Fourth Edition, p. 599: 
Easement. A right in the owner of one parcel of land, by reason of such 
ownership, to use the land of another for a special purpose not inconsistent 
with a general property in the owner. Hollomon v. Board of Education of 
Stewart Counry, 168 Ga. 359, 147 S.E. 882,884; Frye v. Sibbitt, 145 Neb. 
600,17 N.W.2d 617,621. 
Sinnett v. Werelus, 83 Idaho 514,520,365 P.2d 952,955 (1961). 
The consideration clause of the Agreement bars Defendants' contentions that they received 
no consideration for entering into the Vacation Agreement. Additionally, the granting of cross 
easements for access is real and substantial consideration. 
e. Duro-Bilt is not Excused From Performance. 
Duro-Bilt fails to cite any legal authority for this contention. Duro-Bilt's argument is that 
Goodman has been unwilling to consider other options and enter into adiscussion. Essentially Duro- 
Bilt's complaints are that no one has volunteered to give Duro-Bilt a new building and to move the 
Duro-Bilt business at no cost. In his deposition, McKnight testified as follows: 
Q. Just to sort of sum things up, is it fair to say that the street vacation 
agreement is satisfactoty to you if a developer were to come in and gjve you a 
new building at no cost and move you to that new location? 
A. It was- 
MR. HALLAM: Object to the form. 
THE WITNESS: It was in 1995. 
Q. BY MR. STEELE: Is it different now? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. How is it different now? 
A. Well, my business has gown. I now would just have to weigh the 
options. I'm nine years older. 
Q. So if a developer came to you now and said, "Mr. McKnight, we're going 
to move you at no cost to you and give you a new building," you wouldn't 
agree to that? 
MR. HALLAM: Objection, incomplete hypothetical. 
MR. YORGASON: Objection. 
THFi WITNESS: I would entertain the option. 
Q. So you can't really give me any conditions or terms under which you 
would agree to vacation of the street in front of your building - - in front of 
your business? 
A. If you laid a proposal in front of me, I would take some time to look at it. 
See, Bates No. 000253. See also, Yorgason Affidavit, p. 2. 
f. Duro-Bilt Contends That it has Acted Fair$ and in Good Faith and That Goodman has 
Breached its Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a covenant implied by law in the 
Vacation Agreement. See, First Security BankofIdaho v. Gaige, 115 Idaho 172,176,765 P.2d 683, 
687 (1988); Clement v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 1 15 Idaho 298,300,766 P.2d 768,770 (1988) (The 
covenant requires that the parties perform, in good faith, the obligations imposed by their agreemen% 
and a violation of the covenant occurs when either party violates, nullifies or significantly impairs 
any benefit of the contract. See, Idaho First Nut. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Znc., 121 Idaho 266, 
289,824 P.2d 841,863 (1991). See also, Metcalfv. Intermountain Gas. Co., 116 Idaho 622,627, 
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778 P.2d 744,749 (1989). 
Defendants fail to cite the Court to any facts that Goodman has violated the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. Defendant's contention that it has acted fairly and in good faith finds no 
support in the facts of this case. 
v. 
GOODMAN IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF 
DURO-BET'S LIABJLITY FOR BREACH OF THE VACATION AGREEMENT 
Duro-Bilt has breached the Vacation Agreement's covenants by withdrawing its consent and 
improperly instigating the veto (a breach of para. 1 of the Vacation Agreement); by denyingthe grant 
of the perpetual easement (a breach of para. 2 of the Vacation Agreement); by failing to fully 
cooperate to ensure that the purpose and intent of the Agreement is accomplished (a breach of para. 3 
of the Vacation Agreement); by its contentions that the Vacation Agreement has failed ( a breach of 
para. 5 of the Vacation Agreement); and by its breach of the covenant of good faith and f& dealings. 
A breach of contract is non-performance of a contractual duty. See, Enterprise, Inc. v. 
Nampa City, 96 Idaho 734, 740,536 P.2d 729, 735 (1975) (quoting Restatement of the Law of 
Contracts 9 312 (1932)). It is a failure, without legal excuse, to perform any promise, which forms 
the whole or part of acontract. See, Hughes v. Idaho State University, 122 Idaho 435,437,835 P.2d 
670,672 (Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 188 (6& ed. 1990)). 
The existence of the contract (see, page 14 above) and Duro-Bilt's breach are established 
beyond dispute. It is an undisputed fact that Defendants intended to stop the progress of the 
vacation. McKnight testified as follows: "Well, if it's stopping progress of the vacation, then that's 
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okay with me." See, Bates No. 000251. 
Duro-Bilt's conduct not only breached its duties under the Vacation Agreement but the same 
conduct resulted in killing the GoodmanNirylie Purchase and Sale Agreement. 
The facts of Duro-Bilt's breach of the Vacation Agreement are amply set forth above. There 
is no genuine issue as to these essential and uncontroverted facts: 
1.  The Vacation Agreement is valid and enforceable. 
2. In July and August 2004, Duro-Bilt refused to cooperate and consent to the vacation 
procedure in breach of the Vacation Agreement covenants. 
3. Despite Duro-Bilt's refusal to consent and cooperate, Ordinance No. 3374 vacating the 
street was passed and approved. 
4. Duo-Bilt (through McKnight) was the instigator of the illegal veto of No. 
3374. 
5. Duro-Bilt, to this day, contends it has not consented, still refuses to cooperate in the 
vacation of the street, and refuses to recognize the validity of the Vacation Agreement. 
Both parties agree that the Vacation Agreement is not ambiguous and that its interpretation 
is a matter of law. 
The language of the Vacation Agreement is plain and clear. Duro-Bilt's various contentions 
are without merit. Duro-Bilt's unsubstantiated allegations of developer promises are no where 
mentioned in the Vacation Agreement and are inadmissible by reason of the par01 evidence rule. 
See, page 19 above. Duro-Bilt's contention that the Vacation Agreement lacks consideration is 
without merit as a matter of law. See, page 19 above. Finally, Duro-Bilt is estopped, as a matter of 
law, from contesting its consent and the validity of the Vacation Agreement. See, page 16 and 17 
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above. 
Duro-Bilt's conduct, in addition to a breach of the express covenants of the Vacation 
Agreement, also breaches the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This duty obligated Duro-Bilt 
to cooperate with the other parties to the Vacation Agreement so that each could obtain the full 
benefit of performance. 
A violation of the covenant occurs when a party violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any 
benefit of the contract. Sorensen v. Comm. Tels, Inc., 1 18 Idaho 664,669,799 P.2d 70,75 (1990). 
The duty and breach of this covenant have been established. 
Considering the entirety of the Vacation Agreement, giving meaning to all provisions of the 
Agreement, considering the undisputed facts and the application of law, Goodman is entitled to 
Summaly Judgment on the issue of Duro-Bilt's breach of the Vacation Agreement. 
VI. 
GOODMAN IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF 
LIABILITY OF DEFENDANTS FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH THE 
GOODMANAVYLIE PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT 
A prima facie case of tortious interference with a contract exists where aplaintiff establishes: 
(a) the existence of a contract, (b) knowledge of the contract on part of the defendant, (c) intentional 
interference causing breach of the contract and (d) injury to the plainWresulting &om the breach. 
Barlow v. Int '1 Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 88 1,893,522 P.2d 1 102,1115 (1 974). See also, Thirsty 's 
LLC v. Tolerico, 137 P.3d 435 (2006). 
Goodman contends that it is an undisputed fact that the Goodmanlwylie Purchase and Sale 
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Agreement existed. It is also an undisputed fact that this contract had a single contingency - the 
vacation of First Avenue South in an acceptable manner. Prior to entering into the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement with Wylie, Goodman offered to sell its property to Defendants on the same exact terms. 
See, Bates Nos. 000178. 
It is an undisputed fact that Duro-Bilt and McKnight knew of the sale of the Goodman 
property to Wylie. Both Conley and Wylie will testify that they told Duro-Bilt and McKnight of the 
sale and of the contingency. See, Bates Nos. 000178-000179. 
Both Duro-Bilt and McKnight admit that they met with Wylie and were asked to sign a 
consent to the vacation. See, Bates Nos. 000250-000251. According to McKnight, Wylie visited 
him at his business 3 or 4 times. See, Bates Nos. 000250-000251. Wylie asked Duro-BiltJMcKnight 
to sign the consent form requested by the Nampa Fire Department. See, Bates No. 000251. 
McKnight learned of the sale in August of 2004. See, Bates No. 000251. Wylie left Conceptual Site 
Plans with McKnight/Duro-Bit. See, Bates No. 000252. 
It is an undisputed fact that McKnight/Duro-Bilt intended to stop the progress of the vacation 
which resulted in the failure of the GoodmadWyEe transaction. See, Bates No. 00025 1. 
After the Ordinance had been vetoed, McKnight told Goodman that he wished to purchase 
Goodman's property where the car lot is located. See, Bates No. 000181. These lots are # 11 and 12 
and are located to the south of Duro-Bilt's lot. 
It is also an undisputed fact that Goodman has suffered an injury as a result of the reduced 
value of the Goodman property. See, Bates Nos. 000246-000247. 
The knowledge element of the tort is "satisfied by actual knowledge of the prospective 
[economic advantage] or by knowledge of fiictswhich would lead areasonable person to believe that 
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such interest exists." Kutcher v. Zimmerman, 87 Haw. 394,957 P.2d 1076, 1088 11.16 (Haw. Ct. 
App. 1998) (quoting W. P. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton and P. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the 
Law of Torts § 129 at 982 (5* ed. 1984) cited in, Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 
330,338,986 P.2d 996,1004 (Idaho 1999). 
Proof of actual knowledge is not required. It cannot be disputed that Defendants had either 
actual knowledge of the sale or had knowledge of sufficient facts which would lead a reasonable 
person to believe the GoodmadWylie sale existed. 
Goodman is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability of Defendants for tortious 
interference with the GoodmadWylie Purchase and Sale Agreement. 
Defendants have asserted no defense of privilege or justification. See, Walker v, Idaho Fist 
National Bank, 121 Idaho 255,824 P.2d 841 (1991). 
VII. 
GOODMAN IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF 
DEFENDANTS' LIABILITY FOR INTERFERENCE WITH 
PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE 
Under Idaho law, tortious interference with contractual relations is a distinct and independent 
tort from tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, and each has its own elements. 
Barlow v. Int'l Harvester Co. 95 Idaho 881,893-95,522 P.2d 1102,1114-16 (1974). Idaho First 
Nut? Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266,283-84,824 P.2d 841 (1991). For discussion of 
these tort claims, see, Downey Clinic v. Nampa Restaurant Corp., 127 Idaho 283,285-86,900 P.2d 
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The tort of interference with prospective economic advantage was adopted by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Zdaho First National Bankv. Bliss Valley, 121 Idaho 266,824 P.2d 841 (1991). 
The elements of the tort are: 
(1) The existence of a valid economic expectancy; (2) knowledge of the 
expectancy on the part of the interferer; (3) intentional interference inducing 
termination of the expectancy; (4) the interference was wrongfid by some 
measure beyond the fact of the interference itself (i.e. that the defendant 
interfered for an improper purpose of improper means) and (5) resulting 
damage to the plaintiff whose expectancy has been disrupted. 
Highland Enterprises, Znc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330,986 P.2d 996 (1999). 
The torts of intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage and intentional 
interference with contract are very similar, differing only in the type of economic relationship with 
which the defendant has interfered. See, Highland Enterprises, Znc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330,339, 
Goodman's burden of proof is to show that the interference was wrong. "Wrongfulness" of 
the Defendants actions can be shown by either: 
1. That the Defendants had an improper objective or purpose to harm Goodman. 
2. That the Defendants used a wrongful means to cause injury to the prospective 
business relationship. 
See, Please v. City ofSeattle, 1 12 Wash.2d 794,774 P.2d 1158 (1989) and, Top Service Body 
Shop, Znc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 283 Ore. 201,582 P.2d 1365 (1978), cited in Walker v. The Zdaho 
First National Bank, 121 Idaho 266,824 P.2d 841 (1991). 
The undisputed facts in this case satisfy both defintions of'wrongfulness." Defendants own 
testimony is that McKnight intended to stop the progress of the vacation (See, Bates No. 000251), 
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an improper objective, considering Duro-Bilt's consent and agreement to the vacation. Defendant's 
conduct in refusing his cooperation, withdrawing consent and breaching the Vacation Agreement 
all constitute "wrongful means." Defendant's instigation of an illegal veto by the Nampa Mayor is 
also a ''wrongful means." 
Goodman is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability of Defendants for 
interference with prospective economic advantage. 
Defendants have neither pled nor alleged a defense of privilege or justification. See, Barlow 
v. International Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 884,893,522 P.2d 1 102,1114 (1974) (quoting Restatement 
of Torts 5 767 cmt. (a) (1939)). 
m. 
CONCLUSION 
In August of 2004 a unique opportunity was presented to the City of Nampa and the property 
owners adjoining First Avenue South. An experienced developer was willing to invest his time, 
effort and capital into a development that would have enhanced the gateway to Nampa. Duro-Bilt 
and McKnight killed that opportunity. It may be years before that opportunity presents itself again. 
Duo-Bilt, although contractually bound to cooperate and having already consented to the 
street vacation, broke its promises. The result is the one Defendants intended and had hoped to 
achieve. Defendants are directly responsible for torpedoing a development that would have 
enhanced the gateway to Nampa. 
Defendants now must bear responsibility for their ill conceived choices and conduct of 
August 2004. Defendant's motions should be summarily denied. 
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Goodman is entitled to summary judgment on the issues of liability. The issue of damages 
will be addressed at trial. 
DA'IED this - day of August 2006. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
JON M. STEELE 
By: 
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON ISSUES OF LIABILITY, P. 29 
- 000079 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 4 d y of August 2006, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ISSUES OF LIABILITY was 
served upon opposing counsel as follows: 
Christopher Yorgason 
Moore Smith Buxton & Turke, Chtd. y:E$ Delivery 
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520 - Facsimile 
Boise, ID 83702 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
JON M. STEELE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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Attorneys at Law 
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950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 33 1-1 800 
Facsimile: (208) 33 1-1202 
Email: taz@msbtlaw.com 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
1 
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY, ) 
1 
Plaintiff, ) Case No. CV 05-9800 
) 
v. 1 
) ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF BART 
SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR, ) AND ALANE MCKNIGHT 
INC., and Idaho corporation; BART and ) 
ALANE MCKNIGHT, husband and wife; and ) 
DOES I through V. ) 
1 
Defendants. ) 
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Bart and Alane McKnight pursuant to 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and having reviewed the relevant pleadings, briefs and 
memoranda, and having considered oral argument, and good cause appearing therefore: 
It is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff has not shown that the Court should pierce the 
corporate veil and hold Bart and Alane McKnight personally liable for Plaintiffs allegations 
against Scotty's Duro-Bilk Generator, Inc.; and, therefore Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL - 1 
q0"oQsl 
" '  
which relief can be granted against Bart and Alane McKnight; and 
It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs Complaint and Demand for a Jury Trial against 
Bart and Alane McKnight, is hereby dismissed with prejudice, with costs and attorneys fees to be 
addressed separately. 
SEP 1 9 ?On6 
DATED this -day of September, 2006. 
By: 
District Judge, Third ~udiciai~istrict  
ORDER OF DISMISSAL - 2 
"' 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this - day of September, 2006, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Jon M. Steele - U.S. Mail % w 
Karl J. F. Runft H a n d  Delivery 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC - Overnight Mail 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 - Facsimile & 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Facsimile (208) 343-3246 
Email: jmsteele@runfflaw.com 
Tammy A. Zokan - U.S. Mail 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE Hand Delivery 
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520 Overnight Mail 
Boise, Idaho 83702 Facsimile 
Facsimile (208) 33 1 - 1202 
Email: taz@,msbtlaw.com 
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JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
KARL J. RUNFT (ISB # 6640) 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC -A.M. P.M 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83702 K T  0 4 2006 
Phone: (208) 333-9495 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: jmsteele~runftlaw.com 
'>ANYON COUNTY CLERK 
' CRAWFORD, DEPUW 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
SCOT'TY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR, 
INC., an Idaho corporation; BART and 
ALANE MCKNIGHT, husband and wife; 
and DOES I through V. 
Defendants. 
) 
1 
) CASE NO. CV 05-9800 
) 
) GOODMAN'S MOTION FOR 
) RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER 
) DISMISSING BART AND ALANE 
) MCKNIGHT INDIVLDUALLY 
) 
1 
1 
) 
1 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff Goodman Oil Company by and through its counsel of 
record, Runft & Steele Law OfEces, PLLC, and pursuant to I.R.C.P. l l(a)(2)(B) moves 
this Court to reconsider its rulings that Defendants Bart and Alane McKnight are entitled 
to dismissal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12@)6. 
This Motion is based upon a Brief in Support of this Motion and Affidavit of Jon 
M. Steele. 
GOODMAN'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER DISMISSING 
BART AND ALANE MCKNIGHT INDIVIDUALLY - Page 1 
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Oral argument is requested. 
itn DATED this 4 2  day of October, 2006. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
JON M. STEELE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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15 The undersigned hereby certifies that on this day of October 2006, a true and 
correct c o ~ v  of the foreeoine GOODMAN'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
OF ORDER DISMIS'NGIBART AND ALANE MCKNIGHT INDIVIDUALLY 
was served upon opposing counsel as follows: 
T m y  Zokan US Mail 
Moore Smith Baxton & Turke, Chtd. Personal Delivery 
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520 - Facsimile 
Boise, ID 83702 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
KARL J. RUNFT (ISB # 6640) F I ~ L ~ F ~  .M. f3 P.M. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 QCT o 4 2006 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 333-9495 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: jmsteele~m~law.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY, ) 
Plaintiff, 
1 
) CASE NO. CV 05-9800 
VS. 
) 
) BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
) GOODMAN'S MOTION FOR 
SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR, ) RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER 
INC., an Idaho corporation; BART and ) DISMISSING BART AND ALANE 
ALANE MCKNIGHT, husband and wife; ) MCKNIGHT INDIVIDUALLY 
and DOES I through V. ) 
Defendants. 
) 
Goodman respectfully request this Court to reconsider its Order dismissing 
McKnight individually. Goodman's Complaint alleges breach of the Property Owner's 
Vacation Agreement by Duro-Bilt; tortious interference with the Goodman1 Wylie 
Purchase and Sale Agreement by glJ Defendants; negligent interference with prospective 
economic advantage (the Goodman1 Wylie Purchase and Sale Agreement) by & 
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Defendants; and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage (the 
Goodman1 Wylie Purchase and Sale Agreement) by Defendants. 
Paragraph 3 of Goodman's Complaint alleges that "...Defendant's McKnight were 
the alter egos of Defendant Duro-Bilt". This allegation was denied by Defendants. 
The Court's order dismissing McKnights individually was based upon the Courts 
belief that Goodman had failed to present evidence which would justifl "piercing the 
corporate veil" of Defendant Dm-Biit. The only count that the theory of "piercing the 
corporate veil" could apply to is Count I of Goodman's Complaint. 
Count I alleges a breach of the Property Owner's Vacation Agreement dated 
August 2, 1995 between Goodman and Defendant Duro-Bilt. MeKnight was not a party 
to this agreement. 
The other three counts of Goodman's Complaint are tort theories of recovery 
alleging interference with con-. This contract is not the Property Owner's Vacation 
Agreement referred to in Count I. This contract is the Goodman/ Wylie Purchase and 
Sale Agreement dated July 28,2004. The allegations of Counts 11, I11 and IV are made 
against Defendants. These tortious theories of recovery have their own elements and 
do not inciude "piercing the corporate veil". 
The allegations of Goodman's Complaint clearly allege separate and distinct 
counts of breach of contract and tortious interference. In a case dealing with similar 
issues, Davis v. Professional Business Sews., 109 Idaho 810, 813, 712 P.2d 51 1, 514 
(Idaho 1985), substituted opinion at, Magic Valley Radiology Assoc., P.A. v. Professional 
Business Sews., 119 Idaho 558,808 P.2d 1303 (Idaho 1991), the Idaho Supreme Court 
stated the following: 
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All things considered, we view the trial court's characterization of 
plaintiffs claim as one sounding in contract. Hence, judgment 
entered against Helen Kolouch, president of defendant, for the 
reconstruction costs must be reversed, for an officer of a 
corporation is not liable for a breach of a contract made in the 
corporation's name unless it can be shown that the "corporate veil 
should be pierced to avoid unjust consequences inconsistent with 
the corporation concept." Barlow 's, Znc. v. Bannock Cleaning 
Corp., 103 Idaho 310,3 15,647 P.2d 766, 771 (Ct.App.1982); See 
also, Paloukos v. Intermountain Chev. Co., 99 Idaho 740,742,588 
P.2d 939 (1978). Here, there is no evidence to support piercing the 
corporate veil; thus, we adhere to the general rule stated above 
and reverse the district court's judgment entered against Helen 
Kolouch. 
Plaintiff alternatively argues that Kolouch is liable for the 
reconstruction costs it incurred because her acts constituted a 
tortious interference of the contracts between plaintiff and its 
patients. We are not persuaded. Nothing in plaintiffs Second 
Amended Complaint alleges any such tort. Also, the only damages 
found at trial were those [***IS] relating to the reconstruction 
costs of plaintiffs ledger accounts. These damages are in no way 
related to any injury suffered by plaintiff as a result of any alleged 
interference with contracts between plaintiff and its patients. 
Accordingly, no tort liability is assessable against Kolouch for her 
part in breaching the contract entered into by plaintiff and 
defendant. 
In othenvords, the plaintiff failed to include tort allegations in his complaint. Such 
is not the case here. 
Goodman contends that both Defendant Duro-Bilt and Defendant McKnight are 
liable to it for the following torts: 
1. Tortious interference with the Goodman/ Wylie Purchase and Sale 
Agreement 
2. Negligent interference with the Goodman/ Wylie Purchase and 
Sale Agreement 
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3. Intentional interference with the Goodman1 Wylie Purchase and 
Sale Agreement 
The Court's ruling dismissing McKnight individually fails to recognize the 
difference between Goodman's single contract theory of recovery against Duro-Bilt and 
Goodman's three tort theories of recovery against both Duto-Bilt and McKnight. 
The Court is also directed to the Defendant's Answer filed October 12,2005. The 
Answer refers to Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc. and Bart and Alane McKnight 
collectively as Duro-Bilt. Defendants own attorney makes no distinction between the 
corporate defendant and individual defendants. 
This litigation is the result of Defendant Duro-Bilt's breach of contract. That is 
the starting point. Duro-Bilt's breach of the Property Owner's Vacation Agreement led to 
Duro-Bilt's and McKnight's interference with the Goodman/ Wylie Purchase and Sale 
Agreement. 
This entire dispute would never have occurred if Duro-Bilt had abided by the 
contractual terms it agreed to in the Property Owner Street Vacation Agreement. But for 
the breach of that agreement and McKnight's interdiction of Ordinance No. 3374 the 
Goodman/ Wylie Purchase and Sale Agreement would have closed. 
It is an undisputed fact that the Goodman/ Wylie Purchase and Sale Agreement 
existed. It is also an undisputed fact that the Goodman1 Wylie Purchase and Sale 
Agreement had a single contingency - the vacation of First Avenue South in an 
acceptable manner. Prior to entering into the Purchase and Sale Agreement with Wylie, 
Goodman had offered to sell its property to Defendants on the same exact terms as 
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offered to Wylie. See, Bates Nos. 000178. It is undisputed that Defendants had 
knowledge of the Goodman1 Wylie Purchase and Sale Agreement 
It is an undisputed fact that Duro-Bilt and McKnight knew of the sale of the 
Goodman property to Wylie. Both Conley and Wylie will testify that they told Duro-Bilt 
and McKnight of the sale and of the contingency. See, Bates Nos. 000178-000179. 
Both Duro-Bilt and McKnight admit that they met with Wylie and were asked to 
sign a consent to the vacation. See, Bates Nos. 000250-00025 1. According to McKnight, 
Wylie visited him at his business 3 or 4 times. See, Bates Nos. 000250-000251. Wylie 
asked Dm-Biltl McKnight to sign the consent fom requested by the Nampa Fire 
Department. See, Bates No. 000251. Wylie left Conceptual Site Plans with Duro-Biltl 
McKnight. See, Bates No. 000252. 
McKnight, Thorne and the Mayor had been on a ski trip together to Sun Valley in 
March of 2004. Mayor Dale describes McKnight as a Eend. See, Bates No. 000180. 
In his deposition, Mayor Dale co&rmed McKnight7s material, ex parte contact, 
recalling that "he [McKnight] conveyed to me that, as a property owner on that street, he 
did not agree to the vacation at this time. See, Bates No. 0001 81. 
After Ordinance No. 3374 had been vetoed, McKnight told Goodman that he 
wished to purchase Goodman's property where the car lot is located. See, Bates No. 
000181. These lots are #11 and 12 and are located to the south of Duro-Bilt's lot. 
It is also an undisputed fact that Goodman has suffered an injury as a result of the 
reduced value of the Goodman property. See, Bates Nos. 000246-000247. 
A prima facie case of tortious intderence with a contract exists where a plaintiff 
has established: (a) the existence of a contract, (b) knowledge of the contract on part of 
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the defendant, (c) intentional interference causing breach of the contract and (d) injury to 
the plaintiff resulting from the breach. Barlow v. Znt? Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881,893, 
522 P.2d 1102,1115 (1974). See also, Thirsty's LLC v. Tolerico, 137 P.3d 435 (2006). 
The knowledge element of the tort is "satisfied by actual knowledge of the 
prospective [economic advantage] or by knowledge of facts which would lead a 
reasonable person to believe that such interest exists." Kutcher v. Zimmerman, 87 Haw. 
394,957 P.2d 1076, 1088 n. 16 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting W. P. Keeton, D. Dobbs, 
R. Keeton and P. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 129 at 982 (5"h ed. 
1984) cited in, Highland Enterprises, Znc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 338, 986 P.2d 996, 
1004 (Idaho 1999). 
Although proof of actual knowledge is not required, it cannot be disputed that 
Defendants had either actual knowledge of the Goodmad Wylie sale or had knowledge 
of sufficient facts which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the Goodman1 
Wylie sale existed. 
Once the elements of Goodman's claim are established the burden shifts to the 
Defendants to prove a privilege or justification. McKnight and Duro-Bilt have completely 
failed to assert any defense of privilege or justification to Goodman's tort claims. See, 
Brief pages 26 and 28. Goodman contends that rather than dismissal of McKnight, 
judgment as to his liability and Duro-Bilt's liability should be entered in Goodman's 
favor. 
In the case of Idaho First Nut? Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266, 824 
P.2d 841,859 (Idaho 1991), The Idaho Supreme Court stated that: 
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". . .after the plaintiff has established aprima facie case, "the burden is on the 
defendant to prove justification." Footnote 15 ' 
' Footnote 15: With regard to justification for an interference, the Barlow 
case noted: 
"'Unlike the law of defamation, this branch of the law Eiterference 
with contract] has not crystallized a complete set of definite rules as to the 
existence or non-existence of privilege. * * * The issue in each case is 
whether the actor's conduct is justifiable under the circumstances; 
whether, upon a consideration of the relative significance of the factors 
involved, his conduct should be permitted despite its expected effect of 
harm to another." Restatement of Torts $767, comment a at 63 (1939). 
'What is "unwarranted" interference depends on the facts of each ease.' 
Watson v. Settlemeyer, 150 Colo. 326,372 P.2d 453,456 (1962). See also, 
Freed v. Manchester Service, supra, 33 1 P.2d at 691-692. When an action 
involving interference with contract is tried to a jury, it is o r d i i l y  for the 
jury to determine whether the interference of the defendant was justified. 
Mitchell v. Aldrich, supra, 163 A.2d at 837; Jachon v. O'NeiIl, 181 Kan. 
930,317 P.2d 440,443 (1957). 
"Otherwise justifiable conduct is rendered unjustified where 
improper means, such as defamation, are employed by the defendant. 
W.L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts $ 129, pp. 936-37 (4th ed. 
1971). See Calbom v. Knudtzon, supra, 396 P.2d at 151 ." Barlow v. Int? 
Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881 at 893,522 P.2d 1102 at 11 14 (1974). 
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Duro-Bilt, although contractually bound to cooperate and having already 
consented to the street vacation, broke its promises. This conduct was not only a breach 
of the Property Owner's Vacation Agreement, but also was an interference with the 
Goodman1 Wylie Purchase and Sale Agreement. McKnight's undisputed role as 
instigator of Duro-Bilt's refusal to cooperate and of an illegal veto by the Nampa Mayor 
are more than sufficient to withstand McKnight's Motion for Summary Judgment or 
dismissal under IRCP 12(b)6. 
The Defendants Duro-Bilt and McKnight, now bear the burden of proving 
justification. None has been alleged by either Defendant. 
Goodman respectfully requests the Court to reconsider its Order. 
DATED this isy of October, 2006. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
w The undersigned hereby certifies that on this & day of October 2006, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER DISMISSING BART AND ALANE 
MCKNIGHT INDIVIDUALLY was served upon opposing counsel as follows: 
Tammy Zokan US Mail 
Moore Smith Buxton & Turke, Chtd. personal Delivery 
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520 Facsimile 
Boise, ID 83702 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Jn gbh By: 
JON M. STEELE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
KARL J. RUNF1: (ISB # 6640) 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFJKWES, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 333-9495 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: jmsteele@runftiaw.com 
F I L* 
A . M .  
D 
P.M. 
CANYON COUNlY CLERK 
T. CRAVVFORD, DEPUW 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY, 1 
1 
Plaintiff, ) CASE NO. CV 05-9800 
1 
vs. ) AFFIDAVIT OF JON M. STEELE IN 
) SUPPORT OF GOODMAN'S 
SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR, ) MOTION FOR 
INC., an Idaho corporation; BART and ) RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER 
ALANE McKNIGHT, husband and wife; ) DISMISSING BART AND ALANE 
and DOES I through V, ) MCKNIGHT INDIVIDUALLY 
Defendants. 
1 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
COMES NOW, Jon M. Steele, being over the age of eighteen years and 
competent to make this Affidavit, after first being duly sworn, and upon his own 
information and belief, states as follows: 
AFFIDAVIT OF JON M. STEELE IN SUPPORT OF GOODMAN'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER DISMISSING BART AND ALANE MCKNIGHT 
INDIVIDUALLY - Page 1 
1. That I am an attorney in good standing with the Idaho State Bar and counsel 
for the Plaintiff herein. 
2. That I make this affidavit in support of Goodman's Motion for 
Reconsideration of Order Dismissing Bart and Alane McKnight Individually. 
3. That this Court's Order was premised upon the fact that Goodman had failed 
to provide the Court with facts justifying "piercing of the corporate veil". 
4. That Goodman's Complaint has a single contract count (Count I) to which this 
theory could apply. 
5. That Goodman's Complaint has three tort counts (Counts 11, 111, and IV) to 
which the theory of piercing the corporate veil has absolutely no application. 
6. The elements of proof of Goodman's tort counts do not include "piercing the 
corporate veil". Goodman's claim is a direct action against McKnight, 
individually. 
Further, your affiant sayeth naught. 
.tL, DATED this C( day of October 2006. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: J A  ,m 
JON M. STEELE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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OQOQS? 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
On this *day of October 2006, before me hkB\ , a  
notary public, personally appeared JON M. STEELE, known to me to be the person 
whose name is subscribed to the above document, and acknowledged to me that he 
executed the same. 
Notary Public for the State of Idaho 
Residing at: R ) y @  
My Commission Exp~res: 3 -( 
.0) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certified that on this & day of October 2006, a true and 
correct copy of the AFFIDAVIT OF JON M. STEELE IN SUPPORT OF 
GOODMAN'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER DISMISSING 
BART AND ALANE MCKNIGHT INDIVIDUALLY was served upon opposing 
counsel as follows: 
Tamrny Zokan 
Moore Smith 
225 N. 9th, Suite 420 
Boise ID 83702 
US Mail 
_ZL_ Personal Delivery 
F a c s i m i l e  
RUWT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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SUSAN E. BUXTON # 4041' 
TAMMY A. ZOKAN # 5450 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHARTERED 
Attorneys at Law 
950 West Bannock, Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 33 1-1 800 
Facsimile: (208) 33 1-1202 
Email: taz@msbtlaw.com 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
P. SALAS, DEPUTY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY, 1 
Plaintiff, ) Case No. CV 05-9800 
v. ) 
) DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN 
SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR, ) OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
INC., and Idaho corporation; and DOES I ) MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
through V. ) JUDGMENT 
1 
Defendant. 1 
COME NOW, Defendant Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc. ("Duro-Bilt" or "Defendant"), 
by an through their attorneys of record, Moore, Smith, Buxton & Turcke, Chartered, and submit their 
Response in Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment filed on August 22, 2006. 
Defendant's Response is supported by this Response and Second Affidavit of Tammy A. Zokan, 
Defendant's Motions, Memorandum and Affidavits filed on June 16,2006 and June 29,2006, and 
Defendant's Reply and Affidavit of Tammy A. Zokan filed on August 29,2006. 
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I. SUMMARY OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
On July 3 1,1995, Plaintiff, Duro-Bilt, the Blamires Family Trust and T.J. Forest, Inc. entered 
into a Property Owner Street Vacation Agreement (the "Agreement" or "Vacation Agreement"), 
whereby the parties to the Agreement agreed to the City ofNampa's vacation of First Avenue South 
between Blocks 16 and 19 of Pleasants Addition and the execution of subsequent agreements upon 
the happening of the following conditions: 
1. City action approving the vacation of lSt Ave. S; 
2. The parties' grant among them themselves a perpetual easement on the vacated 
property for access to and from each party's property, which access is to be at the discretion of 
property owners; 
3. The parties' execution of an agreement defining their rights and obligations after 
the City vacated the street; 
4. The parties' sharing of maintenance of the vacated property in proportion to the 
amount of property they each own. 
Complaint, Ex. A, 77 1-3. 
Plaintiff filed an application for vacation on August 3, 1995. Plf 000044. The application 
identified the reason for the applications as (1) so adjacent properties owners may more fully utilize 
their properties; and, (2) the construction of a bank building. Id. On September 6, 1995, the City 
notified Plaintiff that an ordinance approving the vacation would be prepared and approved upon 
Plaintiff satisfymg three (3) conditions: 
1. Provision for storm drainage and public utilities. 
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2. Closure in a manner acceptable to the City Engineer. 
3. Provision for emergency access. 
Plf 000098,000240. No ordinance related to the vacation was adopted in 1995 or anytime thereafker 
prior to 2004. Plaintiff does not provide any evidence that it attempted to satisfy the City's 
conditions for vacation after the vacation was tabled in October 1995 and before 2004. See Plf 
000241-242,000233. 
The matter did not come up again until Mr. Ralph Wylie sought to purchase Plaintiffs 
property in 2004. Plf 000203-206. On August 4,2004, the Nampa Fire Department issued a letter 
stating its terms of agreement regarding the vacation. Plf 000046. The requirements included: (1) a 
twenty foot (20') access easement, and (2) written approval of the Nampa Fire Department's access 
requirement by all affected property owners. Id. The 20' access did not exist as a condition to 
vacation prior to August 4,2004, hence the Fire Department's requirement for owner approval. See 
Id., Plf 000046. 
In the summer of 2004, Mr. Wylie approached Duro-Bilt and asked that it sign a new 
document signifying its agreement to the Nampa Fire Department's August 4, 2004, 20' access 
requirement. See Plf 000233,000250; Affidavit of Chris E. Yorgason in Support of Defendant's 
Motions filed on June 16,2006 (hereinafter "Yorgason Aff."), Ex. B (Conley Tr.) pp. 47-51, Ex. 6. 
After review, Duro-Bilt refused to sign the document because the 20' easement did not provide 
adequate access to Duro-Bilt's property and would injure Duro-Bilt's business. Plf 000250-251, 
253; Yorgason Aff., Ex. A (McKnight Tr.) p. 45,l. 25, p. 46,ll. 1-7; p. 85,ll. 24-25, p. 86,ll. 1-14, 
p. 90,11. 11-25, p. 91,ll. 1-22. 
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Despite Duro-Bilt's objection, Mr. Wylie proceeded with the vacation application and the 
Narnpa City Council approved the vacation of First Avenue South by Ordinance No. 3374. Plf 
000251; Yorgason Aff., Ex. B (Conley Tr.) p. 99,ll. 10-13. The Ordinance pursued by Mr. Wylie, 
Ordinance No. 3374, was adopted by the City Council on August 16,2004. Complaint, Ex. C. 
Ordinance No. 3374 conditions the vacation on a certain fifty-foot (50') access and utility 
easement. Id. Duro-Bilt was not aware that Ordinance No. 3374 approving the vacation was before 
the City Council nor did Duro-Bilt have any knowledge of the contents of any such Ordinance until 
after the Ordinance was adopted on August 16,2004. Plf 000213,000253; Yorgason Aff., Ex. A 
(McKnight Tr.) p. 63 1. 10-25, p. 64 1. 1-1 1, p. 87 1. 1-1 1, p. 88 I. 5-20, p. 89 1.8-25, p. 90 1. 1-3, p. 
100 1. 2-24. 
After learning that the City adopted an ordinance approving the vacation, Duro-Bilt contacted 
the City to express its disagreement with the vacation. Duro-Bilt expressed its objection verbally on 
or about August 19,2004 and by letter dated September 3,2004. Complaint, Ex. D; Plf 000253. The 
basis for that objection was that 20' would not provide adequate access to Defendant's property and 
Defendant's business "has grown to where it has need of access through the whole block from both 
sides for industrial & agricultural vehicles, eighteen wheelers, commercial vehicles and general 
traffic. . . . To restrict this street would cripple [Duro-Bilt's] business, frustrate customers and 
become a traffic hazard." Complaint, Ex. D.' These concerns were based on the 20' easement 
1 Defendant did not know the Ordinance imposed a 50' access and utility easement rather than 
the proposed 20' access easement. Defendant does not know whether a 50' easement would 
- A 
provide adequate access to Defendant's business. Yorgason Aff. Ex. A (McKnight Tr.) p. 100 1. 
2-25. 
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required by the Nampa Fire Department and presented to Defendant by Wylie prior to the City's 
adoption of Ordinance No. 3374. Yorgason Aff., Ex. A (McKnight Tr.) p. 63 1.10-25, p. 64 1.1-1 1, 
p. 87 1. 1-11, p. 88 1. 5-20, p. 89 1. 8-25, p. 90 1. 1-3, p. 100 1. 2-24. 
According to Plaintiff, the 50' access and utility easement imposed by the City spoiled 
Plaintiffs sale of its property to Wylie and devalued Plaintiffs property. Plf 000246, 000184. 
According to Plaintiff, the value of the property was further reduced by twenty percent (20%) due to 
the City's rezone of Plaintiffs property. Id. 
The Vacation Agreement was not recorded until September 14,2004. Plf 000038. 
On October 5,2004, Plaintiff sued the City and Duro-Bilt seeking a writ of mandamus for 
publication of the Ordinance and a petition for judicial review challenging the City's reservation of 
fifty-foot (50') access and utility easement. Petition for Writ of Mandate and Petition for Judicial 
Review, Goodman Oil Company v. City of Nampa, et a1 and Scotty 's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc., 
Case No. CV 04-10007. On June 29,2005, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs claims against Duro-Bilt 
with prejudice for the reason that Plaintiff failed to state a claim against Duro-Bilt upon which relief 
could be granted. Zokan Aff., Ex. A. The Court also awarded Duro-Bilt costs and attorney fees in 
the amount of $9,332.49. Id., Ex. D. 
After dismissing Plaintiffs claims against Defendant with prejudice, the Court granted 
Plaintiffs request for Preemptory Writ of Mandamus and issued its Order on August 8, 2005, 
compelling the City to publish OrdinanceNo. 3374. Plf 000001-2,000004-5. Judge Morfitt found 
and concluded that the act of publishing the Ordinance No. 3374 was a non-discretionary ministerial 
function because: 
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1. The City Council passed Ordinance No. 3374; and 
2. The Mayor approved Ordinance No. 3374; and 
3. The Mayor relinquished possession and control of Ordinance No. 3374. 
Second Zokan Aff., Ex. A, Goodman Oil Co. v. City ofNarnpa, CaseNo. CV04-10007, Hrg. Tr. pp. 
38-39 (July 15,2005). Ordinance No. 3374 as adopted and subsequently published in accordance 
with Court Order, provides for a 50' emergency and utility access easement. Plf 00001 1. 
Even though Ordinance was adopted and then was published upon Plaintiffs demand, 
Plaintiff continues to object to the City's requirement for adequate emergency and utility access and 
the vacation is subject to ongoing litigation. See Plf 000012-54. 
11. ARGUMENT 
A. Defendant did not Breach the Vacation Agreement 
There is no dispute that the 1995 Agreement was contingent upon the occurrence of specific 
conditions, including vacation by the City of Nampa. Complaint, Ex. A, 7 1. Once vacated, the 
parties were to grant themselves a perpetual easement on the vacated property for access to and from 
each parties' property -- said access to be at the discretion of property owners. Id. at g 2. Then the 
parties would execute an agreement defining their rights and obligations after the City vacated the 
street. Id. at 7 3. The parties would then be responsible for maintenance in proportion to the amount 
of property they own. Id. 
There is no perpetual easement at issue in this case. There was not and could not be a 
perpetual easement under the terms of the Agreement until there was a vacation by the City of 
Nampa. Plaintiff did not attempt to fulfill the conditions for the vacation until 2004 and there was no 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
-Page 6 
vacation until 2005 and that vacation is tied up in litigation brought by Plaintiff against the City of 
Nampa. Plaintiff filed a vacation application on August 3, 1995, and the City of Nampa advised 
Plaintiff that the vacation would be approved upon Plaintiff fulfilling three (3) conditions. Plf 
000044, 000098, 000240. The only thing Plaintiff did was file the application; Plaintiff did not 
fulfill or attempt to fulfill the required conditions until 2004. Id., Plf 000241-242. The conditions 
and the grant was therefore defeated or never occurred as the result of Plaintiffs nonperformance. 
Idaho Code $ 5  55-608, 55-609. 
The failure of Plaintiff to meet the conditions imposed by the City in 1995 and achieve the 
vacation of the street in accordance with the Agreement, or within a reasonable time, resulted in an 
impossibility, impracticality and frustration of the contract such that performance under the contract 
was excused as a matter of law. As shown by the undisputed evidence in this case, Duro-Bilt has 
acted fairly and in good faith under the terms of the Agreement. See Idaho Power Company v. 
Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738,746,9 P.3d 1204 (2000); Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corporation, 
141 Idaho 233,243, 108 P.3d 380 (2005). Defendant did not fail to perform any contractual duty 
owed to Plaintiff. Id. Even if Defendant arguably had some contractual duty it failed to perform, 
Defendant are legally excused from performance. Id. 
If this Court determines that the parties are still bound by the Vacation Agreement, Defendant 
has not breached the conditions of the Agreement, because: 
1. Performance of subsequent conditions is not due; 
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2. The vacation is tied up in litigation because Plaintiff disagrees with the terms of the 
vacation and without resolution of the scope and conditions of vacation, the matter is not ripe 
for grant of a perpetual easement; 
3. There is no perpetual easement in the record and the Plaintiff has not proposed such 
easement. Plaintiff admits that no perpetual easement has been drafted or granted and that 
any perpetual easement would be conditioned on agreement by all parties, Yorgason Aff., Ex. 
B, P 64; 
4. There is no evidence that Defendant has refused to discuss or cooperate with the 
parties to the Agreement regarding the grant of a perpetual easement for each party to access 
each party's property. 
There is no evidence that Plaintiff andlor all the parties to the Vacation Agreement have 
attempted to fdfill their obligation to grant and convey a perpetual easement providing for access to 
each of their properties. Likewise, there is no evidence that Plaintiff andlor the parties to the 
Vacation Agreement have presented a formal agreement regarding the parties rights and obligations; 
no evidence that it is time to perform any of obligations Plaintiff alleges have been breached. Once 
the City took final action on the vacation ordinance, Plaintiff commenced litigation against the City 
and Defendant. The scope and conditions of the vacation then are currently unknown and cannot be 
known until the matter is finally decided by the Court. 
B. Defendant is not Liable in Tort 
The undisputed evidence shows Defendant has not intentionally or negligently interfered with 
Plaintiffs contract. Defendant did not cause injury to the contractual relationship or any economic 
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damage to Plaintiff. See Thirsty's L.L.C. v. Tolerico, ---Idaho---, 2006 Opinion No. 62 (May 26, 
2006). According to Plaintiff, the veto of OrdinanceNo. 3374, adopted on August 16,2004, caused 
the sale of the property to Mr. Wylie to fall through. Complaint at 7 39. Plaintiff and Mr. Wylie also 
identify the City's adoption of the Ordinance No. 3374 with the 50' access and utility easement 
(along with the rezoning of the property by the City) as causing the sale to fail and decrease the value 
of Plaintiffs property. Plf 000246-247. Defendant did not adopt and has no authority to adopt the 
Ordinance that is the basis of Plaintiffs complaint. Likewise, Defendant did not impose and has no 
authority to impose the 50' emergency and utility easement on the vacated property. Moreover, 
Defendant did not veto nor does it have the authority to veto an Ordinance of the City. Finally, 
Defendant did not play any part in the rezone of Plaintiffs property. The conduct framing Plaintiffs 
Complaint isthe conduct of the City of Nampa, not Defendant. 
Defendant acted reasonably and its actions were justified. Barlow v. International Hawest 
Co., 95 Idaho, 881, 893, 522 p. 2d 1102 (1974)' 
The issue in each case is whether the actor's conduct is justifiable under the 
circumstances; whether upon a consideration of significance of the factors involved, 
his conduct should be permitted despite its expected effect of harm to another. What 
is "unwanted" interference depends on the facts of each case. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
In 2004, Plaintiff asked Defendant to agree to a 20' access easement which width is not 
2 Plaintiff falsely asserts that Defendant has not argued that its actions were justified. See Plf s 
Br. at p. 28 and Plf s Brief in Support of Reconsideration at p. 6. Plaintiffs assertions are 
untrue. Defendant has repeatedly argued and the undisputed evidence in the record shows, that 
Defendant has acted in good faith and its actions were justified. Def s Memo in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment at p. 20 and Def s Reply at pp. 14-15. 
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adequate to access Defendant's property and is not sufficient to accommodate Duro-Bilt's customers 
and suppliers. When Defendant later learned the Ordinance was adopted, it understood the vacation 
was limited to the 20' proposed by wylie.' The evidence shows that Duro-Built contacted the City 
government due to its concern about City action on what Duro-Bilt understood to be a vacation with 
a much too small access easement. Because the 20' access did not provide adequate access to Duro- 
Bilt's property as expressly provided for in the Vacation Agreement; and, because the inadequate 
access would negatively impact Duro-Bilt's property, Duro-Bilt inquired into the status of any such 
action and asked how Duro-Bilt could participate in the process. Clearly, Duro-Bilt's actions were 
reasonable and justified under the circumstances. 
The undisputed evidence shows Duro-Bilt had no objective other than to protect access to its 
property, which access is expressly provided for under the Vacation Agreement. Duro-Bilt had no 
objective to harm Plaintiff nor did Duro-Bilt employ wrongful means to cause injury to the 
prospective business relationship. See Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 
Idaho 266, 285-286, 824 P.2d 841 (1991). There is no allegation or evidence that Defendant 
engaged in "conduct that violates the law, violence, threats, intimidation, deceit, misrepresentation, 
bribery or disparaging falsehoods. Id. at 286 fh. 16. Likewise, there is no evidence Defendant used 
"improper means, such as defamation" in contacting the City. See Barlow v. International Harvester 
Co., 95 Idaho at 893. Contrary to Plaintiffs assertions, the evidence indisputably shows that 
Defendant merely wanted to ensure access to its property. Defendant have advised Plaintiff of their 
3 The evidence shows that Defendant did not know that the Ordinance adopted a 50' access and 
utility easement rather than a 20' access easement. It is unknown whether 50' access easement is 
sufficient for Defendant's customers and suppliers. 
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access needs and told Plaintiff that Defendant would entertain ideas to address Defendant's needs. 
Plf 000251-254; Yorgason Aff. 72. Defendants have acted reasonably and in accordance with the 
Vacation Agreement. 
If any alleged injury occurred to the contractual relationship, property value or any other 
interest of Plaintiff, that injury was directly caused by Plaintiff and Plaintiff's purchaser's own 
actions. As explained above, Ordinance No. 3374, adopted on August 16, 2004, specifically 
conditions the vacation of First Avenue South on a certain 50' emergency and utility access 
easement. The Ordinance was adopted upon Plaintzfs request; Defendant knew nothing about it. 
The Ordinance was published and therefore became law at the behest ofPlaint8 who sued the City 
and obtained a Writ of Mandamus compelling publication of said Ordinance. Plaintiff says it is the 
size of the easement that resulted in the cancellation of the sale agreement. Finally, any alleged 
decrease in the value of Plaintiffs property due to rezoning by the City is an issue between Plaintiff 
and the City, not Plaintiff and Duro-Bilt. 
The actual undisputed evidence of record shows that the 1995 Vacation Agreement was 
based on a number of conditions, which conditions have not occurred and cannot occur until 
Plaintiffs litigation over the vacation is resolved in the City ofNampa case; and, which Agreement 
arguably has expired because the conditions were not llfilled within a reasonable time. The 
undisputed evidence further shows that the Agreement expressly provided each party thereto access 
to each party's property with said access to be a the discretion of each party after the vacation was 
approved by the City. 
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The undisputed evidence also shows that between 1995 and 2004 no one contacted Defendant 
about the Agreement or vacation; that in 2004 Wylie asked Defendant to sign an agreement to the 
Nampa Fire Department's 2004,207 access easement, which access is not adequate to provide access 
to Defendant's property. It is undisputed that Defendant did not know the vacation was back before 
City Council; did not know Ordinance No. 3374 was pending before City Council; and did not know 
the contents of Ordinance No. 3374. The undisputed evidence further shows that when Defendant 
learned Ordinance No. 3374 had been adopted, Defendant immediately contacted their City 
govement  because of Defendant's concerns about adequate access to its property. The undisputed 
evidence shows there was no intentional or negligent interference by Defendant to cause a breach of 
contract, no wrongful means employed by Defendant, no duty owed to Plaintiff or breach thereof and 
no a causal connection between the Defendant's conduct and the Plaintiffs injury and actual loss or 
damage and that Defendant's actions were justified under the circumstances. The complained-of 
conduct: (1) adoption of the Ordinance with the 50' easement, and (2) veto of the same Ordinance, 
was entirely within the purview of the City, not Defendant. 
There are no genuine issues of material fact on Plaintiffs contract and tort claims against 
Defendant and Defendant, not Plaintiff, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
C. Defendant is not Estopped from Contesting the Vacation Agreement 
The Transcript of the July 15, 2005, hearing in the matter of Goodman Oil Co. v. City of 
Nampa makes clear that the validity of the Vacation Agreement was not resolved in that matter. 
First, the Court determined that Plaintiff raised no issues or claims for Duro-Bilt in the City 
ofNampa case before entering its Order mandating publication of the Ordinance. Zokan Aff. Ex. A, 
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D, E. The Court held that Plaintiff stated no claim against Duro-Bilt and dismissed all of Plaintiffs 
claims against Duro-Bilt with prejudice. Zokan Aff., Ex. A. Second, the validity of the Vacation 
Agreement was not decided in the prior proceeding. Second Zokan Aff., Ex. A, Hrg. Tr. pp 38-39. 
As explained by Plaintiffs counsel, Mr. Steele, that the City ofNampa case "is a veto case.. . [olur 
summary judgment is based upon the veto power of the mayor." Id. at p. 16,l.  3-4. The Court was 
concerned only with the question of whether, as amatter of law, the Mayor had the authority to veto 
the Ordinance after the City Council adopted it and the Mayor relinquished control over it and 
directed the clerk to publish it. Id. at pp. 38-39. The Court noted specifically that it was undisputed 
that the Ordinance was passed in the manner according to law. Id. at p. 37. The duty to publish the 
Ordinance then became ministerial and there was thus a clear duty to act. Id. at p. 39. There was no 
inquiry into or discussion of the underlying vacation or Vacation Agreement. See id. at p. 37-39. 
The Judge did note the Mayor's asserted justification for the veto: the requirement for 
landowner consent under Idaho Code 8 50-1321. Id. at p. 37,l. 9-13. However, it is clear from the 
Judge's ruling in that case that the issue of landowner consent played no role in, and was unnecessary 
to, the Judge's decision. See id. at p. 37-39. The validity of the Vacation Agreement was not 
resolved in the other proceeding. Id. 
The issue decided by Judge Morfitt is not identical to the issues in this litigation, the parties 
are not the same, and the issues in this litigation are not and were not necessary to support the 
outcome in the case before Judge Morfitt. Western Indus & Envt'l Sews., Inc. v. KaldveerAssocs., 
Inc., 126 Idaho 541, 887 P.2d 1048 (1994). 
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111. CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment in favor of Defendant, not Plaintiff, is appropriate in this case. The 
undisputed facts show that Defendant is not in breach of any Agreement with Plaintiff and Defendant 
have not intentionally or negligentiy interfered with any contractual relationship of Plaintiff nor 
caused any damage to Plaintiff and Defendant's actions were justified. Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment should be denied and Defendant's Motion should be granted. 
DATED this 10th day of October, 2006. 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIN3 JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
1 
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) Case No. CV 05-9800 
) 
v. ) SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF TAMMY A. 
) ZOKAN 
SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR, ) 
JNC., and Idaho corporation; and DOES I 1 
through V. 1 
1 
Defendants. ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Ada 1 
TAMMY A. ZOKAN, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am one of the attorneys of record for Defendant Scotty's Duro-Bilt in the above- 
entitled matter and make this affidavit upon my own personal knowledge. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Transcript of the July 
15,2005, hearing before the Honorable James C. Morfitt, District Judge, in Goodman Oil Company 
v. City of Nampa, Case No. CV-04-10007, that I received from Plaintiffs counsel via email on 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF TAMMY A. ZOKAN - 1 
000915 
September 1 1,2006. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
~amm~(&,&kan, o f  tli/e Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Q% day of October, 2006. me this - 
- .  0 
NOTARY P U ~ L I C  FOR IDAHO 
Residing at: U ~ ~ C C /  \D 
My Commission ~ x ~ i i e s :  3 - b ~  a01a 
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+'4 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this aday of October, 2006, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing SECOND AFFIDAVLT OF TAMMY A. ZOKAN by the method indicated 
below, and addressed to the following: 
John M. Steele U.S. Mail 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC Hand Delivery 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 2 Overnight Mail 
Boise, Idaho 83702 ~acsimile 
Facsimile (208) 343-3246 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THETHlRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FORTHE COUNTY OF CANYON CALDWELL, IDAHO, FRIDAY, JULY ISTH, 2005 I 
GOODMAN OILCOMPANY, 1 1 3  P R O C E E D I N G S  I 
I 
Petitioner, ) 
1 
VS. ) CaseNo. CV 04-10007 
1 
CITY OF NAMPA, a corporate body ) 
politic; THE CITY COUNCIL of ) 
the CITY OF NAMPA; MAYORTOM ) 
DALE, in his capacity as Mayor ) 
of the City of Nampa; DhNA ) 
LAMBING, in her capacity as ) 
City Clerk; and SCOTPI'S ) 
DURO-BELT GENERATOR, INC., ) 
an Idaho corporation, ) 
REPORTFA'S TRANSCRIPT 
~~ ~ - -  
BE IT IIEMEhIBERED. that thc above-entitled rnatter came on 
regulvly for a hearing on .MO~IUDS to Strikc and Writ of 
Mandate on Frihy July 15. 2005, Caldwcll, Idaho, bcforr 
the Honorable James C. Mottilt, District Judge. 
4 
5 THE COURT: Okay. We're now ready to move on to 
6 the City of Nampa -- Goodman Oil versus the City of 
7 Nampa. 
8 MR. KORMANIK: Good afternoon, Judge. 
9 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 
1 0  MR. STEELE: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 
1 1 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 
1 2  Mr. Steele and Mr. Runft appear on behalf of 
1 3  the plaintiffs. And Mr. Kormanik appears on behalf of 
1 4  the City of Nampa. Mr. Jorgenson on behalf of Scotty 
15  Duro-Bilt is not appeating. And I guess that answers my 
1 6  question as to whether or not their motion -- or the 
1 7  objection on attorney's fees has been noticed. I did 
18 not fmd that it had been. So apparently it has not. 
1 9  Is that your understanding? 
2 0 MR. STEELE: That's correct. 
2 1 MR. KORMANIK: I believe that's correct. Judee. 
Andrea L. Chandler, RPR 
A P P E A R A N C E S  
For the Petitioner: RUNFT & STEELE 
By: Jon M. Steele, Esq. 
By: Karl J. Runfl , Esq. 
1020 West Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 333-8506 
Facsimile: (208) 343-3246 
jmsteele@runfllaw.com 
For the Respondents: WHITE PETERSON 
By: John R. Kormanik, Esq. 
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
Telephone: (208) 466-9272 
Facsimile: (208) 466-4405 
jkonnanik@whitepeterson.com 
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2 2 THE COURT: This case is before the Court today. 
2 3 The City of Nampa has filed a motion to strike and have 
2 4 filed a second motion to strike. And the plaintiffs 
2 5 have filed a motion for summary judgment on the Writ of 
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1 Mandate issued. 
2 Are those the three matters that we have 
3 before US today? 
4 MIL KORMANDK: That's correct, Judge. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. Probably, we need to take up 
6 the motions to strike first, and then we'll take up the 
7 plaintiffs inotion for summary judgment. I'll hear -- 
8 can we take both of these up together? 
9 MR. KORMANK Yes, Judge. 
1 0  THE COURT: They're somewhat related. 
11 MR. KORMANIK: Yes. 
1 2  THE COURT: Very well, you may proceed. 
1 3  MR. KORMANIK: The initial motion to strike filed 
1 4  by Mr. Ilallam deals with some statements in the brief in 
1 5  support of the motion for summary judgment that allude 
1 6  to Mayor Dale's veracity. And I believe that's why 
1 7  Mr. Hallarn moved to strike them. I understand that -- 
18 THE COURT: It doesn't actually allude to his 
1 9  veracity. Doesn't it allude to the fact that the Court 
2 0 might be called upon to -- 
2 1 MR. KORMANIK: To weigh. 
1 be it the Court in the court trial, or the jury in a 
2 jury trial always have to do? 
3 MR. KORMANIK: Yes, Judge, it is. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. But, also, isn't that some of 
5 the language in that California case, Polscamp? 
6 MR. KORMANIK: I hate to say three yeses in a row, 
7 but, yes, Judge, it is. Other than what Mr. Hatlam has 
8 filed, and with the questions of the Court, we will 
9 simply rest on what he filed for that fvst motion. 
1 0  The second motion to strike, however, deals 
11 with a supplemental affidavit filed by the petitioner in 
12 this matter. The petitioner filed a supplemental 
1 3  affidavit along with their responsive briefmg. Under 
1 4  Rule 56, the move in for summary judgment must file 
1 5  their motion, along with supporting affidavits, no later 
1 6  than 28 days before the hearing date, which, in this 
17 case, initially was done. 
1 8  The supplemental affidavit doesn't comply with 
1 9  Rule 56, so we would request the Court strike it and not 
2 0 consider its contents. 
2 1 THE COURT: I believe that was filed in support of 
2 2 both summaq judgment and in opposition of the motion to 
2 3 strike, is the way it's headed. 
2 4 MR. KORMANIK: But I don't believe anything in any 
2 5 of the contents -- and, again, this would require the 
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1 Court to review it -- any of the contents of the 
2 attachments to that supplemental affidavit deal with the 
3 legal question of whether or not the Court is ultimately 
4 going to be tasked with determining and weighing the 
5 evidence before it. 
6 And so notwithstanding the title of the 
7 supplemental affidavit, 1 think the substance of it 
8 deals with the summary judgment motion. 
9 THE COURT: Let me ask you one question on your 
1 0  first motion to strike. Normally I see motions to 
11 strike, affidavits, and exhibits, and the like. Seldom 
1 2  do I see motions to strike statements in memoranda. And 
1 3  I was -- I'm a little intrigued if you have any 
1 4  authority for that? 
1 5  I am well aware that opposite parties 
1 6  generally disagree with many statements that are made in 
1 7  memoranda. 
18 MR. KORMANIK: So back to the Court's question 
1 9  whether or not Mr. Hallam -- who unfortunately isn't 
2 0 here. 
2 1 Again, Judge, I think it was just simply to 
22 bring to the Court's attention the concern of theNampa 
2 3 respondents with regard to whether or not Goodman Oil 
2 4 was calling into question the Mayor's veracity, 
2 5 especially given some other statements in the summary 
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1 judgment briefmg dealing with a supposed friendship 
2 between the Mayor and the president of Scotty's 
3 Duro-Bilt, and things along those lines. 
4 It was simply to bring to the Court's 
5 attention the fact that if the petitioner was calling 
6 into question the Mayor's veracity, then that's not a 
7 proper -- a motion for summary judgment before the Court 
8 is certainly not a proper avenue for that. 
9 THECOURT: Okay. 
1 0  MR. KORMANIK: Thank you. 
11 THE COURT: Thank you. I appreciate that. 
1 2  Anything from the plaintifPs on that matter, 
1 3  Mr. Steele? 
1 4 MR. STEELE: Yes, Your Honor. 
1 5  The motion to strike the statement concerning 
1 6 Mayor Dale's veracity points out the problem presented 
1 7  to the case -- to the Court in this case. The 
1 8 inconsistency of a mayor's veto being invoked in this 
1 9  situation places the Court in an unusual situation of 
2 0 having to potentially rule upon the veracity of the 
2 1 Mayor's testimony. 
2 2 In this case -- 
2 3 THE COURT: But, again, isn't that - I think 
2 4 that's what I have to do in case after case, or the jury 
2 5  has to do if it goes to jury trial. 
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1 MR. STEELE: Should we have a jury trial, the jury 
2 would be presented with that situation, yes. 
3 And, Your Honor, we found the Mayor to be 
4 entirely truthful in this case. There's no allegation 
5 that he did not tell the truth. He was entirely 
6 forthcoming about his friendship with MI. McKnight, and 
7 the ski trip that he took with Mr. McKnight to Sun 
8 Valley. There was no allegation that he was dishonest 
9 in any way. I believe the motion to strike should be 
1 0  summarily denied. 
11 In regard to the second motion to strike, 
1 2  concerning my affidavit, which I filed seven days ago, 
1 3  I'd like to point out to the Court that the City of 
1 4  Nampa has, in their brief, asked this Court to enter 
1 S summary judgment on their behalf. And that authority -- 
1 6  under the authority of the case of Harwood versus 
1 7  Talbert, this Court is empowered to grant summary 
18  judgment to the Nampa respondents, even if the Narnpa 
1 9  respondents have not filed their own motion with the 
20 Court. 
2 1  Your Honor, I had to read the brief two or 
22 three times to actually catch that statement. But once 
2 3 1 caught it, I felt obligated to submit an affidavit in 
2 4 opposition to the summary judgment motion submitted on 
2 5 behalf of the Nampa respondents. 
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1 THE COURT: But that affidavit has to be filed, 
2 under the rule, within 14 days of an affidavit in 
3 opposition; does it not? 
4 MR. KORMANIK: That's correct, Your Honor. 
5 MR. STEELE: That's correct. 
6 THE COURT: At least 14 days. 
7 MR. STEELE: At least 14 days. 
8 And should the Nampa respondents feel at a 
9 disadvantage in any way, we're very agreeable to coming 
1 0  hack in 14 days. All those matters contained in my 
11 affidavit are already part of the court record. There 
1 2  have been extensive affidavits filed in this case 
1 3  already. I submitted the affidavit in order to make it 
1 4  easier for the Court to follow the testimony in this 
1 5  case. And I believe that motion should also be denied. 
1 6  THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
1 7  Any response on either issue? 
1 8  MR. KORMANIK: Not unless you have any questions 
1 9  for me, Judge? 
2 0 THE COURT: I don't believe that I do. 
2 1  I have reviewed this. The Court will deny 
2 2 Nampa's motion to strike the portions of the 
23 petitioner's -- I'm sony. The Court will grant the 
2 4 motion to strike that portion of the petitioner's brief. 
2 5  I will also grant the motion to strike the affidavit. 
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1 It was not filed timely. If it is a brief -- or an 
2 afftdavit in opposition of summary judgment, so I will 
3 order both of those stricken. 
4 If you'd prepare an order on both of these, 
5 please? 
6 MR. KORRIANIK: I will, Judge. Thank you. 
7 THE COURT: Now, moving on to the plaintiffs 
8 motion for summary judgment on the Writ of Mandate 
9 issue. 
1 0  Mr. Steele? 
11 MR. STEELE: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you for the 
1 2  opportunity to appear before you today on this important 
1 3  case. This case is one of first impression of the State 
1 4  of Idaho. It deals with the veto power of the executive 
1 5  of a city in the state of Idaho. The veto power, as 
1 6  you're aware, is a legislative function. It's an 
1 7  exercise of the legislative branch. 
1 8  And it is inappropriate that it be exercised 
1 9  in connection with a quasi-judicial proceeding. The 
2 0 facts of this case are, for the most part, undisputed. 
2 1 The only disputed facts that the City of Nampa lists are 
2 2 in their memorandum at pages 8 and 9. None of those 
2 3 facts relate to the exercise of the Mayor of his veto 
2 4  power. 
2 5 Your Honor, if you recall, this case involves 
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1 a vacation of a section of 1st Avenue South in the city 
2 of Nampa. My client, Goodman Oil, owns property on both 
3 sides of 1st Avenue South. There are several other 
4 property ownen adjoining 1st Avenue South. And in the 
5 summer of 1995, those property owners joined together 
6 and executed a propertylowner vacation agreement, 
7 agreeing to vacate 1st Avenue South in front of their 
8 adjoining properties. 
9 That agreement, Your Honor, is very clear. 
1 0  The first paragraph in the agreement states: "We 
11 consent to the vacation of 1st Avenue South." The 
12 application for vacation was filed with the City of 
1 3  Nampa, proceeded to public hearing, a staff report was 
1 4  prepared. The report recommended approval of the 
15  vacation of 1st Avenue South. 
1 6  The ordinance was prepared, the ordinance was 
1 7  read at two Council meetings, and then tabled. That 
1 8  ordinance sat on the table until the summer of 2004, at 
19 which time it was brought back before the Council, and 
2 0 it was asked that it be acted upon. The third reading 
2 1 of the ordinance was completed. It was completed on 
2 2 August 16th of last year. 
2 3 The ordinance was presented to the mayor, 
2 4 Mayor Dale. At that Council meeting on August 16th, the 
2 5 Mayor signed the ordinance indicating his approval. He 
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1 handed the ordinance to the clerk, the clerk testified 
2 his signature by executing the ordinance, and the clerk 
3 left the Council meeting with that o rd i i ce .  The clerk 
4 then sent the ordinance to the newspaper to be 
5 published. 
6 Before the ordinance was published, on August 
7 19th, Mr. McKnight, the president of Scotty's Duro-Bilt 
8 and adjoining property owner, called Mr. White, the city 
9 attorney, and indicated that he had a problem with the 
10 street vacation ordinance. Mr. White referred 
11 Mr. McKnight to Mr. Holm. Mr. Holm is the planning 
12 director of the City of Nampa and has been for the last 
1 3  26 years. 
1 4  Mr. Holm is the one who made the decision that 
15  the street vacation should proceed, that the proper 
1 6  consents had been obtained, and that the ordinance was 
17 ready to be approved. On August 19th, or thereabout, 
18 when he spoke to Mr. McKnight, he advised Mr. Mcknight 
1 9  that if he no longer consented, be needed to somehow get 
2 0 that back before the City Council. 
2 1 Mr. McKnight took it upon himself to phone the 
2 2 Mayor. The exact date that he talked to the Mayor, I 
2 3 don't know. But in that phone conversation, the Mayor 
2 4 recognized Mr. McKnight as his friend, as a man who had 
2 5 -- excuse me -- the Mayor as a man who had taught 
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1 Mr. McKnight's children. The Mayor also recognized 
2 Mr. McKnight as the fellow he had taken a ski vacation 
3 to Sun Valley with the previous year. 
4 According to Mr. McKnight, the Mayor 
5 unilaterally volunteered to veto the ordinance. When he 
6 volunteered to veto the ordinance, he had not reviewed 
7 the file in any way. He'd not seen the property owner's 
8 vacation agreement. He'd not seen the correspondence 
9 from &city of Nampa to my client, Goodman Oil, 
1 0  reaffirming the fact that the application was still 
11 pending. He'd not talked to Mr. White or to Mr. Holm. 
1 2  He simply volunteered to veto. 
13 Your Honor, the ordinance was vetoed. It was 
1 4  vetoed on September 2nd, just last fall. The following 
1 5  day, September 3rd, the City received Mr. McKnight's 
1 6  written objection withdrawing his consent to the 
1 7  property owner vacation agreement to the vacation of 1st 
1 8  Avenue South. My client immediately went to the City 
1 9  Council and asked that that be remedied. 
2 0 The City Council refused to -- the City 
2 1 refused to reconsider the Mayor's veto that led to this 
2 2 action. Your Honor, the reason this is an important 
2 3 case is, that it presents you with a fundamental 
2 4 question in the separation of powers. We have the City 
2 5 Council, who, in this situation, is acting as a 
Paoe 1 3  
1 quasi-judicial body. And there's no doubt about that. 
2 The cases are clear, when the City acts in a 
3 quasi-judicial body, they are bound by the same 
4 standards as you're bound by in this situation we're 
5 presenting here today. We're bound by due process 
6 requirements. The City admits this proceeding was a 
7 quasi-judicial proceeding. The end result, Your Honor, 
8 is that a veto is simply inconsistent with a 
9 quasi-judicial proceeding. 
1 0  The cases, particularly the case of Tombs 
11 versus King County, are very defGte on this point. In 
1 2  that case it was a zoning case, Your Honor. A similar 
13 case, but the application of a general ordinance to a 
1 4  specific piece of property. That's what we have here: 
1 5  A general ordinance dealing with street vacations and 
16 its application at 1st Avenue South. 
1 7  In that case, the court was very clear. It 
1 8  recognized that the veto power is inconsistent with a 
1 9  proceeding under -- for a quasi-judicial body. The 
2 0 reason they're inconsistent, is that, in that case, the 
2 1 executive, and in our case, the Mayor, is an elected 
2 2 ofticial. It's impossible to insulate him against 
2 3 contact. And in this case, the Mayor was quite frank. 
2 4 He takes calls from all constituents. 
2 5 THE COURT: The city councilmen are elected 
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1 officials, also; isn't that true? 
2 MR. S'EELE: The city councilmen are elected 
3 officials, also. But at some point, Your Honor, the 
4 record is set. There is no more fact gathering to be 
5 done. And that is the due process requirement. 
6 MR. KORMANE Judge, I hate to intermpt. But if 
7 1 may, Counsel's argument with regard to whether or not 
8 Mayor Dale has the authority under the statutes or the 
9 Nampa City Code to veto a street vacation, I don't 
1 0  think, is relevant to the issue of whether or not this 
11 Court should issue a Writ of Mandate. 
1 2  The statutes are what the statutes are. If 
1 3  this Court determines that Goodman has a legal right to 
1 4  have the ordinance published, and that Goodman Oil also 
1 5  satisfies the other requirements for a Writ of Mandate, 
16  then under the writ statute, the Court will issue the 
1 7  writ. Whether or not the constitutional issue of 
1 8  whether the Mayor has the authority to veto a street 
1 9  vacation ordinance, I don't think, is relevant to this 
2 0 summary judgment, or the writ proceeding. 
21 Thank you. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. I'll note that. I'm going to 
2 3 hear the argnments from both sides. 
2 4 MR. KORMANIK: Thank you. 
2 5 THE COURT: Each side will have their say. 
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1 You may continue, Mr. Steele. 
2 M1L STEELE: Thanks, Your Honor. 
3 Your Honor, this is a veto case. Our summay 
4 judgment is based upon the veto power of the mayor. The 
5 exercise of a veto is inconsistent with the 
6 quasi-judicial nature of these proceedings that were 
7 before the City Council. In addition, street vacation 
8 is a very specific procedure. 
9 In the case of Black versus Young, Judge 
10  McDevitt was very clear, street vacation proceedings are 
11 governed by 50-31 1 and those several other statutes 
12 found in chapter 50. The powers of the city are found 
1 3  in that section. And the city has no powers beyond what 
1 4  are found in that section. And there is no veto power 
1 5  found in the section dealing with street vacations. 
1 6  Your Honor, the third reason why we're 
17 entitled to summryjudgment is that Mayor Dale believes 
1 8  he has the power to both veto and approve an ordinance. 
1 9  The statute granting the mayor the power of veto is very 
2 0 specific. The mayor has the power to approve or to 
2 1 veto. He does not have the power to approve and to 
2 2 veto. Mayor Dale believes that he has the power to do 
2 3 both. I believe he's incorrect. The statute is very 
2 4 clear; it is one or the other. He cannot do both. 
25 Your Honor, the fourth reason we're entitled 
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1 to summary judgment in this case is that when Mayor Dale 
2 approved the ordinance and parted with possession and 
3 control of the ordinance on August 16th --excuse me. 
4 August l6th, yes. When he handed it to the city clerk, 
5 and the city clerk left with the statute, he lost the 
6 right to veto that ordinance. That's the Polscamp case 
7 that's cited in our brief, Your Honor. When he parted 
8 with possession and control, he lost whatever veto power 
9 he had. 
1 0  In snmmary, Your Honor, there simply is no 
11 veto power that exists in the mayor of the city of Nampa 
1 2  to veto a street vacation proceeding. It's a power that 
1 3  is inconsistent with a quasi-judicial proceeding It's 
1 4  inappropriate and a violation of due process that he 
1 5  exercised in this case. 
1 6  THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Let's hear from the 
1 7  City of Nampa on the issue. 
1 8 MR. KORMANIK: Thank you, Your Honor. 
19 At the outset, I feel compelled, on behalf of 
2 0 the Mayor and the City, to take issue with some of 
2 1 Counsel's statements with regard to the relationship 
2 2 between the Mayor and Mr. McKnight, the president of 
2 3 Scotiy's Duro-Bit. 
24 Counsel alluded to the fact that the Mayor 
2 5 instantly recognized Mr. McKnight as a friend. Well, 
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1 Judge, there's nothing in the record about that. In 
2 fact, I believe if you look in Mr. McKnight's testimony, 
3 he'll tell you that he and the Mayor aren't friends. 
4 They know each other, they're acquaintances, they run 
5 into each other, but they're not friends. 
6 Counsel also alluded to the fact that the 
7 Mayor taught Mr. McKnight's children band in school. 
8 Well, if you look at the affidavit submitted - 
9 Mr. Runft's affidavit submitted in support of summary 
1 0  judgment, Mr. McKnight's specific testimony is: "Did 
11 your children have the Mayor as their band insttuctor'l" 
1 2  And the answer was, "No, sir." So I just -- on behalf 
1 3  of the Mayor, I feel compelled to respond to those 
1 4  statements. 
1 5  Now, the undisputed facts in this case are: 
1 6  In 1995 Goodman obtained a street vacation agreement by 
1 I the adjoining landowners of 1st Avenue South. And the 
1 8  Nampa City Council fust considered whether or not to 
1 9  vacate 1st Avenue South. Also, in 1995, Goodman was 
2 0 required to communicate with the Nampa f re  marshal with 
2 1 regard to access for ingress and egress. It didn't do 
2 2 so. And that's evidenced in Exhibit C, page 2 to 
2 3 Mr. Runft's affidavit. 
2 4 Nine years later Mr. Goodman wants to sell the 
8 
1 would have been vacated when the City Council acted on 
2 the ordinance finally. 
3 And that's very important, because, I t h i i  
4 at the end of the day, what Goodman is asking this Court 
5 to do would be contrary to law. If the Court issues a 
6 writ forcing the City to publish an ordinance vacating 
7 1st Avenue South, and all of the landowners along 1st 
8 Avenue South do not agree to that street vacation, it's 
9 contrary to law. 
i 0 THE COURT: Doesn't the statute provide that any 
11 agreed person may appeai after publication? 
12  MR. KORMANIK: Yes, it does, Judge. 
1 3  THE COURT: And publication triggers the time for 
1 4  appeal? 
1 5  MR. KORMANIK: Yes, it does. Absolutely. And I 
16  was going to raise that in regard to whether or not a 
17 writ is even appropriate in this circumstance. But, 
18 yes, the landowners affected along the street would have 
19  the avenue of appeal under 15-1322, I believe is the 
2 0 statutory provision. That's correct, 15-1 322. 
2 1 But I ask myself, does it make sense for the 
2 2 Cout to publish -- to order published an ordinance that 
2 3 there's evidence in the record is going to be challenged 
2 4 on appeal because not all the landowners consent, and 
1 Council. Now, there's evidence in the record that the 
2 landowners in 2004 are not all the same landowners that 
3 signed the street vacation agreement. And that's 
4 important, because under the street vacation statute, 
5 each adjoining landowner must consent to the vacation, 
6 otherwise, as a matter of law, it cannot happen, 
7 regardless of what the City Council does. 
8 The City Council can approve it, but it would 
9 be contrary to law. And that's important in this case, 
10  because Goodman represents to the Court, and their 
11 entire argument appears to be based on the fact that 
12  everybody agreed in 1995, so evetything in 2004 was 
1 3  proper. And that's just not the case, Judge. There are 
14  other property owners involved. 
1 5  And there's evidence in the record before the 
1 6  Court that those property owners do not agree to 
1 7  vacating that street. Additional businesses have been 
1 8  located there. The property owners who located those 
1 9  additional businesses, specifically Blazen Burgers, I 
2 0 thii is the name of the business, say that they need 
2 1 that street for customer access. 
2 2 And those owners, the Blarnires, were never 
2 3 parties to the original street vacation agreement. And 
2 4 Goodman never obtained their consent to vacate the 
2 5 street in 2004, which is when, presumably, the street 
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2 5 property and puts the issue back before the City 
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2 5 not all of the landowners' consent was sought by the 
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1 applicant? So it's contrary to 50-1321, which requires 
2 all the consent of the adjoining landownem. 
3 Also important, I think, and the undisputed 
4 fact is, the ordinance was never published. And I think 
5 that takes us out of the ambit of the California case 
6 relied on -- the Polscamp case relied on by Goodman. In 
7 that case, Mayor Bradley signed the ordinance, it was 
8 taken out of his control, and it was published in the 
9 manner which the statute required in Los Angeles. Then 
10 the Mayor attempted to veto it. 
11 Well, the Polscamp court said, no, you can't 
12 do that, because it's already been -- it's left your 
1 3  control. It's been published. All the statutory 
1 4  requirements have been satisfied. So you can't now go 
15  back and change your mind, or attempt to veto a properly 
1 6  passed and enacted ordinance. 
1 7  In this case, the ordinance was never enacted. 
18 And there's a difference. Although, it's a highly 
1 9  technical difference, I think. The Mayor signed it, the 
2 0 clerk had it, but it was never published. So it was 
2 1 never effective. 
2 2 THE COURT: It never became effective under the 
23 statute, but is publication a ministerial function as 
2 4 opposed to some kind of discretionary function? 
25 MR. KORMANIK: Well, Judge, I think in most cases 
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1 it's ministerial. But I think, in this case, it is not, 
2 because of the specific requirements that all of the 
3 landowners along the street grant their consent. And, 
4 also, given the facts and circumstances of this case 
5 with nine years passing between the fmt time it was 
6 brought before the City and Goodman sought to vacate the 
7 street, and then the action in 2004. I think there may 
8 be a difference. 
9 I don't think that in this case it was purely 
1 0  ministerial, given the facts and circumstances known at 
11 the time that the o r d i c e  was vetoed. A Writ of 
1 2  Mandate is only appropriate, as the Court is aware, if 
1 3  the applicant demonstrates it has a clear legal right 
14 and does not have a speedy, just, and adequate remedy of 
1 5  law. 
1 6  The Nampa respondents argue that there's no 
1 7 clear legal right, and there is a plain, adequate, 
18 speedy remedy at law. And I'm going to address those in 
1 9  reverse order just for my argument's sake. 
2 0 Interestingly, 50-1322 specifically provides 
2 1 for an appeal from the refusal of an application of a 
2 2 street vacation. Now, if the application is refused, 
2 3 then it goes without saying that it's never going to be 
2 4 published. So the refusal -- the time period begins 
2 5 when it's refused, and the parties become aware of that. 
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1 Goodman, interestingly, in its reply brief 
2 says, no, wait a second -- pages 10 and 11 says, no, 
3 wait a second, 50-1322 may say what it says, the 
4 procedure is no longer valid. Judge, that simply is not 
5 founded in the law. The statute 50-1322 gives an 
6 applicant, or any other effected party the legal right 
7 to appeal. The procedure for that appeal is irrelevant. 
8 The right is established in 50-1322. 
9 The procedure is set forth now in Idaho Rules 
1 0  of Civil Procedure 84, and the specific provisions of 
11 that. And we've been before the Court before on this, 
1 2  that the Rules of Civil Procedure apply in writ 
1 3  proceedings. So there is a plain, speedy, adequate 
1 4  remedy at law. 
1 5  There is no impending sale of the property. 
1 6  There is no evidence in the record, whatsoever, that the 
1 7  normal appellate process that Goodman had available to 
1 8  it would not have satisfied the requirements of a plain, 
1 9  speedy, and adequate remedy. 
2 0 Interestingly, also, Goodman has included in 
2 1 its filings with the Court its notice of tort claim. I 
2 2 think that goes along in conjunction with the appeal 
2 3 process. If they had a problem with or a concern about 
2 4 the process that was utilized by the City of Nampa 
2 5 between -- any time between, really, 1995 and September 
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1 of 2004, they had an appeals process to deal with it. 
2 So a writ is not appropriate, because there is a plain, 
3 speedy, and adequate remedy. 
4 Also, a writ is not appropriate because 
5 Goodman cannot demonstrate a clear legal right to the 
6 relief it seeks. Goodman contends that the Mayor has 
7 absolutely no right to veto a street vacation ordinance. 
8 That just goes contrary to Idaho Code and the Nampa City 
9 Code. Idaho Code Section 50-6.1 specifically states 
1 0  that the mayor shall have the power to veto or sign any 
11 ordinance passed by the city council. It doesn't say, 
1 2  except for street vacation ordinances. 
1 3  And it's important to note that -although we 
14 didn't brief this, the Court is well aware that statutes 
1 5  are presumed constitutional. So there's no reason to 
1 6 think that 50-61 1 is not a constitutional grant of 
1 7  authority to mayors of the cities of this state, whether 
18 they be for other ordinances, or with regard to city 
1 9  street vacation agreements. 
20  The Nampa City Code Section 2-2-2-5 also 
2 1 grants the mayor the power to veto any ordmance. 
22 That's presumed constitutional as well. So the question 
2 3 of whether or not the mayor actually has the authority 
2 4 to veto a street vacation agreement, I t h i i  has been 
2 5 answered by the statutes, which are presumed 
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1 constitutional. 
2 Whether or not the veto was appropriate, 
3 again, I've distinguished Polscamp, I believe, for the 
4 Court. Here the ordinance was never published. Here 
5 the Mayor became aware of facts and circumstances, which 
6 indicated that the ordinance was not in compliance with 
7 the Idaho Code, which requi1.e~ consent of all the 
8 adjoining landowners. So Polscamp, I th& is 
9 distinguishable. The same standard that a general 
1 0  ordinance of a general nature, unless otherwise required 
11 by law, before they take effect must be published. 
12 That's also set forth in the Nmpa City Code, 2-2-3-7. 
1 3  There is a plain, speedy, adequate remedy at 
1 4  law, which Goodman has made allusion -- alluded to -- 
1 5  not allusion, I'm sorry -- in it's filing, saying it 
1 6  would be useless to file an appeal because the City's 
1 7  position is already stated. Well, the City's position 
18 is stated, because Goodman needs to procure the consent 
1 9  of all the adjoining landowners. 
20 It's not the City's job to get the consent of 
2 1 everyone along 1st Avenue South to vacate that street. 
22 It's Goodman's job, because they're the applicant. They 
2 3 have not been able to do that, so they are seeking 
2 4 resort in the extraordinary remedy of a Writ of Mandate 
2 5 because they can't now get the present adjoining 
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1 landowners to agree to vacate the street. 
2 I th* under the circumstances, issuance of 
3 a Writ of Mandate is not appropriate in this matter. 
4 And, in fact, it's not available to Goodman Oil. 
5 And, finally, Judge, as I've stated previously 
6 in my argument, I think what Goodman is asking the Court 
7 to do, is to publish an ordinance that is con- to 
8 statute. The Court has evidence in the record that all 
9 of the landowners do not consent to the vacation of that 
1 0  street. And if the Court were ordered to order the City 
1 1 of Nampa to publish the o r d i i c e ,  it would be ordering 
1 2  it to publish an ordinance that violates 50-1312 of the 
1 3  Idaho Code. 
1 4  Judge, that's all I have. We'll rely on our 
1 5  briefmg. If you have any questions, I'd be happy to 
1 6  take them. 
17 THE COURT: Now, Narnpa's ordinance 2-2-3-7 talks 
1 8  about the effective date of an ordiiance. And it 
1 9  clearly -- and this goes along with the prior sections. 
2 0 There's passage of the ordinance by the city council, 
2 1 there is approval by the mayor, and followed by 
2 2 publication. 
2 3 MR. KORMANIK: Correct. 
2 4 THE COURT: Okay. And I asked you a minute ago 
2 5 whether or not publication was strictly a ministerial 
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1 function rather than a discretionary function. And I 
2 think somewhere there's a requirement that it be 
3 published within a certain number of days. 
4 MR. KORMANE Judge, I believe that -- 
5 THE COURT: I'm ttying to find that in here. 
6 MR. KORMANIK: That might be in 50-901. If that's 
7 what the Court is referring to. It says -- 
8 THE COURT: Published within 30 days? 
9 MR. KORMANE "Shall before they take effect and 
1 0  within one month after they are passed" -- 
11 THE COURT: Okay. Yes. 
1 2  MR. KOIWANR -- "be published in full." 
1 3  THE COURT: Okay. So that's a statutory 
14 requirement? 
1 5  MR. KORMANLK: Yes. 
1 6 THE COURT: Okay. Thanks. I think that's all I 
1 7  had. 
1 8  MR. KORMANIK: Thank you, Judge. 
1 9  THE COURT: Mr. Steele, anything W c r ?  
2 0 MR. STEELE: Your Honor, just a couple of items. 
2 1 The Nampa City Code granting the mayor the 
22 power of veto does not trump the Constitution of the 
2 3 United States, or the Constitution of the State of 
2 4 Idaho, the due process requirements; the pronouncements 
2 5 of the Idaho Supreme Court dealing with how to conduct 
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1 public hearings, providing appropriate notice, 
2 conducting fact finding, cutting off fact fmding, and 
3 then rendering fmdings of fact and conclusions of law. 
4 The exercise of a veto power by the mayor is 
5 simply inconsistent with the subject matter that we're 
6 dealing with in this case. The veto is inconsistent 
7 with the proceeding - a quasi-judicial proceeding. The 
8 veto power of the mayor is not found in the street 
9 vacation sections of the Idaho code. And the veto power 
1 0  given to the mayor does not include the power to do 
11 both approve and veto. It's one or the other. 
1 2  Your Honor, I believe that the legal arguments 
1 3  are simply overpowering. The veto was simply 
1 4  inappropriately exercised in this case. We're entitled 
1 5  to a Writ of Mandate. The possible appeal that is 
1 6  mentioned by the City of Nampa is certainly no reason to 
17 delay the entry of judgment in this case. 
18 There is a difference between a remedy and a 
1 9  procedure. A possible appeal that is mentioned is a 
2 0 procedural item, not a remedy. We're entitled to the 
2 1 remedy of publication of this ordinance. And I believe 
2 2 it's very clear. 
2 3 T h d  you, Your Honor. 
2 4 THE COURT: What about the issue raised by counsel 
2 5 that there was not consent of all the adjoining 
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1 landownen? 
2 MR. STEELE: Consent's a threshold issue, Your 
3 Honor. The consent issue was addressed by Mr. Holm when 
4 he determined that the proceeding should go forward, 
5 that the street vacation proceeding was entitled to its 
6 third reading or final reading, and that the ordinance 
7 was entitled to be passed by the city ordinance, and was 
8 entitled to be approved by the mayor. 
9 That's Mr. Holm's function. That's what he 
1 0  does. That's his job. He's the expert in this area. 
11 He's the one that recommended that the proceedings go 
12 forward. 
1 3  THE COURT: Now, procedurally, the request when it 
14 was first filed in, what, 1995? 
1 5  MR. STEELE: The summer of 1995. 
1 6  THE COURT: Yeah. What happened in 1995? 
17 MR. STEELE.. A hearing was held, a staff report was 
1 8  prepared. At the hearing the staff report was presented 
1 9 to the City Council. The staff report recommended that 
2 0 the street be vacated. No one appeared in opposition at 
2 1 the hearing. The fact finding process was closed. The 
2 2 ordinance was read at the next two council meetings. 
2 3 And at that point it was tabled. 
2 4 THE COURT: And in 2004 it was taken off the table? 
2 5 MR. STEELE: It was taken off the table for its 
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1 f d  reading. Thank you. 
2 THE COURT: Thank you. Anything further in light 
3 of that, Mr. KO&? 
4 MR. KORMANIK: No, Judge. 
5 THE COURT: I have spent a considerable amount of 
6 time looking at this matter. This is before the Court 
7 on the issue of summaryjudgment on the claim for an 
8 application for a Writ of Mandate. It seeks an order 
9 compelling the City of Nampa to publish Ordinance No. 
1 0  3374 vacating 1st Avenue South between 2nd Street South 
11 and 3rd Street South in Nampa. 
1 2  Again, as I noted in the preceding case, that 
1 3  summary judgment is appropriate where the plead'mgs, 
1 4  depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file show 
1 5  that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and 
1 6  the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
17 law. 
1 8  The burden, at all times, of proving the 
1 9  absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests upon 
2 0 the moving party. That's G&M Farms versus Funk 
2 1 Inigation Company at 119 Idaho 514. 
22 In considering a motion for summary judgment, 
2 3 the Court must liberally constme the facts and 
2 4 inferences contained in the existing record in favor of 
2 5 the party opposing the motion. That's Bonds versus 
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1 Sedwicks 119 Idaho 539. 
2 To withstand the motion for summary judgment, 
3 the nonmoving parties' case must be anchored in 
4 something more soiid than specuiation. A mere scintilla 
5 of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of 
6 material fact. That's Edwards versus Chemco, Inc. at 
7 111Idaho851. 
8 III reviewing this, this is an application for 
9 a Writ of Mandate. Rule 74 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
1 0  Procedure deals with Writs of Mandate. It provides 
11 that, "Any party wishing to contest an application for a 
1 2  peremptory Writ of Mandate must file a responsive 
1 3  pleading to the complaint or petition in the same manner 
1 4  as an answer to any other civil complaint or any other 
1 5  complaint in a civil action. The plaintiff or 
1 6  petitioner may then proceed against such responsive 
1 7  pleading in the same manner as any other civil action!' 
1 8  Clearly, summary judgment is an appropriate 
1 9  method for the petitioners to proceed against -- for the 
2 0 City to proceed against -- the petitioners to proceed 
2 1 against the responsive pleading filed by the City. 
22 Rule 74 (d) deals with judgment -- trial and 
2 3 judgment in the matter. Idaho Code Chapter 3 Title 7 
2 4 also deals with Writs of Mandamus. It provides, "The 
2 5 district court may issue such to compel performance of 
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1 an act which the law specially joins as a duty resulting 
2 from an office, tmst, or station." 7-303 requires 
3 that, "A writ must be issued in all cases where there is 
4 not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary 
5 course of law." 
6 In this case we have proceeded through this 
7 matter. The petition has been filed, the response to 
8 the pleadings have been filed, discovery bas been 
9 engaged in, and we're now before the Court on the 
1 0  petitioner's motion for summary judgment. Appropriate 
11 notice has been given to the parties. 
1 2  This 1s an issue arising from the 
13 consideration by the Nampa City Council of an ordinance 
1 4  to vacate a street. Idaho Code 531 1 spec~fically 
1 5  empowers cities to both "create, open, widen, or extend 
1 6  any street, avenue, alley, or lane, as well as to vacate 
1 7  the same whenever deemed expedient for the public good." 
18 It provides for the reversion of any vacated 
1 9  land. Idaho Code Section 50-1321 provides for the 
2 0 necessity for the consent of adjoining property owners. 
2 1 Specifically, it provides that, "No vacation of a public 
2 2 street shall take place unless the consent of the 
2 3 adjoining owners be obtained in writing and delivered to 
2 4 the public highway agency having jurisdiction over the 
2 5 public street or right of way." 
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1 50-1322 provides for an appeal by any person 
2 aggrieved. It requires that it be made withiii 20 days 
3 after the first publication or posting of the statement 
4 as it required. Idaho Code 50-901 deals with the 
5 effective dates of ordinances and requires that, "They 
6 shall, before they take effect, and within one month 
7 aRer they are passed, be published in full or in 
8 summary as provided in the other code sections." 
9 Idaho Code 50-902 provides for the procedure 
1 0  for the passage of ordinances. 50-61 1 provides that, 
11 "The mayor shall have the power to veto or sign any 
12  ordinance passed by the city council." And provides for 
1 3  an override of any veto, which is not in issue in this 
1 4  particular case. 
1 5  Idaho Code 67-5279 provides for a judicial 
1 6  review, along with Rule 84 of the Rules of Civil 
1 7  Procedure. The type of relief available in judicial 
1 8  review is specified in 67-5279, which provides that, "If 
1 9  the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside 
2 0 in whole or part and remanded for further proceedings as 
2 1 necessary." 
22 The Nampa City Code deals with the passage of 
2 3 ordinances. Section 2-2-3-3 provides for how an 
2 4 ordinance is passed. Nampa City Code 2-2-3-4 provides 
2 5 that, "When an ordinance is passed, the city clerk shall 
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1 the petitioner has a claim to speedy and adequate remedy 
2 in the ordinary course of law. That's Almagren versus 
3 Idaho Department of Lands at 136 Idaho 180. 
4 "A Writ of Mandamus will lie if the officer 
5 against whom the writ is brought has a clear legal duty 
6 to perform, and if the desired act sought to be 
7 compelled is ministerial or executive in nature and does 
8 not require the exercise of discretion." Again, that's 
9 the Almagren case. 
1 0  "Proceedings for a Writ of Mandamus are not 
11 available to review. The acts in respect to matters as 
12  to which they are vested with discretion unless it 
1 3  clearly appears that they have acted arbitrarily and 
1 4  unjustly and in abuse of the discretion vested in them." 
1 5  That's Brady versus The City of Homedale at 130 Idaho 
1 6  569. 
1 7  Again, also holding that a Writ of Mandamus 
1 8  will not lie unless the party seeking the writ has a 
1 9  clear right to have it done -- to have done that which 
2 0 the petitioner seeks, and unless it is the clear legal 
2 1 duty of the officer to so act. 
22 A Writ of Mandate will not issue to compel the 
2 3 performance of a discretionary act. Our Supreme Court 
2 4 has previously held that -- this Court has repeatedly 
2 5 held that mandamus is not a writ of right. The 
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1 sign it, and the date of passage by the council shall be 
2 added thereto, and it shall, within three days 
3 thereafter, be presented to the mayor for his approval, 
4 If he approves the same, he shall attach his signature 
5 thereto." 
6 2-2-3-5 provides for basically a veto and an 
7 override of that veto, and also for the effect of the 
8 mayor's neglect or refusal to sign the ordinance where 
9 he returns it with his objections in writing. 
10  The date of passage of an ordinance is set out 
11 in Nampa City Code 2-2-3-6. Considered passed on one of 
12 the following dates, the date of approval by the mayor. 
1 3  Nampa Code Section 2-2-3-7 provides that, "An ordinance 
1 4  shall take effect and be enforced from and after its 
1 5 passage, approval, and publication." It further 
16  provides that, "An ordinance shall be deemed published 
1 7  when it appears in one issue of the official newspaper 
18 published within the city." 
19  That is the Bamework that this case is 
2 0 presented in. The standard of review of a district 
2 1 court's failure to issue a Writ of Mandamus is the same 
2 2 as that required of the district court. The party 
2 3 seeking a Writ of Mandate must establish a clear legal 
2 4 right to the relief sought. 
25 Additionally, the writ will not issue where 
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1 allowance or refusal of such a risk is a matter of 
2 discretion with the court before whom the application is 
3 heard. That's Hunky versus Foot at 84 Idaho 391. 
4 The Supreme Court has held that, "Mandamus 
5 will lie if the officer against whom the writ is sought 
6 has a clear legal duty to perform the desired act, and 
7 if the act sought to be compelled is ministerial or 
8 executive in nature." That's Idaho Falls Redevelopment 
9 Agency versus Countrymen at 118 Idaho 43. 
1 0  The existence of an adequate remedy in the 
11 ordinary course of law, either legal or equitable in 
1 2  nature, will prevent the issuance of a writ. And the 
1 3  party seeking the writ must prove that no such remedy 
1 4  exists. 
1 5  The Court has examined Polscamp versus 
1 6  Martinez, the California case cited by the petitioners 
1 7  in this matter. That's 2 California Appellate 4th at 
1 8  854. In that case there is somewhat of a difference 
1 9  between the factual scenario there and the factual 
2 0 scenario in this case; in that, in that case the 
2 1 ordinance was published. 
2 2  The California appellate court concluded that 
2 3 under the Los Angeles city charter, the ordinance was 
2 4 still in the process of being adopted, although, it was 
2 5 still in the possession of the mayor. Therefore, the 
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1 court held that during the time the legislation was 
2 under his custody and control, there is nothing to 
3 prevent the mayor from reconsidering any action as to 
4 his approval or disapproval of the ordinance. 
5 The notes say, "However, it must be concluded 
6 that once the chief executive has relinquished 
7 possession of the legislation with his signature and 
8 transmitted it to the appropriate depository agent" -- 
9 in this case, presumably, the city clerk -- "the 
1 0  measures' character as a properly enacted law becomes 
11 immutable," the City of Palm Springs versus Ringwald at 
12  52 California 2nd 620. 
1 3  The California Supreme Court has also held 
1 4  that a mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the city 
1 5  clerk to publish an ordinance, so long as the proposed 
1 6  ordinance meets the requirements of law, and the act 
1 7  demanded is a ministerial duty. 
1 8  In this case, I think the issue presented is 
19  one of fmt impression. I don't think there is any 
2 0 factual dispute, but that the Nampa City Council passed 
2 1 the ordinance in question. That's ordinance 3374. They 
2 2 passed it on August 16th in the mauner required by law 
2 3 and by Nampa ordinances. 
24 On that date, the Mayor -- again, I don't 
2 5 think there's any factual dispute at all that the Mayor 
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1 s i ~ e d  and approved that ordinance on the same date. 
2 The Mayor then declared the ordinance be passed, and 
3 directed the city clerk to report it as required by law. 
4 The city clerk delivered the ordinance to the 
5 Idaho Press Tribune on August 17th with instructions 
6 that it be published. Prior to publication, the city 
7 clerk contacted the Press Tribune and canceled the 
8 publication request. 
9 And on September 2nd the Mayor then vetoed the 
1 0  ordinance, asserting that one of the property owners 
11 adjacent to 1st Avenue South had withdrawn its consent 
1 2  to the vacation. And that's the factual scenario that 
1 3  leads to this case. 
1 4  The statutes and ordinances of the City of 
1 5  Nampa set forth the procedure for the city council to 
1 6  pass an ordinance, set forth a procedure for the 
1 7  ordinance that is passed to be transmitted to the mayor, 
1 8  and for the mayor to approve the ordinance. 
1 9  In this case, the Mayor did approve the 
2 0 ordinance, he relinquished control of the ordinance to 
2 1 the clerk with the direction that it be published, and 
2 2 subsequently withdrew it from the --had the clerk 
2 3 withdraw it from the Idaho Press Tribune, and then 
2 4 vetoed it. 
1 and concludes that the act of publishing the ordinance 
2 is strictly a ministerial function. It is not a 
3 discretionary function. The City Counoil had already 
4 enacted -- had passed the ordinance in the manner 
5 required by law. The Mayor had approved the ordinance. 
6 The Mayor released it fiom his possession and control. 
7 And the act of publication is strictly a ministerial 
8 act. It's not a discretionary act. 
9 The Court £in& that the Nampa city clerk had 
10  a clear legal duty to perform the desired act, and that 
11 the act that is sought to be compelled is ministerial 
1 2  and not discretionary. The Court farther finds that the 
1 3  petitionefs have established that they do not have an 
1 4  adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, either 
1 5  legal or equitable in nature such as will prevent the 
1 6  issuance of a writ. 
1 7  Specifically, the appeal right given is 
1 8  triggered by publication or posting the ordinance 
1 9  approved in the publication or posting. The judicial 
2 0 review, if they were successful, simply remands it to 
2 1 the Nampa City Council for fnrther action. 
2 2 The Court finds that the ordinance was 
2 3 previously passed by the Nampa City Council, approved by 
2 4 the Mayor, and that there is no adequate remedy in the 
2 5 ordinary course of law. 
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1 The Court so fmds and concludes, and I will 
2 issue the Writ of Mandate for the publication of the 
3 o r d i i c e .  
4 If you would prepare an appropriate order and 
5 writ please and submit it to me, Mr. Steele. 
6 MR. STEELE: Yes, Your Honor, I will. 
7 THE COURT: Now, we still have pending the petition 
8 forjudicial review. If the City -- I will -- I don't 
9 know. The City of Nampa might desire to, since it's the 
1 0  question of first impression, appeal - if it will take 
11 an interlocutory appeal on this matter or not. I will 
1 2  not sign the order or the writ for a period of five days 
1 3  so you can make any motions that you may want to stay 
1 4  the action or to appeal interlocutory. 
1 5  MR. KORMANIK: Judge, I would simply ask that 
1 6  Counsel prepare the order with a 54 (b) certificate, and 
1 7  then I can consult with the City of Nampa about what 
1 8  action to take. But if the 54 (b) certificate is 
1 9  included, then we have that action available without 
2 0 further action of the Court. 
2 1 THE COURT: I would ask that you do that, please, 
2 2 MI. Steele. With respect to that, if thereis an 
2 3 interlocutory appeal, as I understand the law, I would 
2 4 be the vested jurisdiction on the remaining issues in 
6BoQ)%2'? 10 (Pages 37 to 40)  
2 5 The Court, in reviewing the case law, finds 
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2 5 this case until that appeal is decided. So I'll just 
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1 throw that out so that both parties are aware that there 
2 is also that issue. I think I'm S i t e d  to doing only 
3 thethings I can do while the case is on appeal. 
4 MR. KORMANIK: Judge, that's correct. And I've had 
5 some recent experience with 54 (b), and there may be 
I 6 some circumstances where you could potentially proceed 7 with the decision on the judicial review of the 
8 ordinance. 
9 Especially in this case, because I think 
1 0  publication of the ordinance is wholly separate. And a 
11 judicial review of the procedure and the decision of the 
1 2  city council with regard to the width of easements is 
1 3  sufficiently different from that. But, of course, that 
1 4  would be up to the Supreme Court and yourself. 
1 5  THE COURT: Okay. And that can be addressed 
1 6  depending on what happens. I'm just throwing that issue 
1 7  out because I know it's there. 
1 8  MR. KORMANIK: Thank you, Judge. 
1 9  THE COURT: Is there anything else that we need to 
2 0 address, Counsel? 
2 1 MR. STEELE: Not at this time, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Very well. Thank you both very much. 
2 2 Your briefing and arguments were very enlightening. And 
it was very helpful in understandii the whole matter. 
2 3 MR. STEELE: Thank you very much, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And we'll be in recess. 
2 4 MR. KORMANIK: Thank you. 
2 5 (The proceedings were concluded.) 
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SUSAN E. BUXTON # 4041 
TAMMY A. ZOKAN # 5450 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHARTERED 
Attorneys at Law 
950 West Bannock, Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 33 1-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 33 1-1202 
Email: taz@msbtlaw.com 
/ CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
P. SALAS, DEPUTY 
--. . 
. - 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
) 
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY, 1 
) 
Plaintiff, ) Case No. CV 05-9800 
) 
v. ) 
) DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN 
SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR, ) OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
INC., and Idaho corporation; and DOES I ) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
through v. 1 
1 
Defendant. ) 
COME NOW, Defendants Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc. and dismissed Defendants Bart 
and Alane McKnight ("Duro-Bilt" or "Defendants"), by an through their attorneys of record, Moore, 
Smith, Buxton & Turcke, Chartered, and submit their Response in Objection to Plaintiffs Motion 
for Reconsideration received on October 4, 2006. Defendants' Response is supported by this 
Response and the pleadings and supporting documents filed by Defendants in this matter. 
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I. SUMMARY 
Plaintiffs Complaint named Defendants Duro-Bilt Bart, Inc. and Bart and Alane McKnight 
as defendants, alleging that Bart and Alane McKnight were the "alter egos " of Defendant Duro-Bilt. 
Complaint at 77 2-3. Plaintiffs Complaint alleged the named "Defendants" breached "their" 
obligations under the Vacation Agreement and "their " actions caused various torts against Plaintiff. 
Complaint, Counts 1-4. Plaintiffs Complaint prays for relief against "Duro-Bilt, " requests 
judgment be entered "against Duro-Bilt, " requests "a decree requiring Duro-Bilt to speciJically 
perform, " and requests an award of costs and fees "against Duro-Bilt. " Complaint at p. 10,711-3. 
Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint in its entirety against Bart and Alane 
McKnight because Plaintiff did not plead or make any showing that Bart or Alane McKnight are 
alter egos of Duro-Bilt and should be held to he personally liable for the obligations of Duro-Bilt. 
See Def s Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support 
(filed on June 16,2006); see Hutchison v. Anderson, 130 Idaho 936,940,950 P.2d 1275 (Ct. App. 
1997). Plaintiff filed its response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to 
dismiss on August 22,2006, but failed to object to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or provide any 
support for its theory that the McKnights were the alter egos of Duro-Bilt and should be held 
individually liable, or otherwise address Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Plf s Br. in Response to 
Def s Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss (Aug. 22,2006). 
The Court dismissed Plaintiffs Complaint against the McKnights on September 5,2006, and 
entered its written Order of Dismissal on September 19,2006. 
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On October 4, 2006, Plaintiff served its Motion for Reconsideration on Defendants. The 
Motion asserts a new legal theory for Plaintiffs claims against Defendants; it does not assert new 
facts to provide a basis for this Court's reconsideration of its Order dismissing Bart and Alane 
McKnight. Plaintiff did not previously offer any legal theory to support its claims against Bart or 
Alane McKnight individually nor any defense against Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Furthermore, 
at hearing on September 5,2006, Defendant failed to assert any position remotely resembling the 
position asserted in its Motion for Reconsideration received on October 4,2006. Plaintiffs having 
failed to present any defense to Defendants Motion to Dismiss when it had the opportunity, should 
not be allowed to craft its theory for the first time, or re-craft its theory, after the Court has rendered 
its decision. 
11. ARGUMENT 
A. Plaintiffs Attempt at a Second Bite of the Apple Must Fail. 
Plaintiff is not entitled to raise new legal theories at this late date. Plaintiffhas submitted, for 
the first time, the legal theory that "piercing the corporate veil" is not a requirement to hold Bart or 
Alane McKnight individually liable for alleged torts. While neither Plaintiffs theory nor any alleged 
legal basis therefore is clear, Plaintiffs delinquent attempt to withstand dismissal should fail. 
Plaintiff does not allege that its new theory has resulted from new facts, a change in the law, or 
otherwise was unavailable to it during litigation of the issue. Plaintiff could have and should have 
raised any defense to Defendants' Motion in its briefing and at argument. It did not. Plaintiff should 
not be allowed to raise new theories or switch theories and re-litigate old issues when said theories 
were available to Plaintiff at the appropriate time. 
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The Ninth Circuit's treatment of motions for reconsideration is instructive: "A motion for 
reconsideration . . . should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district 
court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or where there is an 
intervening change in the law." McDowell v. Caleron, 197 F.3d 1253 (9& Cir. 1999) (citations 
omitted). (In federal court there is no specific rule motions for reconsideration and such motions 
may be evaluated under Fed. R.Civ. Pro. 59(e) motion to alter or amend, or 60(b) motion for relief 
from judgment.) There are no highly unusual circumstances warranting reconsideration of the Order 
of Dismissal entered in this case. 
B. There is no Basis to Reconsider the Court's Order of Dismissal. 
Plaintiff has not submitted new evidence in support of its Motion for Reconsideration. 
"When considering a motion [pursuant to I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B)], the trial court should take into 
account any new facts presented by the moving party that bear on the correctness of the interlocutory 
order. The burden is on the moving party to bring the trial court's attention to the new facts." Coeur 
D'Alene Mining Co. v. First National Bank of North Idaho, 118 Idaho 812821, 800 P.2d 1026 
(1990); Jensen v. State, 139 Idaho 57,64,72 P.3d 897 (2003) (without supporting affidavits, there 
was no basis for asking the trial court to reconsider its earlier decision"). The Affidavit of Jon M. 
Steele in Support of Goodman's Motion for Reconsideration does not present new facts. Mr. 
Steele's Affidavit merely restates portions of Plaintiffs Complaint, Affidavit at T/n 4-5, and asserts 
Plaintiffs new legal theory that "piercing the corporate veil" is not required to hold an individual 
liable for alleged torts, Affidavit at 17 5-6. 
Even if this Court were to consider Plaintiffs new legal theory, Plaintiff has cited no 
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authority for its new theory. The case cited by Plaintiff, Davis v. Professional Business Sews., 109 
Idaho 810,813,712 P.2d 51 1,514 (1985), did not hold that aplaintiffneednot meet the elements for 
piercing the corporate veil when a plaintiff has alleged tort. Plf s Br. in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration at pp. 2-3. In Davis, the plaintiff failed to allege tort violations and the court 
determined that it could not assess any tort liability against the individual defendant. Id. at p. 3; 
Davis at 815. The court did not issue a holding on the elements of the tort claims in that case. 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs Complaint was filed against Bart and Alane McKnight "as alter 
egos" of Duro-Bilt, Inc., alleging "their" actions and they as "Defendants" breached their 
obligations and committed various torts. Indeed, Plaintiffs prayer for relief seeks relief only as 
against the corporation. While Plaintiff attempts to re-craft is allegations against Bart McKnight, 
Plaintiff still has not presented any facts related to Alane McKnight individually. In any event, 
Plaintiff has not requested any relief against Bart or Alane McKnight, made no attempt to meet the 
standard for piercing the corporate veil, and still has not alleged a claim against Bart or Alane 
McKnight upon which relief can be granted. 
111. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration should be denied, the Court's Order of Dismissal 
under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) affirmed, and Defendants should be awarded attorney 
fees and costs incurred in responding to Plaintiffs Motion Idaho in accordance with Code §§ 12-120 
and 12-121. 
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DATED this 16th day of October, 2006. 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
~ a r n m v ~ .  Zokan \ 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 16th day of October, 2006, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONSE by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Jon M. Steele - U.S. Mail 
Karl J. F. Runft 2 Hand Delivery 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC - Overnight Mail 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 __ Facsimile 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Facsimile (208) 343-3246 
Email: jmsteele@runftlaw.com 
Tammy A. Zokan 1 
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JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
KARL J. RUNFT (ISB # 6640) 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 333-9495 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: jmsteelciiirunftlaw.com 
I CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
P. SALAS, DEPUTY 
-- I 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR T m  COUNTY OF CANYON 
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) CASE NO. CV 05-9800 
) 
VS. ) GOODMAN'S REPLY BRIEF 
) 
SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR, ) 
INC., an Idaho corporation; BART and ) 
ALANE MCKNIGHT, husband and wife; ) 
and DOES I through V. ) 
1 
Defendants. ) 
) 
COMES NOW Plaintiff Goodman Oil Company by and through its counsel of 
record, Jon M. Steele and submits its Reply Brief in support of Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
The Court is referred to Goodman's Brief in Response to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss and in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Issues of Liability (pp. 2-12) for the course of proceedings in the 
Goodman Mandamus Proceeding before Judge Morfitt and the facts leading to this 
litigation. 
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I. 
GOODMAN SEEKS SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THIS ISSUE OF 
DEFENDANT DURO-BILT'S LIABILITY FOR BREACH OF THE PROPERTY 
OWNERS VACATION AGREEMENT. 
a. Duro-Bilt Consented to the Vacation of First Avenue South. 
The Vacation Agreement executed by Duro-Bilt in 1995 contains Duro-Bilt's 
consent to the vacation of First Avenue South. Consent is a prerequisite to the vacation 
of any street. Idaho Code § 50-1321. 
The only Duo-Bilt consent provided to the Nampa Planning Director, to the 
Nampa City Council and to Judge Morfitt was the Vacation Agreement executed by 
Duro-Bilt in 1995. No one but Duro-Bilt believes consent is an issue in this case. 
The issue of Duro-Bilt's consent was administratively resolved by the Nampa 
Planning Director and has been judicially resolved by Judge Morfitt. 
b. Duro-Bilt Failed to Contest the Vacation Ordinance. 
The City of Nampa in the Goodman Mandamus Proceeding made the same exact 
argument; that is, Duro-Bilt did not consent to the vacation. See, Reporter's Transcript of 
July 15, 2005 before Judge Morfitt, pp. 19-42. Goodman delivered the original 
Reporter's Transcript to Judge Hoff on September 12,2006. 
In the Goodman Mandamus Proceeding Judge Morfitt addressed this issue by 
pointing out to the City that Idaho Code 8 50-1322 entitled, Appeal from Order Granting 
or Denying Application to Vacate, provides that any "aggrieved" person may appeal the 
grant or denial of an application for vacation. 
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However, the appeal must be made within 20 days after the fist  publication of the 
vacation ordinance. The City's vacation ordinance was published on September 5,2005. 
See, Notice of Compliance with Peremptory Writ of Mandamus, attached as Exhibit A. 
Duro-Bilt's consent was required for the vacation of First Avenue South. If Duro- 
Bilt objected its only remedy was to appeal within 20 days of September 5,2005. Duro- 
Bilt, despite being a party to the Goodman Mandamus Proceeding and despite receiving 
the Notice of Compliance with Peremptory Writ failed to appeal. Duro-Bilt's failure to 
appeal binds it to Judge Morfitt's resolution of this issue. Judge Morfitt's ruling was 
accompanied by an I.R.C.P. 54(b) certificate. Neither Duro-Bilt, McKnight nor the City 
of Nampa appealed his decision. 
c. Duro-Bilt is Estopped From Contesting its Consent and the Validity of the 
Vacation Agreement. 
Duro-Bilt's claims concerning its consent and the validity of the Vacation 
Agreement were resolved in the Goodman Mandamus Proceeding. Duro-Bilt is estopped 
from raising those issues, again, in this litigation. See, Goodman's Brief in Response to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss and in Support of 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Issues of Liability, pp. 15-18. 
As the Idaho Supreme Court stated in Lohman v. Flynn, 139 Idaho 312, 3 19-320, 
78 P.3d 379,386-387 (2003): 
Whether res judicata or collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of 
issues adjudicated in prior litigation between the same parties is a 
question of law upon which this Court exercises free review. 
Mastrangelo v. Sandshom, Znc., 137 Idaho 844, 846, 55 P.3d 298, 
300 (2002). There are five factors that must be considered in 
determining whether collateral estoppel will act as a bar: 
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1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier 
case; 2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the 
issue presented in the present action; 3) the issue sought to be 
precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; 4) there was 
a fmal judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and 5) the 
party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity 
with a party to the prior litigation. 
Western Indus. and Environmental Services, Inc. v. Kaldveer 
Associates, Inc., 126 Idaho 541, 544, 887 P.2d 1048, 1051 (1994). 
Res judicata is comprised of claim preclusion (true res judicata) 
and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). Under principles of 
claim preclusion, a valid final judgment rendered on the merits by 
a court of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent 
action between the same parties upon the same claim. The three 
fundamental purposes served by res judicata are: 
First, it "Epresewes] the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution 
against the corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same 
matter were twice litigated to inconsistent results." Second, it 
serves the public interest in protecting the courts against the 
burdens of repetitious litigation; and third, it advances the private 
interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims. 
The doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent 
relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent 
relitigation of any claims relating to the same cause of action 
which were actually made or which might have been made. 
Hindmarsh v. Mock 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002) 
(citations omitted). 
Goodman has been in litigation concerning the vacation ordinance for two and a 
half years. Duro-Bilt had the opportunity to contest its consent in the Goodman 
Mandamus Proceeding. It failed to do so. Despite Duro-Bilt's failure to contest the issue 
of consent, the City of Nampa contested the issue. The Goodman Mandamus Proceeding 
bars Duro-Bilt from raising the issue of consent to the Vacation Agreement. Goodman 
should not have to relitigate the same exact issues in this case. 
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11. 
DURO-BZLT BREACHED THE VACATION AGREEMENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW 
The Property Vacation Agreement is an enforceable contract. The Agreement did 
not lapse. The Agreement includes all necessary terms for its enforcement. The 
Agreement provided consideration. Neither is Duro-Bilt excused from performance. 
See, Goodman's Brief in Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Motion to Dismiss and in Support of Plaintips Motion for S m a r y  Judgment on Issues 
of Liability, pp. 14-22. 
The Vacation Agreement is an enforceable contract. That issue is resolved. See, I 
(a), (b) and (c) above. The breach of the Vacation Agreement as a result of Duro-Bilt's 
conduct is also established as a matter of law. Duro-Bilt's breach consists of the 
following: 
1. In July and August 2004, Duro-Bilt refused to cooperate and consent to the 
vacation procedure in breach of the Vacation Agreement covenants. 
2. Despite Duro-Bilt's refusal to consent and cooperate, Ordinance No. 3374 
vacating the street was passed and approved. 
3. Duro-Bilt (through McKnight) was the instigator of the illegal veto of 
Ordinance No. 3374. 
4. Duro-Bilt, to this day, contends it has not consented, still refuses to cooperate 
in the vacation of the street, and refuses to recognize the validity of the 
Vacation Agreement. 
Both parties agree that the Vacation Agreement is not ambiguous and that its 
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interpretation is a matter of law. 
The language of the Vacation Agreement is plain and clear. Duro-Bilt's various 
contentions are without merit. 
111. 
BOTH DEFENDANT DURO-BILT ANI) DEFENDANT MCKNIGHT 
INTERFERED WITH GOODMAN'S SALE TO WYLIE 
Goodman's action for interference with the GoodmadWylie Sale Agreement is a 
direct action against both Defendant Duro-Bilt (a corporation) and against Defendant 
McKnight (an individual). Goodman need not pierce the corporate veil to establish 
liability on behalf of Defendant Duro-Bilt or Defendant McKnight. See, Goodman's 
Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of Order Dismissing Bart & Alane 
McKnight Individually. 
It is ordinarily for the jury to determine whether the interference of the Defendant 
was justified. See, Idaho I" National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266, -, 
824 P.2d 841,859 (Idaho 1991) A note 15. 
However in this case, once the Court determines the validity and breach of the 
Vacation Agreement, as a matter of law Goodman is entitled to summary judgment on 
the issue of liability of both Defendants for their interference with the GoodmadWyIie 
Sale Agreement. Should the Court not agree with Goodman this issue is one for 
detennination by the jury. 
In regards to the Defendants defense, the only affiiative defenses raised in their 
Answer are estoppel, lack of consideration and waiver. See, Answer, p. 8, paras. 69, 70 
and 71. 
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Defendants fail to assert a defense of privilege or justification. This Court could 
interpret Duro-Bilt's contention that the Vacation Agreement is unenforceable as an 
afftrmative defense. But once the Vacation Agreement is found enforceable under any or 
all of the legal theories advanced above by Goodman, the Defendant's only affirmative 
defense fails. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
In August of 2004 a unique opportunity was presented to the City of Nampa and 
the property owners adjoining First Avenue South. An experienced developer was 
willing to invest his time, effort and capital into a development that would have 
enhanced the gateway to Nampa. Duro-Bilt and McKnight killed that opportunity. It 
may be years before that opportunity presents itself again. 
Duro-Bilt, although conkactually bound to cooperate and having already 
consented to the skeet vacation, broke its promises. The result is the one Defendants 
intended and had hoped to achieve. Defendants are directly responsible for torpedoing a 
development that would have enhanced the gateway to Nampa. 
Defendants now must bear responsibility for their ill conceived choices and 
conduct of August 2004. Defendant's motions should be summarily denied. 
Goodman is entitled to summary judgment on the issues of liability. The issue of 
damages will be addressed at kid. 
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tk DATED this )\O day of October, 2006. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
JON M. STEELE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
By: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this & day of October 2006, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing GOODMAN'S REPLY BRIEF was served upon opposing 
counsel as follows: 
Tammy Zokan 2 US Mail 
Moore Smith Buxton & Turke, Chtd. - Personal Delivery 
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520 x Facsimile 
Boise, ID 83702 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
~ttorneb for Plaintiff 
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Attorneys for Respondents. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICLAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY, 1 Case No.: CV 04-10007 
Petitioner, I 
Respondents. I 
VS. 
CITY OF NAMPA, a corporate body politic; 
THE CITY COUNCIL of the CITY OF 
NAMPA, MAYOR TOM DALE, in his 
capacity as Mayor of the City of Nampa; 
DIANA LAMBING, in her capacity as City 
Clerk; and SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT 
GENERATOR, INC., an Idaho corporation, 
-- - - -- 
COME NOW, the City of Nampa, the City Council of the City of Nampa, Mayor Tom 
NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE WITH 
PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
Dale, in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Nampa, and Diana Lambing, in her capacity as the 
[W,CP~'.TVFD x I 
NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE WITH 
- -- 
EXHIBIT 
City Clerk (hereinafter "Nampa Respondents"), by and through their attorneys of record, the law 
firm of White Peterson, P.A., pursuant to Court Order, and hereby file this Notice of Compliance 
with Peremptory Writ of Mandamus. 
On or about September 5, 2005, the Ordinance at issue in this case was published, 
pursuant to and in accord with Court order, by the City Respondents. Attached hereto as Exhibit 
"A" is a cbpy of the Affidavit of Publication. 
DATED this 22d day of September, 2005. 
NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE WITH PEREMPTORY 
,@WY4GANDAMUS Page 2 of 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
instrument was served upon the following by the method indicated: 
Jon M. Steele 
- Hand Delivered 
RUNFT & STEEL LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1020 W. Main St., Ste..#400 
"%ailed 
Boise, ID 83702 
7 axed 
-
208.343.3246 
Christopher E. Yorgason Hand Delivered 
MOORE, SMITH, BUXTON & TURCKE /Mailed 
225 N. 9" St., Ste. #420 L ~ e d  
Boise, ID 83702 208.331.1202 
Q DATED hi$!-?- ay of September, 2005. 
W\WoIXWWwwmpa CityiGoodmn Oil Co\Pkadin@\pld notlcc ofcampliancc-wilh writ of mandnmvs 09dZ-05 .d~~  
NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE WITH PEREMPTORY VWT-OF MANDAMUS 
OOOl.27 
Page 3 of 3 
..,qvt . v ~ ~  ruu 6 ,  I*M 1 TI'BSS-II'IVUUV 
, * 1 
d010M32 04524686 
1 Nampa, Cily Of 
Lcgd A m !  
224 11th Ave, So. 
Nampam 83651 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
1 SS. 
County of Canyon i 
Amanda K. Anderson 
of Nampa, Canyon County, Idaho, being 
fvst duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. That I am a citizen of the United States, 
and at all times hereinafter mentioned 
was over the age ofeighmn years, and 
not a patty to the above entitled action. 
. . 
2. That I am the Principal Clerk of the 
Idaho Press-Tribune, a dally newspaper 
published in the City of Nam a, in the 
County of Canyon, State of l!' daho; that 
the said newspaper is in general 
Circulation in the said County of 
Canyon, and in the vicinity of Nampa 
and Caldwell, and has been 
unintemxptcdty published in said 
County during a period of seventy-eight 
consecutive weeks prior to the f i ~ t  
publication of this notice, a copy of 
which is hereto attached 
3. That the notice, of which the annexd is 
a printed copy, was pubUshed in said 
newspaper 1 time(@ in the regular 
and entire issue of said paper, and was 
printed in the newspaper proper, and not 
in a suppltmenc 
4. That said notice was published the 
Fonowine: 
County of Canyon ) . 
the year of 
naUy appeared. 
known or identified to me to be the person 
whose name is subscribed lo the within 
OOdB%L48 - .  

